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THE MYTH OF THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: THE
COLLEGE ATHLETE AS EMPLOYEE
Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick*
Abstract: Grant-in-aid athletes in revenue-generating sports at Division I National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) institutions are not "student-athletes" as the NCAA
asserts, but are, instead, "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). To be
an employee under that Act, these athletes must meet both the common law test and a
statutory test applicable to university students. In applying the common law test to athletes,
we describe their daily lives through interviews with current and former Division I grant-inaid athletes. These interviews demonstrate that their daily burdens and obligations not only
meet the legal standard of employee, but far exceed the burdens and obligations of most
university employees. In addressing the statutory definition of the term employee, we
demonstrate that the relationship between these athletes and their universities is not primarily
academic, but is, instead, undeniably commercial. As employees under the NLRA, these
athletes are entitled "to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Consequently, they
will be able to acquire bargaining power through collective association and to negotiate their
terms and conditions of employment, including wages not arbitrarily limited to the level of
athletic scholarships.
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The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands... are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour
with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the
common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of
other Men.'
Every time I try and call it a business you say it's a game and
2
every time I say it should be a game you call it a business.
INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a voluntary

1. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press Student ed. 1988) (1690) (emphasis in original).
2. PETER GENT, NORTH DALLAS FORTY 276 (1973) (E.W. Meadows, the fictional defensive
tackle, injured and high on dexamyl spansules, violently confronting his defensive line coach after
his team's defeat).

Myth of the Student-Athlete
association of approximately 1,200 colleges and universities, 3 has among
its stated purposes promoting amateur athletics.4 Towards that end, the
first stated purpose in its Division I Manual is "[t]o initiate ... and
improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to
promote ... athletics participation as a recreational pursuit. ' 5 Despite
the prominence of this assertion, the NCAA has failed to realize this
ideal for athletes in the most commercially lucrative college sports.
For fifty years, the NCAA has used the term "student-athlete" to
describe the young men and women who are athletes at its member
schools.6 Of late, its insistence that college athletes be so characterized
has reached a fevered pitch. One need only consider the recent NCAA
men's basketball tournaments-the self-styled "March Madness"when for several years the NCAA's constant and insistent media
message has been that these young men and women are learning
important life lessons by engaging in intercollegiate athletics and are,
therefore, student-athletes, not mere athletes.7 The shrill urgency of the
3. See NCAA, What Is the NCAA?, http://www.ncaa.org/about/what is the ncaa.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2006); NCAA, 2004 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 18 (2004), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/membership-report/2004/2004_ncaa-membership-report.
pdf [hereinafter MEMBERSHIP REPORT]. Member colleges and universities establish NCAA policies
and rules at annual NCAA Conventions. See Christopher L. Chin, Comment, Illegal Procedures:
The NCAA 's Unlawful Restraint of the Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1993);
NCAA, 2004-O5 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 5.01.1 (2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/
library/membership/division i manual/2004-05/2004-05_dl-manual.pdf
[hereinafter Div.
I
MANUAL].

4. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 1.2(a), (c), (g). The NCAA has three separate divisions,
each with its own rules. Division I includes universities with the most aggressive athletic programs,
the largest athletic budgets, and the greatest revenues. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1216 n.25. For
football, Division I is divided into two groups, Divisions I-A and I-AA. Division II colleges have
less costly athletic programs. Division I and II universities consider an applicant's athletic ability
when deciding whether to offer aid. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1; NCAA, 2004-05
NCAA DIVISION 1IMANUAL art. 15.01.5 (2004). Division III schools, by contrast, place the least
emphasis on athletic programs, and, as a group, have elected not to grant scholarships on the basis
of athletic ability. See NCAA, 2004-05 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 15.01.3 (2004).
5. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 1.2(a).
6. See WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING
COLLEGE ATHLETES 69-70 (1995).

7. See NCAA Public Service Announcement (CBS television broadcast Mar. 2005) [hereinafter
NCAA PSA 2005]; NCAA Public Service Announcement (CBS television broadcast Mar. 2004)
[hereinafter NCAA PSA 2004]; NCAA Public Service Announcement (CBS television broadcast Mar.
2003) [hereinafter NCAA PSA 2003]. Typical of the NCAA advertising campaign is an ad with a
young man practicing the shot put while he describes his thoughts:
I have to focus, gather everything I've learned, all my successes, all my sacrifices, all my pain,
and concentrate that energy into one moment. That's a moment I'll use every single day of my
life. There are 360,000 NCAA student-athletes, and just about all of us will be "going pro" in
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NCAA's "student-athlete" media campaign evokes Queen Gertrude's
damning observation to Hamlet: "The lady doth protest too much,
methinks."8
Why, a half century after adopting this term, should the NCAA
unceasingly intone to millions of viewers that these young men and
women are "student-athletes"? The NCAA's purpose in this message is
to shore up a crumbling fagade, a myth in America, that these young
athletes in NCAA-member sports programs are properly characterized
only as "student-athletes." This characterization-that athletes at
NCAA-member schools are student-athletes-is essential to the NCAA
because it obscures the legal reality that some of these athletes, in fact,
are also employees. 9 By creating and fostering the myth that football and
men's basketball players at Division I universities are something other
than employees, the NCAA and its member institutions obtain the
astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits of the athletes' talents,
time, and energy-that is, their labor-while severely curtailing the
costs associated with such labor.' ° The advantages to these institutions
from fixing and suppressing labor costs in this manner have enabled
them to reap a fantastic surfeit of riches."
The NCAA's characterization of these athletes as student-athletes,
and not employees, lies at the core of another, broader, fallacy: that
something other than sports.
Id. Additional ads featuring a basketball player, a swimmer, and others, aired constantly throughout
the 2003, 2004, and 2005 three-week NCAA Division I men's basketball tournaments. See NCAA
PSA 2005, supra; NCAA PSA 2004, supra, NCAA PSA 2003, supra; see also NCAA, NCAA
Television and Print Campaign for 2005, available at http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/flashcontent/
sniffer.html [hereinafter NCAA, Public Service Campaign) (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
8. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.
9. As discussed below and for reasons described throughout this Article, our thesis is limited to
those athletes in Division I revenue-generating sports, that is, to football and men's basketball
players.
10. The real cost to the university-employer of extending a tuition waiver for an athlete is
substantially less than tuition. It is, instead, only the cost to the university of another seat in the
classroom. See Alfred D. Mathewson, The Eligibility Paradox, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 84
& n.5 (2000).
11. College sports is a multi-billion-dollar industry. See infra Part IlI.B.2.a. By way of one
example, CBS is paying the NCAA $6 billion for the right to broadcast the annual men's basketball
tournament, March Madness, over an eleven-year period, 2003 through 2013. See MEMBERSHIP
REPORT, supra note 3, at 22; Tim Martin, Cash Upfor Grabs: MSU Likely Will Receive at Least $2
Million from the Tourney Plus IncreasedDonations and Publicity, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 9, 2003,
available at http://www.greenandwhite.com/mens basketball/p_030309_ncaa_1-8a.html; Welch
Suggs, Big Money in College Sports Flows to the Few, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 29, 2004, at
A46.

Myth of the Student-Athlete
NCAA Division I football and men's basketball are, in fact, amateur. On
the contrary, these sports are not amateur except in the pernicious sense
that the "employee-athletes" 12 who produce the product receive no
market wage. In fact, these major
college sports have not been truly
3
1
ever.
if
years,
many
for
amateur
By virtue of this camouflage, the NCAA and its members are
permitted, like no other association of institutions or businesses in this
country, to employ one type of labor without paying a competitive wage
for it. 14 At least some of these athletes, however-specifically those who
receive athletic grants-in-aid in revenue-generating sports at Division I
NCAA institutions 15-are employees under the law, and their
relationship with the colleges and universities for which they labor is an
employer-employee relationship.
A broad array of participants in college sports harvests a wealth of
riches. Colleges and universities, of course, enjoy enormous revenues16
and other important indirect benefits from their athletics programs.
Corporations that sponsor and underwrite the athletic contests gain

12. We define the term "employee-athlete" to be those students in NCAA Division I schools in
revenue-generating sports who receive athletic grants-in-aid, i.e., compensation for athletic services.
We use that term rather than the NCAA-mandated term "student-athlete" to label these athletes
accurately and to highlight the persuasive effect of NCAA propaganda. See infra Part I.
13. As early as 1915, William Foster wrote:
Only childlike innocence or willful blindness need prevent American colleges from seeing that
the rules which aim to maintain athletics on what is called an 'amateur' basis, by forbidding
players to receive pay in money, are worse than useless because, while failing to prevent men
from playing for pay, they breed deceit and hypocrisy.
William T. Foster, An Indictment of Intercollegiate Athletics, 116 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 577, 579
(1915). Scholarships awarded solely on the basis of athletic ability were technically banned by the
NCAA only from 1948 through 1951. This ban, however, was never successfully enforced, and
athletic scholarships flourished both before and after that period. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 53-55,
67.
14. See ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE
EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA'S AMATEUR MYTH ix-x, xii-xiii, 4, 6-8 (1998); ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE

SPORTS 6 (1999) ("Big-time intercollegiate athletics is a unique industry. No other industry in the
United States manages not to pay its principal producers a wage or salary."); Kenneth L. Shropshire,

The Erosion of the NCAA Amateurism Model, ANTITRUST, Spring 2000, at 46.
15. Football and men's basketball at Division I institutions are the significant revenue-generating
sports. These are the sports that have become by far the most commercialized. See infra Part
IlI.B.2.a. "Men's basketball and football generate 97 percent of [Big Ten college athletics
revenues]." Lori Hayes, College Sports Need Big Business, Delany Says, LANSING ST. J., Jan. 24,

2003, at 3C.
16. See infra Part lII.B.2.a.
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unparalleled exposure for their products and services. 17 The NCAA
supports itself entirely by the revenues generated from the sports
activities of its member institutions. 18 Coaches are paid lavishly for
recruiting and training winning teams. 19 Media corporations like CBS
and ESPN generate huge advertising revenues by airing college athletic
events. 20 Even high school coaches have found illicit ways to profit from
the enterprise of college sports.21 College athletics has been estimated to
be a $60 billion industry. 2
Only one group of persons is denied the full financial fruit of the
bountiful enterprise known as college sports-the players themselves.
Ironically, these are the very individuals who create the product and its
attendant riches.23 In fact, it could fairly be said that these persons often
are the product.2 4 They labor in the demanding, and often brutal,25

17. High Nielsen ratings for athletic events are evidence of their popularity. Such ratings
guarantee corporate sponsors a large audience for their heavily advertised products. See, e.g., Bowl
Championship
Series, 2004-O5
Bowl
Game TV Ratings,
http://www.bcsfootball.org/
index.cfm?page---tvratings (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter BCS, TV Ratings] (providing
Nielsen ratings for various post-season college football bowl games); see also Martin, supra note 11
(describing the increasing popularity of revenue-generating college sports).
18. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23.
19. Annual compensation for top football coaches will soon exceed $3 million. See Dennis Dodd,
Notebook: Price Tags for Top Coaches Reaching Stratosphere, CBS SPORTSLtNE.COM, Jan. 25,
2005, http://www.sportsline.com/collegefootball/story/8133032/1; see also Mike Fish, Sign of the
Times: College Football Coaching Contracts Filled with Lucrative Incentives, SI.CoM, Dec. 23,
2003, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/writers/mike-fish/2/I9/coaching.contracts/index.html
[hereinafter Fish, Sign of the Times] (describing lucrative college football coaching contracts); Mike
Fish, Sweet Deals: More and More College Coaches are Making CEO Money, SI.cOM, June 2,
2003,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/news/2003/06/02/contracts/#kentucky
[hereinafter Fish, Sweet Deals] (describing lucrative college basketball coaching contracts).
20. Coca-Cola alone will pay CBS at least a half-billion dollars over the eleven-year period from
2003 through 2013 for the right to advertise its beverages during the NCAA men's basketball
tournament. Scott Graham, Call Me Mad, But NCAA Bandwagon is Running Out of Room for
Businesses, BALT. BUS. J., Mar. 26, 2004, available at http://baltimore.bizjoumals.com/baltimore/
stories/2004/03/29/editorial3.html.
21. Memphis-area high school football coach Lynn Lang recently pled guilty to racketeering
conspiracy after it was revealed that he accepted $150,000 from a University of Alabama booster to
convince his star player, Albert Means, to sign with the Crimson Tide. See Mark Schlabach,
Alabama Booster Convicted: Guilty Verdict Sets Precedent in Wake of $150K in Improper
Payments, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2005, at D1.
22. The News Hour: Dollars, Dunks and Diplomas (PBS television broadcast July 9, 2001),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-dec01/ncaa_07-09.html (discussing the
prospect of reforming college athletics).
23. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 3, at 1214 (characterizing student-athletes as "the main producer[s]
of revenues in intercollegiate athletics").
24. In 2001, the University of Oregon paid $250,000 to purchase a seven-story billboard in New

Myth of the Student-Athlete
college sports vineyard, sometimes risking life2 6 and limb, and are
York City's Times Square, featuring star quarterback Joey Harrington, to promote its football
program and Harrington's candidacy for the Heisman Trophy. See Jodi Wilgoren, Spiraling Sports
Budgets Draw Fire from Faculties, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2001, at 12; 60 Minutes: Here's Ours?
(CBS television broadcast Jan. 6, 2002), transcript at 14. The following year it paid $300,000 for a
similar ad, featuring football player Keenan Howry, at 47th and Broadway. See William C. Rhoden,
Oregon Likes the Visibility of Broadway, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Dl.
The athlete himself, as much as the games, has become the product. The "college
athlete.., becomes.., a promotional tool for the university." Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What
They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participationin Intercollegiate Athletics, 3
SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 27 (1996); see also JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT'S PERSPECTIVE 76, 152 (2000) (the media
have "repackaged athletic events, coaches, and players as entertainment products" and universities
have "willing[ly] ... oblige[d]"); Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: RestoringEducationalPrimacy
to College Basketball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595, 605 (2002) (noting that athletes and coaches
"are viewed as entertainment products"); Tim Wendel, Pay the Players, USA TODAY, Mar. 21,
2005, at 23A (noting that the "game is nothing without the players"). As the athlete becomes the
product, the college game looks more and more like a professional event adopting the trappings of
the professional leagues.
25. Participation in college football often impairs an athlete's long-term physical health. "They're
giving a big chunk of their life for this education. They're giving up a big chunk of their health." 60
Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 16 (statement of Leo Gerard, President, United Steelworkers of
America). From 1977 through 2004, thirty-one college football players received cervical cord
injuries, and from 1984 though 2004, ten received cerebral injuries from which they never
completely recovered. Nat'l Ctr. for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research, Data Tables, Annual
Survey of Catastrophic Football Injuries 1977-2004, http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/CataFootball
Data.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
In one stunning example, University of Miami tailback and Heisman Trophy finalist Willis
McGahee suffered a severe knee injury in the fourth quarter of the last football game in his college
career, the national championship Fiesta Bowl. See Kelly Whiteside, Status of Miami's McGahee
Uncertain After Surgery, USA Today, Jan. 6, 2003, at IC. In another graphic instance, San Jose
State University football player Neil Parry's lower right leg was amputated after a 1999 compound
fracture and twenty surgeries. See Mike Lopresti, Season to Have its High Points, Lansing St. J.,
Aug. 23, 2002, at Cl.
26. In 2001, Eraste Autin, an 18-year-old freshman at the University of Florida, collapsed during
a pre-season workout and died after lying comatose for a week. See Jamal Thalji, Six Schools Will
Start Playing it Cool, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Pasco Times ed.), Apr. 13, 2004, at 4; 60 Minutes,
supra note 24, transcript at 17. Northwestern University player Rashidi Wheeler died in August
2001 during a preseason conditioning workout. See Skip Myslenski, FootballPlayer Dies at NU:
Wheeler, 22, Collapses During ConditioningTest, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 2001, at 1.
From 1931 through 2004, eighty-six college football players died from direct injuries sustained
from playing or practicing football and another 102 died from indirect injuries. Nat'l Ctr. for
Catastrophic Sport Injury Research, Data Tables, Annual Survey of Football Injury Research: 19312004, http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/FootballlnjuryData.htm#TABLE%201 (last visited Feb. 5,
2006); see also Nat'l Ctr. for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research, Glossary of Injury Terms,
http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/lnjuryTerms.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (defining direct injuries
as those resulting directly from participation in the skills of the sport and indirect ones as those
caused by systemic failure resulting from exertion or by a complication secondary to a non-fatal
injury).
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entitled, as a matter of right and law, to a just portion of the fruits of
their toil. Indeed, in that the athletes alone do not profit from this
fabulously rich enterprise, their status plainly carries vestiges of
servitude where men labor for enterprises that conspire, under sanction
of law, to limit their wages.
Emblematic of the regime under which these employee-athletes
currently labor, the college and university employers have also agreed
among themselves to require these particular employees to spend their
artificially limited wages only at the "company store" 27-the institutions
themselves.2 8 By this last arrangement, then, these athletes, unlike any
other working people, are not free to spend their limited wages where
they choose, but must spend them on college tuition, books, and other
institutionally related expenses, regardless of their real needs or those of
their families. 29 Indeed, many full-scholarship athletes live below the
27. The "company store," vividly recalled in Tennessee Ernie Ford's ballad, "Sixteen Tons," was
an infamous part of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American labor history. See TENNESSEE
ERNIE FORD, Sixteen Tons, on 16 TONS OF BOOGIE: THE BEST OF TENNESSEE ERNIE FORD (Rhino
Records 1990) (1955). It was usually part of a "company town"--a "feudal domain," FOSTER R.
DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 172 (3d ed. 1966)-where employees were required as a
condition of employment to live in company-owned housing and to purchase company-provided
goods and services at grossly inflated prices. See THOMAS R. BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 92-93 (1964); DULLES, supra. A classic form of exploitation, the
company store was often "[b]ound up with.., the scrip or truck system: payment of wages in the
form of scrip or draft redeemable only at the company outlets." GEORGE S. McGOVERN &
LEONARD F. GUTrRIDGE, THE GREAT COALFIELD WAR 23 (1972).
28. No Division I rule explicitly requires players to use their limited compensation to purchase
goods and services from their educational employers, but the requirement that compensation be
provided only in the form of "financial aid" to offset the player's educational and living expenses
effectively mandates this result. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.02.4.
29. A common reason basketball and football players offer for leaving college before their
eligibility expires, and instead attempting to play professionally, is the desire to support themselves
and their families. See Malcolm Moran, League, Colleges Fret as Players Go Pro Early:
Multimillion-dollar Deals, Peer PressureLure Youths, USA TODAY, May 17, 2001, at IA; Matt
Myftiu, Money Draws Athletes Away from Degree, ST. NEWS (Mich. St. Univ.), Dec. 8, 1999,
available at http://www.statenews.com/editions/120899/pl-sport.html (noting that many players'
families desperately need money, a significant consideration for players debating whether to turn
professional early).
Although athletes are not compensated in a form that permits them to support their families, they
are commonly thought to receive a valuable degree or education in exchange for their athletic
services. A variety of factors, however-including the admission of athletes who are academically
unprepared to do college-level work, the coach's plenary authority not to renew annual scholarships,
inadequate progress requirements under NCAA rules, and the unending demands on the athlete's
time and energy-frequently combine to prevent many athletes from having any real chance of
completing their degrees. See infra Parts IlI.A.I-2, ill.B.2.b.(l), (7). The abundance of
educationally empty curricula for athletes, even at otherwise elite institutions, often renders
worthless the education received by those athletes who do graduate. See infra Part lll.B.2.b.(4).

Myth of the Student-Athlete
poverty line.3 °
Our thesis is straightforward: grant-in-aid athletes in revenuegenerating sports at Division I NCAA schools are "employee-athletes,"
not merely "student-athletes." 3' Under the foundational pillar of U.S.
32
labor policy-the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) the relationship between scholarship athletes and their colleges and
universities can no longer be fairly characterized as anything other than
an employment relationship in which the athletes serve as employees
and the institutions for which they labor as their employers. By this basic
measure, 33 the relationship between these athletes and their institutions is
plainly one of employer and employee.
We understand that legal recognition of some of these young men as
"employees" would carry profound implications for the NCAA, its
member schools, and the future of major college sports.34 College

30. For example, in the year 2000, full-scholarship athletes at UCLA received $7,380, nearly
$1,000 less than the $8,350 designated by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services as the
poverty line for a single person household for that year. Collegiate Athletes Coal., Living Below the
Poverty Line.... http://www.cacnow.org/living.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). For a scholarship
athlete at UCLA, financial aid leaves the athlete approximately "$2,250 short of what is [sic]
actually costs to live as an undergraduate student at UCLA." Id.; see also 60 Minutes, supra note 24,
transcript at 15 (former football player Ramogi Huma asserting that "the vast majority [of players]
live under the poverty line"); id., transcript at 16 (discussing the NCAA concession "that a
scholarship falls $2,000 a year short of what it really costs to get by").
It is commonly believed that college athletes need not be treated as employees and paid a
competitive market wage because soon enough they will be wealthy professional athletes, and
therefore their economic injury is merely one of compensation delayed, not denied. In reality, the
vast majority of college athletes do not become professional athletes. Only 2% of NCAA football
players and 1.3% of men's basketball players join professional leagues. NCAA, Estimated
Probability of Competing in Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic Level,
http://www.ncaa.org/research/prob-of-competing/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter NCAA,
Estimated Probability]. Some will never become professionals because of injuries sustained in
college.
31. Our thesis extends only to football and men's basketball scholarship athletes at Division I
institutions because only their relationships with their universities can be said to be plainly
commercial and not primarily academic-a necessary showing under the law. See infra Parts II.B,
11.B. Athletes in the non-revenue-generating sports and those at Division II and III institutions have
relationships with their universities that are characterized less by commercial incentives.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000); see also infra Part 1I.
33. The NLRA standard for "employee" has two components-a common law test and a special
statutory standard for students in the university setting. See infra Part II.A-B.
34. As employees, these athletes may be entitled to the panoply of rights accorded employees
under the many federal and state laws that govern the employment relationship. For example,
"employees" have the right to earn a minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219, the right to a safe workplace under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),
id. §§ 651-678, and the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and
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football and basketball, however, will not perish as a result of an
insistence upon justice for the people who produce these great sources of
pleasure and profit. The importance of these sports in America is too
great. They provide fantastic entertainment and constitute a source of
36
35
interest, pride, identity, and deep loyalty for millions of Americans,
ourselves included.
While some outcomes of this revolution cannot be fully known, many
can. Among other things, these employee-athletes would earn a
negotiated wage, like other employees.3 7 They would also be entitled to
national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15. Indeed, "[tihe United States Department of Labor, alone, is charged with administering
some 180 federal statutes governing the employment relationship." ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (13th ed. 2001). Many state laws also regulate the employment
relationship. See infra note 66. Determining the applicability of legislation such as Title VII, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), OSHA, and state workers' compensation statutes would require an analysis of each federal,
state, and local statute that grants benefits based upon status as an "employee" and is beyond the
scope of this Article. At the same time, however, many employment statutes are modeled upon the
NLRA. Accordingly, the proper recognition of the status of employee-athletes under the NLRA
would likely eventually alter their status under other legal regimes as well.
Acceptance of our thesis would also have important practical implications. For example, given
the dependence of all other collegiate sports upon the revenue generated by football and men's
basketball, how would these other sports be funded? How would universities comply with other
laws, such as Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000), requiring equal treatment of women's
sports? The practical reverberations of our thesis are many, and plainly beyond the scope of this
Article. It seems fair to say, however, that most involve a reslicing of the rich pie of college
athletics.
35. It has been observed that sport "is infused with themes consistent with the American Dream."
HOWARD L. NIXON, II & JAMES H. FREY, A SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 41 (1996). Among these values
are "competition, individualism, [and] achievement." D. STANLEY EITZEN & GEORGE H. SAGE,
SOCIOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICAN SPORT 13 (5th ed. 1993).

36. Total attendance at NCAA football and men's basketball games in 2003-04 exceeded 76.9
million. NCAA, OFFICIAL 2005 NCAA MEN'S BASKETBALL RECORDS 262 (2004), available at

http://www.ncaa.org/library/records/m-basketballrecords-book/2005/2005-m basketball-records.
pdf [hereinafter BASKETBALL RECORDS] (showing that total attendance in 2004 for NCAA
basketball games was 30,760,510); NCAA, 2003 NCAA COLLEGE FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE 2,

http://www.ncaa.org/stats/football/attendance/2003/2003footballattendance.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2006) [hereinafter FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE] (reporting 46,144,539 total football attendees in 2003).

Of these, 25,548,468 individuals attended Division I men's basketball games, BASKETBALL
RECORDS, supra, and 35,085,646 attended Division I-A football games. FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE,
supra, at 1.
37. Currently, under the aegis of the NCAA, colleges and universities violate U.S. antitrust law
by agreeing to limit the maximum compensation these employee-athletes may earn to the level of
"tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, [and necessary] transportation." Div. I
MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.7, .02.2; see Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College
Students be Paidto Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 206 (1990); Chad W. Pekron, The Professional
Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation
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form themselves into unions to bargain collectively with their employers
through representatives of their own choosing, and their right to strike
would be federally protected.38 And while the challenges of reforming
college sports to meet the commands of the law would necessarily be
great, they are by no means insurmountable. In fact, wisely applying the
law and properly characterizing the labor that produces this uniquely
American product would place college athletics upon a more just,
Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24 (2000); Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 802, 817-18 (1981); Nelson 0. Fitts, Note, A Critique of Noncommercial Justificationsfor
Sherman Act Violations, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 478 (1999) (arguing that the purported noncommercial nature of nonprofit institutions should not render them exempt from antitrust laws);
Note, Tackling IntercollegiateAthletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 659-60 (1978);
Robert D. Tollison, Understandingthe Antitrust Economics of Sports Leagues, ANTITRUST, Spring
2000, at 21, 22-24; Murray Sperber, In Praise of 'Student-Athletes': The NCAA Is Haunted by Its
Past, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1999, at A76. NCAA Division I members engage in classic,
illegal price-fixing by agreeing among themselves to limit the wages of employee-athletes. See DIV.
I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.1-2, .7, 15.02.2, .5. Ultimately, it is through this naked pricefixing arrangement that colleges and universities have conspired to suppress the wages of their
employee-athletes and thereby to maximize the financial fruits of college sports for themselves.
Technically, establishing players as "employees" would not be required to prevail in a pricefixing antitrust claim against the NCAA and its member institutions. Such employee-athletes have
antitrust standing because they suffer antitrust injury, not because they are employees. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has explained, the antitrust injury requirement "ensures that the harm claimed by the
plaintiff," in this case, price-fixing, "corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the
antitrust laws in the first place," that is, "if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or
effect of the defendant's behavior." Atil. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342-44
(1990) (emphasis in original). Naturally, the NCAA's limitation of compensation to tuition, room,
board, and books reduces competition among universities in the market for player services.
Nevertheless, a showing that athletes are employees under the law would be useful to convince a
reluctant public and judiciary that the compensation paid to these young men ought to be a marketbased wage, not an artificial one limited to the cost of tuition, room, board, and books. See Div. I
MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.7, 15.02.2, .5 (limiting compensation to that level of support
needed for tuition, fees, room, board, transportation, and required course-related books and
supplies).
This Article does not seek to establish antitrust violations, but rather to demonstrate that so-called
student-athletes are actually employees of their universities and colleges and, therefore, are entitled
to the benefits that this legal characterization affords.
38. It should be noted that the ability of employee-athletes to form a union may well provide a
perfect opportunity for the NCAA, its member schools, and the union representing the employeeathletes to regulate the "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d), of the employee-athletes in a collective bargaining agreement. By so doing, the NCAA
and an athlete union could shelter otherwise anticompetitive practices through the non-statutory
labor exemption to the antitrust laws, as do all major professional sports leagues in the United States
and the player associations representing their employees. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S.
231, 235-36 (1996); Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2004); Wood v.
Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959-61 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600
F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611-12 (8th
Cir. 1976).
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honest, and ultimately sane path than the one it is currently taking.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of the "student-athlete"
concept as an unabashed mechanism for the NCAA to avoid an
employment relationship between its members and their athletes. Part II
describes the legal standards for "employee" under the NLRA, setting
forth two legal tests required for that status. First, Part I.A identifies the
common law test for "employee" while Part II.B identifies the NLRA's
special statutory test for "employee" as it applies to students in the
university setting. Part III applies these tests to employee-athletes.
Part III.A applies the common law test to college athletes. First, Part
III.A.1 recounts the pervasive control exercised by universities over
athletes' daily lives to demonstrate the control element of the common
law test. Second, Part III.A.2 analyzes the athletic grant-in-aid to
demonstrate that the compensation element of the common law test is
satisfied and to further reveal the employer's control over these athletes.
Finally, Part III.A.3 addresses the last element of the common law test,
showing athletes' economic dependence upon their universityemployers.
Part III.B then applies the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB
or the Board) statutory test for "employee" to college athletes. Part
III.B. 1 illustrates that the four criteria announced by the NLRB in Brown
University4 ° (Brown) strongly support the classification of these athletes
as "employees." Finally, as required by Brown, Part III.B.2 establishes
that the relationship between the university and these athletes is not
primarily academic but is deeply commercial and that, as a consequence,
a fair-minded judiciary can no longer deny these athletes their employee
status.

39. See Rick Telander, Something Must Be Done, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 2, 1989, at 94, 94,
reprinted from RICK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE
FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT (1989).

The criminal behavior of the players, the rampant pursuit of money, the tunnel vision of the
coaches, the complacency of the fans, the sliminess of the boosters, the sanctimonious
platitudes of the NCAA pooh-bahs, the exploitation of the players, the desire to expand the
season and to televise everything, the brutality on the field .... the lack of anything remotely
resembling an ethical anchor holding big-time football programs and their patrons to the
ground.... And the ugliest part was that these sins were being committed in a world-our
universities-that Americans have always assumed to be a realm of virtue and idealism.
Id.
40. 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 2004 WL 1588744 (July 13, 2004).
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I.

THE NCAA CREATED THE TERM "STUDENT-ATHLETE"
TO DENY ATHLETES EMPLOYEE STATUS

The NCAA's fevered insistence on the use of the term "studentathlete" begs the question: what led it to adopt this term in the first
place? The history of the NCAA's extraordinary and continuing effort to
mask the true nature of the university-athlete relationship bears exquisite
witness to its purpose in inventing the term "student-athlete. ' 4 1 From the
beginning, more than a half-century ago, the NCAA utilized the term
"student-athlete" to cloak the actual relationship between the parties.42
Indeed, the term itself was born of the NCAA's swift and alarmed
reaction to a judicial determination in 1953 that, consistent with our
thesis, certain college athletes were employees and entitled to statutory
benefits under state law.
In 1953, in University of Denver v. Nemeth,43 the Colorado Supreme
Court upheld a determination by the state Industrial Commission that
Ernest Nemeth, a football player at the University of Denver, was an
"employee" within the meaning of the Colorado workers' compensation
statute.44 Thus, the university was obligated to provide workers'
compensation for his football injuries.4 5 Stunned by the Nemeth decision,
41. This Part of the Article explains how two workers' compensation cases, both holding football
players to be "employees," motivated the NCAA a half-century ago to undertake their ongoing,
vigorous public-relations campaign to convince the judiciary and the community at large otherwise.
We recount these cases only to demonstrate the NCAA's motive in adopting the term "studentathlete," not as support for our thesis that such athletes are "employees" under the NLRA. Indeed,
most recent workers' compensation cases hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Rensing v. Ind. State Univ.,
444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (holding that college athletes are not employees under state
workers' compensation laws and, therefore, are not entitled to workers' compensation for
athletically related injuries); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983) (same).
42. As such, the use of the term "student-athlete" is classic propaganda, defined as "doctrines,
ideas, arguments, facts, or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of
communication in order to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1817 (3d ed. 1986).

For a thorough chronicle of the genesis of the term "student-athlete," see BYERS, supra note 6, at
69-76; MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY: THE CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS
445-57 (1998); Sperber, supranote 37, at A76.
43. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).

44. See id. at 429-30.
45. Also apropos to our thesis here, more than a half-century ago the Colorado Supreme Court
noted that
[h]igher education in this day is a business, and a big one. The University of Denver with its
ten thousand students has, as the record discloses, hundreds of jobs for students and nonstudents. A student employed by the University to discharge certain duties, not a part of his
education program, is no different than the employee who is taking no course of instruction so
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the NCAA responded by coining the term "student-athlete" and
requiring its exclusive use thereafter.46 By emphasizing the identity of
athletes as "students," the NCAA endeavored to diminish any tendency
to characterize them as "employees., 47 As then-NCAA Executive
Director Walter Byers later wrote:
[The] threat was the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes
could be identified as employees by state industrial commissions
and the courts.
[To address that threat, w]e crafted the term student-athlete,
and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations
as a mandated substitute for such words as players and athletes.
We told college publicists to speak of "college teams," not
football or basketball "clubs," a word common to the pros.4 8
The NCAA adopted and mandated the term "student-athlete" purposely
to buttress the notion that such individuals should be considered students
rather than employees.
At the same time, however, universities were widely endorsing full
athletic grants-in-aid to recruit the best athletes, formally sanctioning
such grants in 1956.49 Allowing full scholarships as compensation for
athletic services, however, could reveal the employer-employee-like
nature of the university-athlete relationship at a time when doing so
would more likely expose these universities to liability for workers'
compensation. 50 Given this trend, it became even more important for the
NCAA to obscure the actual nature of the relationship, and thereafter it
far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned.
Id. at 425-26.
46. BYERS, supra note 6, at 69-76, 371-72; SPERBER, supra note 42, at 445-46.
47. See Tom Farrey, Pay-for-Play: Not Yet, But Soon?, ESPN.coM, Mar. 28, 2003,
http://espn.go.com/neb/ncaatoumeyOl/s/2001/0326/1162258.html
(quoting Professor Andrew
Zimbalist's assertion that if athletes were treated as employees, athletic department costs would
increase by some $2 million annually for such items as extra insurance, taxes, and workers'
compensation); accord Allen L. Sack & Ellen J. Staurowsky, A Rejoinder to Timothy Davis,
Intercollegiate Athletics in the Next Millennium: A Frameworkfor Evaluating Proposals, 9 Marq.
Sports L.J. 253, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 117, 117-18 (1999) (suggesting that the historical record
demonstrates that the NCAA fashioned and maintained the illusion of amateurism to avoid taxation,
antitrust scrutiny, workers' compensation laws, and player demands for a share in revenues).
48. BYERS, supranote 6, at 69 (emphasis in original); see Farrey, supra note 47.
49. See BYERS, supranote 6, at 10, 72.
50. See id. at 69 ("It was [when more and more colleges offered full athletic grants-inaid] ... that they came face to face with a serious, external threat that prompted most of the colleges
to unite and insist with one voice that, grant-in-aid or not, college sports still were only for
'amateurs.'").
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embarked on its long, fervent public relations campaign to persuade the
public that these athletes are students, not employees. 5'
In 1963, a California workers' compensation case again heightened
NCAA concerns that courts might view athletes as employees.52 Edward
Gary Van Horn, an athletic grant-in-aid football player at California
State Polytechnic College, was killed in a 1960 plane crash while
returning home with his team from a game. The California Industrial
Accident Commission subsequently ruled that Van Horn had not been an
employee of the college, and so his widow and minor dependent children
were ineligible for death benefits under the state's workers'
compensation law.53 In Van Horn v. IndustrialAccident Commission,54
however, the California Court of Appeals reversed, stating that "[t]he
only inference to be drawn from the evidence is that decedent received
the 'scholarship' because of his athletic prowess and participation. The
form of remuneration is immaterial., 5 s The case established that a
college football player could have a contract of employment with a
university in which a scholarship served as compensation for athletic
services.56
Coincidentally, this case emerged during a period when NCAA
universities were moving away from four-year guaranteed athletic
scholarships and towards one-year scholarships, renewable at the
coach's option.5 7 And, given the likely inference that such one-year,
renewable scholarships constituted pay for services, the NCAA member
institutions were "deeply concerned" about the Van Horn case.58 Instead
of eliminating athletic scholarships altogether or requiring full, four-year
scholarships, however, the NCAA responded by encouraging its
members to use the following language in their athletic grant-in-aid
forms:
"This award is made in accordance with the provisions of the
51. See Farrey, supra note 47.
52. See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)
(finding a contract of employment between a football player and a state college).
53. See id. at 172.
54. 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
55. Id. at 174.
56. See id. at 172-74.
57. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 75. The initial grant-in-aid commonly guaranteed the athlete four
full years of scholarship, regardless of whether he was successful as a player or even whether he
remained with the team. See infra Part III.A.2.
58. BYERS, supra note 6, at 75.
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Constitution of the [NCAA] pertaining to the principles of
amateurism, sound academic standards, and financial aid to
student athletes.... Your acceptance of the award means
that
' 59
you agree with these principles and are bound by them.
Setting aside the irony that athletes would receive compensation only by
renouncing the commercial, pecuniary nature of their relationship with
their universities, this insistence on characterizing athletes as amateurs
was again used to mask the reality of the NCAA members' activitiesemploying players to provide athletic services in exchange for
compensation.
The NCAA purposely created the term "student-athlete" as
propaganda, solely to obscure the reality of the university-athlete
employment relationship and to avoid universities' legal responsibilities
as employers.6 ° In the ensuing fifty years, the NCAA, colleges, and
universities have profited immensely from the vigorous defense and
preservation of this myth.
II.

A COMMON LAW AND A STATUTORY TEST ESTABLISH
THE "EMPLOYEE" STATUS OF STUDENTS

Our thesis is that Division I athletic grant-in-aid students in revenuegenerating sports are employees under both the NLRA-the
foundational labor relations statute in the United States-and under
numerous applicable state laws. The characterization of an individual as
an employee under the law, as distinct from some other status, is
essential in drawing necessary delineations throughout American
industry. Such a characterization confers many rights upon that person

59. Id. (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Robert L. Ray, NCAA
President, and Everett D. Barnes, NCAA Secretary-Treasurer, to NCAA membership (Dec. 21,

1964)).
60. See id.; see also Telander, supra note 39, at 107 (noting generally the NCAA's role "as a
public relations outlet"); Farrey, supra note 47; cf Telander, supra note 39, at 94 (noting the
"absurdity of the 'student-athlete' notion" and that amateurism is "the rottenest block in the
foundation of big-time college football"). Former University of Alabama head football coach Paul
"Bear" Bryant laid bare the "student-athlete" myth:
I used to go along with the idea that football players on scholarship were "student-athletes,"
which is what the NCAA calls them. Meaning a student first, an athlete second. We were
kidding ourselves, trying to make it more palatable to the academicians. We don't have to say
that and we shouldn't. At the level we play, the boy is really an athlete first and a student
second.
DONALD CHU, THE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT

190(1989).
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under federal and state law. 6 1 And because the question of whether an
individual is an employee has been elemental in the development of
American labor law, 62 ample guideposts have evolved by which to assess
whether the scholarship athletes in revenue-generating NCAA programs
are employees.
For seventy years the NLRA has served as the cornerstone of U.S.
labor policy. It provides the best template for distinguishing between
labor and capital and for determining the circumstances under which a
person should be characterized as an employee. The Act's purpose is to
regulate the inherent conflict between capital and labor in America.6 3 For
this reason, drawing appropriate lines between those two adversaries was
an early and essential task under the statute. 64
Given the primacy of the NLRA in defining the employment relation
under federal law, 65 any analysis of the status of college athletes as
61. See supra note 34 for a description of some employee rights under federal law. Under
numerous state laws, employee status confers similar rights. For example, Michigan's Elliott-Larsen
Civil Rights Act protects employees in Michigan from discrimination on the basis of "religion, race,
color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status." MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 37.2102 (2001); see generally id. §§ 37.2101-2804.
62. See infra Part lI.A (discussing the development of the common law test for "employee" in the
context of differentiating employees from independent contractors).
63. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (providing findings and policies in the preamble to the
NLRA).
64. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKtN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 37-38 (2d ed. 2004) (describing courts' early efforts

to distinguish between employees under the Act and other persons). Compare Field Packing Co., 48
N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1943) (demonstrating the Board's early adoption of the common law test for
employee), with NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1944) (illustrating the
Supreme Court's acceptance of additional considerations, including the economic realities of the
employer-employee relationship).
65. For example, "Section 7 rights to form and join labor organizations and to engage in
collective bargaining and concerted activities are given to statutorily defined 'employees."'
GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 32. The meaning of the term "employee" has also recently
arisen under another federal employment statute, the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. In EEOC v.
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit concluded that partners at a law firm could be "employees," rather than
employers, within the meaning of the ADEA. If a partner's role in running the firm were minimal
and if a small coterie of managing partners exercised an overwhelming degree of control over him,
he could potentially be deemed an "employee" under the ADEA. See id. at 707.
The U.S. Supreme Court faced a similar problem when it considered the meaning of "employee"
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-25 (1992). There, the Court wrote:
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished .... Since the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or
magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer,... all of the incidents of the relationship
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employees requires an examination of that legislation's view of the term
"employee." While the NLRA governs only private enterprises and thus
would not apply directly to public universities, it remains the starting,
and usually ending, point for this inquiry. This is because the various
state statutes governing the employment relationship among public
employers and employees 66 are modeled after the NLRA and usually
draw their meanings from the interpretations given the NLRA by the
NLRB6 7 and the federal courts.6 8 Therefore, an analysis of the NLRA
must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive."
Id. at 323-24 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) and NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,
258 (1968)).
66. Some thirty-two states have public employment relations statutes which grant employees
rights to organize and bargain collectively and which could be applied to employee-athletes. See,
e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3512-3524 (West 1995 & Supp. 2005) (State Employer-Employee
Relations); id. §§ 3560-3596 (West 1995 & Supp. 2005) (Higher Education Employer-Employee
Relations); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1-315/27 (West 2005) (Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act); MICH.COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-217 (West 2001) (Public Employment Relations Act);
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (Consol. 1999 & Supp. 2005) (Public Employees' Fair
Employment Act); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-24 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005) (Public
Employees' Collective Bargaining); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.101-.2301 (West 1999 & Supp.
2005) (Public Employe [sic] Relations); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.010-950 (2004 & Supp.
2005) (Public Employees' Collective Bargaining); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-97 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2004) (State Employees' Bargaining Rights).
67. Congress created the NLRB in 1935 to prevent the commission of unfair labor practices, 29
U.S.C. § 160(a), and to resolve questions concerning the representation of employees, see id. § 159.
See also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 9.
68. See DONALD H. WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 25 (4th
ed. 1993) ("Nearly all state public employee labor relations statutes contain declarations of
organizational rights, and prohibitions against interference and discrimination, though there is some
variation in language. The similarity in language between these public sector statutory provisions
and... the National Labor Relations Act has led to extensive reliance upon federal precedents.");
Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1680 (1984) ("Many
statutes draw heavily on the NLRA in their definitions .. ")."Virtually all of the public sector
collective bargaining statutes set forth the rights of public employees. This statutory statement
frequently parallels the statement of the rights of employees in §7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended." HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
CASES AND MATERIALS 139 (4th ed. 1991); see also Goolsby v. City of Detroit, 358 N.W.2d 856,
861 n.5 (Mich. 1984) (basing construction of state labor statutes on NLRB and federal court
interpretations of analogous NLRA provisions). Other state courts also commonly look to federal
interpretations of the NLRA in construing their state public employment relations statutes. See, e.g.,
United Faculty of Fla. v. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 898 So. 2d 96, 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (quoting Pasco County Sch. Bd. v. Fla. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So. 2d
108, 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)); State Employment Relations Bd. v. Miami Univ., 643 N.E.2d
1113, 1116 (Ohio 1994); Portland Ass'n of Teachers v. Multnomah Sch. Dist. No. 1, 16 P.3d 1189,
1200 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 620 A.2d 594, 598 n.9
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
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sheds light not only upon the employee status of athletes at private70
universities, 69 but also upon their status at public institutions as well.
Parts II.A and II.B of this Article identify the two tests for "employee"
that must be met under the NLRA, a common law test and a special
statutory test for university students seeking coverage under the Act.
A.

The Standardfor "Employee" Under the NLRA Is Based upon Its
Common Law Meaning

In the NLRA, Congress identified labor as a discrete category,
separate and distinct from its partner and adversary, capital. 7 The Act
conferred federal rights upon labor, which it described as "employees"
and granted only to employees "the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection., 72 Because the NLRA gave organizing and collective
bargaining rights only to employees, the question of whether a particular
person was or was not an employee was plainly of central importance in
administering the statute.
Unhelpfully, the Act defines both "employer ' 73 and "employee ' 74 by
69. These universities include: Boston College; Brigham Young; Duke; Georgetown; Miami
(Florida); Northwestern; Notre Dame; Rice; Southern California; Stanford; Syracuse; Tulane;
Vanderbilt; Villanova; Wake Forest; and others. As regards these private universities, of course, our
analysis would apply directly.
70. In fact, state laws governing public employment often broaden the coverages and protections
of the federal law, expanding the range of individuals considered to be "employees." For example,
unlike under the NLRA, supervisors employed by public institutions have organizing and collective
bargaining rights under Michigan's Public Employee Relations Act (PERA). See MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §423.201(1)(e) (West 2001) (defining "[p]ublic employee" broadly to include
supervisors). More to the point, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), the
agency that administers PERA, and Michigan courts interpret PERA to permit graduate students at
public universities to organize and bargain collectively. See Macomb Cmty. Coll., 1988 M.E.R.C.
Lab. Op. 741, 743-44. In Macomb Community College, MERC adhered to the Michigan Supreme
Court's opinion in Regents of University of Michigan v. Michigan Employment Relations
Commission, 204 N.W.2d 218, 226 (Mich. 1973).
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL
1588744, at *8 (July 13, 2004) (describing how the Act was premised on the view of a fundamental
conflict between employers and employees). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (citing the inequality of
bargaining power between employees and employers and the denial by some employers of the right
of employees to organize as sources of depressed wage rates and industrial strife).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
73. "The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly .....Id. § 152(2).
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reference only to the very terms being defined, distinguishing employer
only from employee and vice versa. Because the statutory language itself
fails to distinguish the salient characteristics of either employer or
employee from other classes of entities or persons, the judiciary and the
NLRB have been guided primarily by common law principles in
determining the meaning of the term "employee. 7 5
The debate over the meaning of "employee" first crystallized in the
form of the question as to whether certain persons were employees, and,
therefore, imbued with organizing rights under the law, or independent
contractors, and, therefore, without such rights.76 While the original Act
did not expressly exclude independent contractors, the Board
nevertheless commonly found such persons were not "employees.",77 To
distinguish between the two categories, the Board adopted the common
law approach for defining employee, the so-called "right of control"
test. 78 Under this standard, the most important factor distinguishing
employees from independent contractors was the degree of control the
alleged employer maintained over the working life of the alleged
employee. 79 Thus, the Board found an employer-employee relationship
where the employer's control or right of control included "both the end

74. "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer .... but shall not include any individual ... having the status of an

independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor .. ."Id. § 152(3).
75. E.g., Klement Timber Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 681, 683 (1944); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64,
at 38.
76. While no argument exists that athletes are independent contractors, the reasoning of the
NLRB and the courts in distinguishing independent contractors from employees gives residual
meaning to the term "employee." Many precedents addressing the meaning of"employee" under the
NLRA focus on distinguishing employees from others who are also paid for their work, but are not
covered by the Act, such as independent contractors. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 3740. This Article examines that distinction to identify the residual meaning of "employee" and then
assesses the applicability of that meaning to athletes who are paid for their work in a non-traditional
manner, that is, through scholarships. As such, two sets of precedents inform our analysis: those that
distinguish employees from groups such as independent contractors, see Part II.A (discussing the
common law test), and others that determine whether an individual paid in a non-traditional manner,
such as a trainee, a student, or an apprentice is properly characterized as an "employee," see infra
Part II.B
(discussing the statutory test).
77. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38.
78. See Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1943) (holding that truck drivers were
employees and, therefore, not independent contractors because the employer had not fully divested
itself of the right to control drivers' work); GORMAN & FINKIN, supranote 64, at 38.
79. See Klement Timber, 59 N.L.R.B. at 683; Butler Bros., 41 N.L.R.B. 843, 855 (1942); Seattle
Post-Intelligencer Dep't of Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1275 (1938); 2 THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw 2131 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 200 1).
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80
result and the manner of achieving it."
In its 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act, Congress expressly
excluded independent contractors from the definition of employee 81 and
emphatically endorsed the common law right of control test as the
proper measure of statutory coverage.82 This right of control test
examines the degree to which the employer controls the daily lives of its
putative employees, including the manner in which they carry out their
work.83 The Board and the courts have since repeatedly referred to the
right of control as the basic measure for determining whether individuals
are "employees" under the Act.84 As the NLRB has underscored,
"[u]nder the common law, an employee is a person who performs
to the other's
services for another under a contract of hire, subject
85
payment.
for
return
in
and
control,
of
control or right
Over time, the Board's reasoning has occasionally been influenced by

80. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38; see Nat'l Freight, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46
(1964). The right of control test was derived from the common law doctrine of respondeat superior,
which determines whether a master might be liable for the torts of his servant. See Carnation Co.,
172 N.L.R.B. 1882, 1888 (1968); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38. Under this measure, a
person who performs a particular task by his own methods, not subject to the control of the alleged
employer, is an independent contractor, while a person who is subject to the control of the
employer, not only as to the ends to be accomplished, but also as to the methods and means of
performing the work, is an employee. See id.
81. "The term 'employee' . . . shall not include any individual ...having the status of an

independent contractor... "29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
82. See GORMAN & F1NKIN, supra note 64, at 38-39.
83. See, e.g., NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1948) (stating that
"the employer-employee relationship exists when the person for whom the work is done has the
right
to control and direct the work, not only as to the result accomplished by the work, but also as
to the details and means by which that result is accomplished"); Teamsters Nat'l Auto. Transp.
Indus. Negotiating Comm., 335 N.L.R.B. 830, 832 (2001) ("[T]he contracting employer must have
the power to give the employees the work in question-the so-called 'right of control' test.")
(footnote omitted); Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe
Fitting Indus., 177 N.L.R.B. 189, 190 (1969) (describing the "right to control" test as "the most
readily available analytical tool"); United Ins. Co. of Am., 162 N.L.R.B. 439, 455-56 (1966) ("[A]n
employer-employee relationship has been found where the person for whom the work is to be
done.., retains control over, or the right to control, the significant portions of the details and means
by which the desired result is to be accomplished."). In an analogous case testing the reach of the
term "employee" under the ADEA, Judge Richard Posner wrote that "the most important factor in
deciding whether a worker was an employee ... was the employer's right to control the worker's
work." EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Ost v. W.
Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435, 438 (7th Cir. 1996)).
84. See cases cited supra note 83.
85. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *11 n.27 (July
13, 2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:71, 2006

consideration of the "economic realities" of the relationship, that is, the
degree to which putative employees are economically dependent upon
an employer. 86 Thus, since Taft-Hartley, the Board and courts have
sometimes used a blended approach, measuring the degree of control an
alleged employer may exercise over an alleged employee alongside a
consideration of the alleged employee's economic dependence upon the
employer. 87 While the right-of-control standard remains the primary
measure for differentiating employees from non-employees, 88 we will
demonstrate that under either approach-the right of control standard or
one also influenced by economic realities-athletic grant-in-aid students
are employees under the NLRA.
B.

In Brown University the NLRB Reestablished a Statutory Testfor
Students Seeking Status as Employees

Because university students who receive academic scholarships and
perform services as teaching or research assistants appear to satisfy the
common law test for "employee," the question has arisen whether they
are such under the NLRA. To analyze this question, the Board has
developed an additional statutory test for this setting.8 9 Under this test,
86. See A. Paladini, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 952, 952 (1967) (applying right-of-control test "in light of
the economic realities"); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 30 (1976).

87. See, e.g., Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 130, slip op. at 10-11, 2004
WL 2203013, at *17-20 (Sept. 28, 2004) (finding that cab drivers were not employees due to their
high degree of independence from the fleet owners); Comedy Store, 265 N.L.R.B. 1422, 1441-42
(1982) (considering the "economic realities" of comedic performers' relationships with a comedy
club and stating that the economic realities of the relationship, alone, cannot be dispositive of the
question of employee status); Drukker Commc'ns, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 734, 744 (1981) (noting that
the right-of-control "test is not mechanically applied, and is applied in the light of the economic
realities of the situation"). A recent example of the use of the blended approach has arisen in EEOC
v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002). At issue in that case was whether law
firm partners were "employees" and, therefore, protected under the ADEA. See id. at 705, 706-07
(citing Ost, 88 F.3d at 438, for the proposition that right-of-control is the most important factor in
assessing employee status under the ADEA but also acknowledging the existence of the economicrealities test and enforcing an EEOC subpoena seeking related economic information about the
concentration and distribution of profits among law firm partners).
88. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 40 (implying that the touchstone for NLRA
coverage is the right of control, not economic dependence).
89. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7 (July 13,
2004) (stating that "attempting to force the student-university relationship into the traditional
employer-employee framework" is problematic and that "principles developed for use in the
industrial setting cannot be 'imposed blindly on the academic world') (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva
Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1980)).
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students are deemed employees only if they satisfy both the common
law right of control test and the Board's additional statutory test.90
For many years, graduate assistants at American colleges and
universities have sought to organize and bargain collectively, arguing
that they are "employees" under the Act. And, just as the NCAA seeks
to characterize grant-in-aid athletes as something other than
employees, 91 so, too, universities have sought to classify graduate
assistants as something other than employees. During this period, a body
of analogous doctrine, culminating in Brown, has addressed whether
students who receive compensation from universities for services while
also enrolled as students are employees under the NLRA.
In its 1974 Leland Stanford Junior University92 decision, the Board
directly addressed whether graduate research assistants were
"employees" within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Act and held they were
"primarily students" and, therefore, not employees. 93 In support of this
conclusion, the Board looked to four criteria: the persons in question
were graduate students enrolled in the Stanford physics department as
Ph.D. candidates; they were required to perform research to obtain their
degree; they received academic credit for their research work; and their
stipend from the university was94 not dependent upon the nature or value
of the services they performed.
During this same period, the Board analyzed student-like
relationships in the health-care industry and reached decisions parallel to
that in Stanford. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center95 and St. Clare's
Hospital,96 the Board considered whether medical students who were
interns, residents, and clinical fellows, collectively known as house staff,
were employees under the Act.97 Drawing on Stanford,98 the St. Clare 's
Hospital Board found that medical interns who "perform services at their
educational institutions which are directly related to their educational

90. See Brown, slip op. at 9, 2004 WL 1588744, at *12 (stating that the statutory test is required
and that "[t]he issue is not to be decided purely on the basis of older common-law concepts").
91. See supra Part I (describing the origin of the term "student-athlete").
92. 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
93. See id. at 621, 623.
94. See id. at 621-22.
95. 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
96. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
97. Id. at 1002; Cedars-Sinai,223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
98. St. Clare's, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002 nn.19-20.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:71, 2006

program," 99 are "serving primarily as students and not primarily as
employees" 100 within the meaning of the Act. As an equally compelling
factor, the Board found that "the mutual interests of the students and the
educational institution in the services being rendered are predominantly
academic rather than economic in nature."' 01
By the late 1990s, however, the Board's view of graduate assistants
and house staff had changed dramatically. In its 1999 decision in Boston
Medical Center,10 2 the Board overruled Cedars-Sinaiand St. Clare's and
term employee,
found house staff to fall within the meaning of the
10 3
students.
as
status
simultaneous
their
notwithstanding
The following year, the Board followed suit in New York University
(NYU), 10 4 finding non-medical graduate students to be employees and,
therefore, within the Act's reach. 105 Like the hospital in Boston Medical,
the university contended that as "students," these persons were not
"employees" and, therefore, were outside the reach and protections of
the Act. 10 6 The Board flatly disagreed with the university's contention
and, consistent with its ruling in Boston Medical, held graduate
assistants to be employees under the Act. 10 7 In NYU, the Board wrote
that the term "employee" "reflects the common law agency doctrine of
the conventional master-servant relationship,"' 1 8 and that "[t]his
relationship exists when a servant performs services for another, under
10 9
the other's control or right of control, and in return for payment."'
Noting "graduate assistants perform services under the control and
direction of the Employer"' 10 and "are compensated for these services by
the Employer,""' the Board found their relationship with the employer

99. Id. at 1002.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).

103. See id. at 159, 161.
104. 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).

105. See id. at 1205.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id. (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 93-95 (1995)).

109. Id. at 1206 (citing Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 90-91, 93-95); see Seattle Opera Ass'n,
331 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1073 (2000) (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1999)); Boston
Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999).
110. NYU, 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206.
111. Id.
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"indistinguishable from a traditional master-servant relationship,"' 12 and,
therefore, they were employees under the Act. 13
The status of graduate assistants at universities as "employees" under
NYU, however, was short-lived. In July 2004, the Board issued its most
recent decision on the matter in Brown, explicitly overruling NYU. 14 In
Brown, as in NYU, the issue was whether teaching assistants, research
assistants, and proctors were "employees" under the NLRA." 5 In
concluding that they were not, the Board analyzed facts fitting into four
specific categories:
Thus, in light of [(1)] the status of graduate student assistants
as students, [(2)] the role of graduate student assistantships in
graduate education, [(3)] the graduate student assistants'
relationship with the faculty, and [(4)] the financial support they
receive to attend Brown, we conclude that the overall
relationship between the graduate student assistants and Brown
6
is primarily an educational one, rather than an economic one."
The Brown Board thus returned to Stanford, which had held graduate
research assistants were not statutory employees because they
"perform[ed] services at a university in connection with their studies,
[and

had] ...a

predominantly

academic,

rather

than

economic,

relationship with their school." ' 1 7 The Board in Brown grounded its
decision on precisely that same footing, that "graduate student
assistants... are primarily students and have a primarily
educational,
8
not economic, relationship with their university.'
Brown is thus grounded on two core principles: students who work
for their universities are not employees, first, if their work is primarily
educational and, second, if their relationship with the university is not an
economic one. When these two conditions characterize the studentuniversity relationship, that is, when the students' efforts are
predominantly academic and not economic, then those individuals are
not employees within the meaning of the Act. Conversely, when a
student who works for his university performs services that are not
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 1, 2004 WL 1588744, at *1 (July 13,
2004).
115. See id.
116. Id., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10.

117. Id., slip op. at 1, 2004 WL 1588744, at *1 (describing Stanford).
118. Id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:71, 2006

primarily educational or academic and his relationship to the university
with respect to those services is an economic one, then the student may
be an employee under the Act, provided that he also meets the common
law test for that term.119
III.

UNDER THE NLRA'S LEGAL STANDARDS, CERTAIN
UNIVERSITY ATHLETES ARE EMPLOYEES

While primarily serving the purpose of higher education, American
colleges and universities also act as employers with respect to hundreds
of thousands of faculty and staff, including many students who are
enrolled in classes and simultaneously perform certain services for their
universities. 20 Indeed, at many state universities, even graduate
assistants who teach and perform services as part of their academic
programs are recognized as employees under the laws in those states. 21
There being no dispute that universities are employers, the only question
is whether the relationship between the universities and their athletic
grant-in-aid students is an employment relation in which the athletes are
employees.

119. Significantly, the Brown Board did not overrule NYU's use of the common law test for
"employee" as applicable under the NLRA. See id., slip op. at 1, 2004 WL 1588744, at *1
(returning to pre-NYU precedent that included the common law test); id., slip op. at 9, 2004 WL
1588744, at *12 (declining to abandon the common law test by indicating that common law
concepts could be considered in part); id., slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at * II n.27 (finding
that the common law test is still relevant, and noting Member Peter Schaumber's separate analysis
that graduate student assistants fail to be employees under that common law test). Because the
Brown majority found that graduate assistants were not employees by virtue of failing the NLRA's
statutory definition of employee, and not because they failed the common law test, see id., slip op.
at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *11 n.27 (noting that Member Schaumber believed graduate
assistants had failed the common law test and declining to state that any other member of the Board
was in agreement with him), Brown does not eliminate that common law standard.
The applicability of the common law test to employee-athletes is addressed in Part III.A.
120. For example, students who work for an hourly wage in the library, the bookstore, and
administrative offices, would unquestionably be considered employees of their universities.
121. See Brown, slip op. at 17 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *25 n.27 (Liebman & Walsh,
dissenting). Graduate assistants at public universities in the following states have organized under
state laws granting bargaining rights: California; Florida; Iowa; Kansas; Massachusetts; Michigan;
New Jersey; New York; Oregon; Pennsylvania; and Wisconsin. See Daniel J. Julius & Patricia J.
Gumport, GraduateStudent Unionization: Catalysts and Consequences, 26 REV. OF HIGHER EDUC.
187, 192-93 tbl. 1 (2002) ("The Status of Graduate Student Unions in U.S. Institutions").
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A.

Certain College Athletes Meet the Common Law Standardfor
"Employee"

Grant-in-aid athletes in revenue-generating sports at NCAA Division
I institutions are employees under the common law. They perform
services for the benefit of their universities under an agreement setting
forth their responsibilities and compensation, are economically
dependent upon their universities, and are subject virtually every day of
the year to pervasive control by the athletic department and coaches. Put
somewhat differently, employee-athletes perform services for their
universities under a contract of hire which subjects them to the
universities' control and in return for payment. Thus, employee-athletes
meet the common law definition of employee. Having described the
common law standard by which to assess our thesis, we next examine
the actual degree of control exercised by university-employers over
employee-athletes, 122 the compensation paid them, and the economic
realities of the lives of those employee-athletes.
1.

Right of Control: The Daily Lives of Employee-Athletes
Demonstrate that They Are Controlledby the University

Employee-athletes are subject to an extraordinary degree of control
by their universities. Indeed, employee-athletes are subject to more
control by their universities than is any other employee or group of
employees at their institutions. 123 Part III.A. 1 of this Article describes a
composite view of the daily life of the football and men's basketball
employee-athlete at different universities and illustrates graphically the
pervasive and virtually constant control university-employers exercise
over employee-athletes. We gathered this evidence through interviews
with four current and former grant-in-aid athletes from three different
NCAA Division I and Division I-A universities. 12 4 All play or played in
122. It is the reality of the athlete's relationship to his university that governs his legal status as an
employee or otherwise. In language beautifully apropos to our thesis, Judge Posner has written that

the resolution of the question of whether law firm partners were, in fact, employees turned on the
actual circumstances of the relationship and not upon "the tyranny of labels." EEOC v. Sidley

Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002). So, here, whether athletes are properly
deemed employees depends not upon their label as "student-athletes," but rather upon the reality of
their lives, especially the degree of control exercised over them.
123. What other university employee is subject to such control by his supervisor that he must lift

weights at 5:30 a.m., run in the summer sun, and seek permission to leave campus during
summertime off hours, or risk termination? See Part III.A. 1-2.
124. We conducted lengthy interviews with these athletes. All information regarding athletes'
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revenue-generating sports, that is, football and men's basketball, at their
institutions. Given the vital economic importance of a full grant-in-aid to
the players, the precariousness of that financial aid, 2 5 the importance of
the player-coach relationship to the continuance of that aid as well as to
the players' development, and, hence, to their financial potential, we
offered all interviewees anonymity. All accepted it.
a.

FootballPlayers' Daily Lives Illustrate the Great Control
Universities Exercise over Those Players

The actual life of the athlete contrasts dramatically with the image
portrayed in the NCAA's rules and media messages. Drawing upon data
from personal interviews, this Section chronicles the daily existence of
Division I-A football players throughout the football season, the
remaining academic year, and the summer. The extent to which coaches
exercise control over players supports the conclusion that these athletes
are employees under the NLRA's common law test.
(1)

Coaches Exercise Inordinate Control over the Football
Athlete During the Season

The regular football season begins on the Thursday preceding Labor
Day and ends on the second Saturday or Sunday in December, lasting

experiences in Part III.A.1 arises from these interviews. Interviews were conducted by Robert A.
McCormick and Amy Christian McCormick with four anonymous athletes on September 7, 2003
(football player), September 25, 2003 (former basketball player), October 15, 2003 (former football
player), and November 10, 2003 (former basketball player). Through these interviews, we provide
qualitative data regarding the daily lives of employee-athletes to illustrate university control and do
not here purport to provide a quantitative analysis.
Finding athletes to interview was challenging because, as we discovered, many fear reprisals
from their coaches. We scheduled interviews with other athletes as well, but those arrangements
were unilaterally cancelled by the players and were not rescheduled. Cf BYERS, supra note 6, at 14
(describing athletes' similar reluctance to talk to NCAA investigators about activities taking place at
their colleges because of intimidation by coaches). Athletes are commonly instructed not to give
interviews to members of the media, and that interviews may be approved only by the university's
sports-information department. See Ted Gup, Losses Surpass Victories, by Far,in Big- Time College
Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 18, 1998, at A52. With regard to whether the experiences of
these four athletes are representative of life for all Division I football and men's basketball players,
published information confirms much of what the interviews revealed and is noted where
applicable. Moreover, the information provided by each athlete was independently corroborated by
the descriptions of the others. That is, although minor details varied, the stories were uniform and
consistent.
125. See infra notes 183-88, 192-93 and accompanying text (discussing the conditions under
which athletes can lose their scholarships).
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more than fourteen weeks, but as many as nineteen weeks if the team
plays in a January bowl game. 2 6 During this period, a conservative
estimate of a player's time commitment to football during the week of a
home game is approximately fifty-three hours. 127 Daily afternoon
126. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 17.11.3-4.
127. This computation assumes that players report to the training facility at 1:00 p.m. from
Monday through Friday where they practice until 5:30 p.m.; that they lift weights twice a week for
ninety minutes; that mandatory training table dinners last an hour each evening, Monday through
Thursday; that on Friday before the game, they stay together from 5:30 p.m. until bedtime at
approximately 10:00 p.m.; that on game day they are controlled from 8:00 a.m. until approximately
7:00 p.m. when the game ends; and that on Sunday, their time is directed from 10:00 a.m. until 2:00
p.m. and again from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. A player who is "red-shirted," however, must lift
weights at least three times each week, not twice. Under "red-shirting" rules, a player practices with
and is retained on the team, but does not play. By this device, the university may extend players'
servitude with an apprenticeship because, under NCAA rules, a red-shirt year does not count
towards the player's four years of playing eligibility. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.2.1
(explaining the five-year rule). By the end of a Saturday football game, when the players may
finally leave, they will have spent nearly thirty consecutive hours under the direction and control of
their coaches.
Evaluating the Pac-10 football programs, noted sociologist Professor Harry Edwards found that
football players spent an average of forty hours per week, year round, meeting all the obligations for
their athletic scholarships. See RICHARD E. LAPCHICK & JOHN B. SLAUGHTER, THE RULES OF THE

GAME: ETHICS IN COLLEGE SPORT 116 (1989) (detailing Professor Edwards' findings); Chin, supra
note 3, at 1247 n.274; accord Ted Gup, Foul!, TIME, Apr. 3, 1989, at 54, 55 (asserting that athletes
commonly practice as many as thirty hours per week). The total time commitment amounted to
approximately eighty hours a week during away-game weeks. See LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra,
at 116; Lynch, supra note 24, at 602, 604 (estimating athletic commitments of from forty to sixty
hours per week).
The following discussion about players' time commitment was part of a recent 60 Minutes
episode:
Stahl: No money, but between the workouts, practices, games and travel, being a big-time
athlete amounts to a full-time job and more.
Huma: The NCAA official rulebook reads that a student athlete isn't supposed to put in more
than 20 hours of mandatory service a week.
Stahl: If they say it's 20 hours a week, what is it really?
Huma: Anywhere between 30 and 60 hours. I think it can get that high.
60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 17 (Lesley Stahl interviewing Ramogi Huma, former UCLA
linebacker). John Square, a football player at the University of Miami, started his Tuesdays with a
7:00 a.m. defensive line meeting, after which he lifted weights for an hour, attended classes until a
2:00 p.m. team meeting, practiced from 3:20 p.m. until 5:30 p.m., gulped down dinner, and went to
class from 6:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. See Joe Drape, A Full Ride Can Have Its Bumps: Scholarships
Often Leave Athletes Lookingfor More Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at Dl.
The above description of the daily experience of football players during the season mirrors
published accounts of off-season life. Dominick Brown, a former Michigan State University and
Northern Iowa University football player described his typical day: "Every day it's football when
you get up at 6 in the morning till 9 at night." Geoff Kimmerly, Winston Could See Much Playing
Time Early in his Career:Coaches Impressed by Recruit'sAbility Beyond Linebacker,LANSING ST.
J., Feb. 23, 2004, at 6C. Michigan State University football player Brian Davies reported
"conditioning is at 5:30 a.m., throughout the whole winter. After that, we have to go to class, finish
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practice is one significant component of this time commitment. Arriving
late for practice is not permitted and may result in sanctions as moderate
as additional running, weightlifting, or other exercises, to those as severe
as demotion to a lower string. 28 For repeat offenders, outright dismissal
from the team and withdrawal of the grant-in-aid can and does result.
One consequence of daily required practice is that football players are
foreclosed from taking afternoon classes, although they are
simultaneously required by NCAA rules and by their universities to
carry full academic loads) 29 The highly regimented nature of practice
and training schedules and the excessive number of hours required of
athletes are important elements showing the extreme control coaches
exercise over athletes as to both the ends sought and the means of
achieving them. The athletes are controlled to such a degree that they are
commonly foreclosed from certain classes and majors. 3 '
The fifty-three hours required each week for football, of course, is in
addition to class time, study time, and ten hours per week of mandatory
study hall time in academic-support facilities. Thus, although the
primary job of the players is to win football games, even studying has
become part of their jobs as universities and the NCAA seek to deflect
criticism over low graduation rates.' 31 And the university-employers
all of our homework, . . and you might be running on five hours of sleep per night." Adrienne
LaFrance, Davies Invests in His, Football Program'sFuture: Senior Defensive Tackle Brian Davies
Reflects on the Opportunitiesfor Success that Emerge from Change, on the Field and off, at
Michigan State and Beyond, SPARTANS ONLINE, July 7, 2004, http://msuspartans.collegesports.com/
sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/070704aaa.html. Jeremy Bloom described the experience of football
players at the University of Colorado:
We football players get up at dawn, do an hour of wind sprints, go to classes, spend two hours
in the weight room, devote a couple of hours to seven-on-seven drills, study for school, and try
to have something of a social life. And this is our off-season-the hours only increase after the
games start.
Jeremy Bloom, Op-Ed., Show Us the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A21.
128. Interviews reveal that while such disciplinary measures are common, they are not uniformly
applied. Favored players are regularly given special dispensation.
129. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 24, at 23A (noting that athletes are advised not to take classes
that conflict with practice time); AM 870 SportsTalk with Earle Robinson (WKAR public radio
broadcast Sept. 29, 2003) (university professor calling in and reporting that an athlete requested
permission to miss half of his scheduled classes and that his coach had suggested he change his
major because classes conflicted with practice). NCAA rules state: "To be eligible for competition,
a student-athlete shall be enrolled in at least a minimum full-time program of studies leading to a
baccalaureate or equivalent degree as defined by the institution, which shall not be less than 12
semester or quarter hours." Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.1.8.2.
130. See infra notes 326-28 and accompanying text.
131. See infra Part III.B.2.b.(7) (describing progress requirements), Part IIl.B.2.b.(8) (describing
the Academic Performance Program).
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exercise control over the location, duration, and manner in which the
employee-athletes carry out even these academic commitments.
The time required of players is even greater during away-game
weeks. Their schedule depends upon how far away the opposing team is
located, and thus upon the mode of transportation used for travel. On a
typical Friday preceding an away game, players must report to the
stadium by noon where the team assembles and is transported to the
airport. Upon arrival at the destination, the athletes are transported to a
hotel where the team checks in, holds team meetings, and eats dinner
together. On game day, usually Saturday, they are controlled from 8:00
a.m. until the game ends. After the game, the team travels home
together, and the following day, Sunday, their time is directed from
10:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. and from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.
NCAA rules require players to take twelve credit hours-a full
academic load-each term,' 32 and some universities require their players
to take a minimum of fifteen credit hours to bolster flagging graduation
rates. Players are required to attend class and sometimes even to sit as
near the front of the classroom as possible. Athletic department student
tutors police these rules and monitor the athletes to ensure their
compliance. Thus, virtually every aspect of the athletes' lives on campus
is regulated by their university-employers.
(2)

Coaches' Control over Players' Lives Extends to the Rest of
the Academic Year as Well

Even during the off-season, football players are under the regular
direction and control of their coaches. In early spring, for six weeks prior
to the NCAA-sanctioned spring training season, 133 football players
undergo a rigorous conditioning period. Three conditioning workouts are
required each week, beginning promptly at 5:30 a.m. Players often arise
at 4:30 a.m. to be punctual because, as one player put it, "you can't be
late." These one- to two-hour workouts often include running, agility
drills, and vigorous cardiovascular conditioning. Furthermore, on three
or four additional days per week during this period, players must also
report for weightlifting for at least sixty to ninety minutes each session.
In addition, players must attend team meetings for forty-five minutes
132. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.1.8.2.
133. See id. art. 17.11.6(b) (describing sanctioned spring practice period); Interview with
anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003) (describing early spring practice period); Interview
with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003) (same).
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each day, Monday through Friday. Freshmen and those having academic
difficulty continue to have mandatory study hall. During this period,
when classes are also considered, players' lives are essentially regulated
from 5:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., four days per week.
Once spring practice ensues, the regimented nature of the players'
schedules continues, but is accompanied by an even more demanding set
of workouts. Like regular-season practice, spring practice involves
physically draining and strenuous full-contact drills. In April, the
grueling nature of practice escalates as the team undergoes fifteen days
of full-contact practices which culminate in the spring intra-squad game.
This spring practice period, like the period immediately preceding the
season, consumes virtually all of the players' waking hours.
(3)

During the Summer Term, Coaches Continue to Control the
Lives of FootballAthletes

Even in the summer, players are controlled by their universityemployers. They are required to remain on campus during the week,
Monday through Friday. Indeed, if a player wishes to leave campus
during the week, he must obtain advance permission from a coach. The
coach grants permission, it was reported, only if he deems the proffered
reason for leaving significant. On summer weekends, players who can
arrange transportation are allowed to leave campus and visit their homes.
During summer months, players are "strongly encouraged" to be
present for weightlifting sessions from 6:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. every
weekday. On four of those days, the players must also run in the
afternoon for two to two and one-half hours each day. 134 Running takes
place in the summer heat, humidity, and sun, not in an air-conditioned
facility. Players are also encouraged to take summer classes, but may not
do so during the second summer session because those classes conflict
with official practices, which begin in the first week of August.
(4)

Coaches' ControlIntensifies During Summer Pre-Season
Practice

Pre-season "camp" opens in early August and begins the annual cycle
again. 135 During this most intensive training period, players are
134. "[T]o be a good player, you should spend most of your summer working out, not working [at
a job]." Telander, supra note 39, at 97.
135, Under NCAA bylaws, pre-season football practice may begin as early as thirty-five days
prior to the first scheduled game. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 17.02.11, 17.11.2.1.
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effectively "on duty" from 6:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. six days a week.
They must participate in three arduous full-contact practices every two
days. The physical regimen during this pre-season period is legendary.
Designed to harden the players for the rigors of the upcoming season,
this boot-camp-like experience includes weightlifting, running,
meetings, and group meals and is universally considered to be
exhausting and brutal.
From the commencement of pre-season practice, attendance at all
practices and other scheduled events is mandatory and recorded.
Moreover, players are required to sign a statement each week describing
the number of hours they practiced. These statements, prepared by team
personnel, are maintained to comply with NCAA rules limiting total
often falsely understate the amount of time the players
practice time and
136
actually spend.

(5)

Other Information Also Demonstrates Universities'Extensive
Control over FootballPlayers

In years in which the team does not attend a post-season bowl game,
demands are placed upon these athletes for approximately 240 days. 137 If
a team plays a bowl game, this increases to as many as 262 days.
136. Under NCAA rules, records documenting the amount of time each athlete engages in
required athletically related activities must be maintained. Id. art. 17.1.5.3.4. Athletes must receive
one day off per week during the regular playing season. Id. art. 17.1.5.4. NCAA rules require them
to spend no more than four hours per day and twenty hours per week engaging in required
athletically related activities, id. art. 17.1.5.1, but certain meetings and so-called "voluntary"
workouts, at which coaches may be present, are not counted in these limits. See id. arts. 17.02.1, .13.
Athletes uniformly commented that so-called "voluntary" workouts are, in reality, required. See
infra note 325 and accompanying text.
NCAA hours limitations similarly do not count as days used to travel to an athletic event. DIV. I
MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 17.1.5.4. Moreover, the university may treat travel days as a "day off"
provided the athletic contest occurs the day preceding or following the day of travel. Id. art.
17.1.5.4.1. Therefore, the time an athlete must actually commit to his sport is significantly greater
than the NCAA limits suggest.
137. A published account describes the Ohio State University football calendar. The football year
commences in the second week of January and does not end until December or the following
January. The training schedule begins in January with eight weeks of weight-lifting, four days a
week. Spring football practice begins in mid-March and lasts for six weeks. After a week off,
players continue their conditioning regimen throughout the summer. Athletes' conditioning peaks
by mid-August when pre-season practice begins. Thereafter, the fourteen-week season begins.
Welch Suggs, How Gears Turn at a Sports Factory: Running Ohio State's $79-Million Athletics
Program Is a Major Endeavor, with Huge Payoffs and Costs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 29,
2002, at A32. According to one football athlete we interviewed, his athletic obligations span 330
days each year.
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Notably, this time commitment approximates or exceeds the 250 days an
average American works each year.
Coaches place tremendous pressure on the players throughout the
year, and many transfer or quit before exhausting their eligibility. If a
player falls into disfavor with the coaching staff, he may be "recruited
over," that is, replaced by a newer player.1 38 Coaches often encourage
players who have been recruited over to quit the team or to transfer. By
this, the coach may terminate a player by refusing to renew his
scholarship, reserving it instead for another player.139 If a player
40
transfers, he loses one of his four years of NCAA eligibility.1
Moreover, if a new player transfers without permission from his
university after having signed a National Letter of Intent, he loses two of
his four years of eligibility. 4 This regime often induces players who are
"recruited over" to give up and withdraw from school altogether. 142 In
138. For a published account of football player Sammy Maldonado being recruited over at Ohio
State University, see Ryan Hockensmith, Extra Credit, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=l 919255. See also infra note 142.
139. See infra Part III.A.2 and sources cited therein. NCAA rules limit the number of
scholarships available in a given sport. Each scholarship, thus, is a valuable resource to the
university. The number of scholarships available at any given time for a Division I-A football
program is eighty-five. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.02.3, 15.02.3.1, 15.5.5.1.
140. Div. I MANUAL, supranote 3, arts. 14.5.1, 14.5.5.1 (requiring an athlete to complete one full
academic year of residency at the new institution before becoming eligible to compete); id. art.
14.2.1; NCAA, 2004-05 TRANSFER GUIDE: DIVISION 1/lI/Ill 25 (2004) [hereinafter NCAA,
TRANSFER GUIDE] (indicating that once an athlete begins competing, the five-year clock for using
four eligibility years does not pause). These two sets of rules function together to cause the
transferring athlete to lose one of his four years of eligibility completely. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra
note 3, art. 14.2.
141. See Collegiate Comm'rs Ass'n, Text of the National Letter of Intent, paras. 4-5,
http://www.national-letter.org/guidelines/nlijtext.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (charging an athlete
who transfers before completing one year with a year of eligibility at his subsequent institution,
which is in addition to the year lost under NCAA rules); see also NCAA, TRANSFER GUIDE, supra
note 140, at 7; Chin, supra note 3, at 1239; Collegiate Comm'rs Ass'n, Administrative Guidelines &
Interpretations for the National Letter of Intent, http://www.national-letter.org/documents/
AdminGuide.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006); Collegiate Comm'rs Ass'n, National Letter of Intent
Penalty Provisions & Appeals Process, http://www.national-letter.org/documents/Appeals
Process.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006); Collegiate Comm'rs Ass'n, Release Request Form,
http://www.national-letter.org/documents/ReleaseRequest.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
142. One player told the following story. He was recruited from a California junior college to a
Midwestern university. He started for the team immediately and was very successful, earning
conference player-of-the-week honors. At the conclusion of the season, the university fired his
coach. During the following spring practice, it became apparent that his new coach wanted to "weed
him out." Despite carrying a 3.7 grade point average and never missing a practice, the coach
ridiculed the player, calling him "lazy," "unmotivated," and unwilling to listen to directions.
Assistant coaches, he reported, refused to help him, train him, or otherwise coach him.
Understanding that the head coach wanted him to quit the team to recoup his scholarship, see Div. I
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such a system, coaches exert plenary control over athletes.
Many other rules restrict even the private lives of the athletes. At
some schools, athletes may not use tobacco products or alcohol at any
time, nor may they frequent any alcohol-serving establishment.
Breaching these rules results in discipline. With few exceptions, no other
university employees in America are controlled by their employers to
this degree. 143 And while alcohol and illegal drugs are prohibited, the use
of protein supplements, by contrast, is encouraged. One athlete reported
144
that at his school some ninety percent of the players take creatine.
Random drug testing is carried out, but is administered45by the coaching
staff and is loosely executed to make evasion possible. 1
b.

The Daily Lives of Men's BasketballPlayersDemonstrate the
Pervasive Control UniversitiesExercise over Them
Like football players, men's basketball players at NCAA Division I

MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.5.5.1, but not wishing to relinquish it, he continued to practice and to
comply with team rules. In June, however, he received a letter saying that, by the coach's decision,
his scholarship would not be renewed. He had been "recruited over," and thereafter was forced to
pay out-of-state tuition to remain in school.
143. Faculty members and staff at Brigham Young University, for example, may not drink
alcoholic beverages at any time or any place. Brigham Young Univ., Church Educational System
Honor Code, http://campuslife.byu.edu/HONORCODE/honor-code.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2005)
(making it a "condition of employment" to "[a]bstain from alcohol[] ... [and] tobacco" "at all times
and ... in all places").

144. Creatine is a chemical dietary supplement that some athletes use to promote muscle strength
and bulk.
145. See Brent Schrotenboer, Tested ... and then Discarded: Trainer Says Aztecs Dump Some
Samples Taken for Drug Screens, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 3, 2005, at CI (describing other
questionable drug-testing procedures employed at San Diego State University that may permit
athlete drug use to go undetected; criticizing in-house drug-testing programs as less reliable than
those of independent labs; noting that the NCAA does not monitor or regulate universities'
independent drug-testing programs and suggesting those programs may be administered loosely;
criticizing an NCAA drug-testing program for frequently notifying coaches in advance as to which
athletes will be tested and implying that coaches may warn athletes; and describing
acknowledgement among several former players of steroid use on a university football team and
recounting one's sworn declaration that the coach "encouraged steroid use"); Chad Starkey et al.,
Athletic Trainers' Attitudes Toward Drug Screening of Intercollegiate Athletes, 29 J. ATHLETIC
TRAINING 120, 120 (1994) (confirming that athletic trainers administer the drug-screening process
for athletes at NCAA institutions); cf Ed Garvey, University Athletics Contain Incentivesfor Abuse,
CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Mar. 2, 2004, at 9A (describing a Baylor University coach's refusal to
allow the results of failed drug tests to be reported); Mark Winitz, Drugs in Sports: An Ethical
Maze, AM. TRACK & FIELD, Winter 2002, at 38, 41, available at http://www.americantrackandfield.com/features/winter02_drugs.html (stating that athletes in general often get drugs and
training supplements from coaches and other support staff).
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universities live lives much more akin to employees than to students.
Their lives are highly regimented and subject to detailed control by the
coaching staff which regulates the manner in which they perform their
athletic and other duties. Drawing upon information gathered through
interviews, Part III.A. 1.b describes the daily lives of basketball players
during the season and the remainder of the year. The pervasive control
coaches exercise over these players supports the conclusion that these
athletes are employees under the NLRA.
(1)

Coaches Exercise Extensive Controlover Men's Basketball
Players During the Season

During basketball season, one athlete said, "life revolves around the
athletic schedule." From mid-October until the end of the season,
sometime in March, players are required to spend four to five hours per
day, six days a week, wholly devoted to basketball. In mid-October,
official practices begin with a "midnight madness" celebration. This
period, one player said, is "pure misery." Monday through Friday he
awakens at 6:00 a.m. to report to the gym at 7:00 a.m. for a grueling
workout of running, weight training, and cardiovascular conditioning,
including long-distance running and wind sprints. The team eats
breakfast together at 8:30 a.m. Classes start at 9:00 a.m. and last until
early afternoon. Like football players, basketball players are not
permitted to enroll in afternoon classes because teams devote afternoon
and early evening hours to required practice and related activities. From
2:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. the team practices and watches film of past games
or future opponents' games. The team then eats dinner together, after
which freshmen and players whose academic performance is deemed
deficient attend mandatory study hall. On Saturdays, as one player said,
"some kind of meeting or practice" takes place, "especially if we lost the
"most of us are
previous game." There is no Sunday obligation, although
', 146
pains.
and
aches
our]
of
[treatment
for
Sunday
there on
146. This description echoes a published account of a typical day in the life of Alan Anderson, a
member of the Michigan State University men's basketball team. See Joe Rexrode, Playing It
Smart: ProposedNCAA Rule Demands Higher Grades, Better GraduationRates: A Day in the Life,
LANSING ST. J.,Mar. 14, 2004, atIA. On January 29, 2004 at 3:00 am. Anderson and the team
arrived at the Lansing airport after having played the University of Minnesota the previous evening.
He returned home, took a nap, and arose in time to attend his 8:00 a.m. health psychology class until
9:20 a.m. From 10:20 a.m. until 11:40 a.m. and then again from 12:40 p.m. until 2:00 p.m., he
attended two family child ecology classes. After class, he rushed to the Breslin Center, the MSU
basketball arena, where he got taped up for practice. From 3:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m., he practiced,
lifted weights, and ate dinner with the team. During this period, he was also available for university-
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The game schedule begins in early November with the conference
season starting a month later. For most away games, the team is bussed
to and from the game site the day of the game. For an eight-hour trip, the
team departs at 6:00 a.m. Occasionally, the group spends the night,
returning the following morning and arriving back at the campus in the
afternoon. Games, both at home and away, are often played during the
week. 147
Athletes with whom we spoke make their "best attempt" to select
classes so as to not miss many. Despite this, one said, it is "impossible
not to miss class." One player estimated that he is typically absent from
fifteen to twenty percent of his classes. While he is not "forgiven from
any of the academic requirements," he said, "the professors are
extremely accommodating" and excuse his absences due to basketballrelated activities. Professors fill out progress reports chronicling the
athletes' classroom performance. Athletes who miss class or who fail to
maintain adequate grades are reported to the coaching staff and must
"run wind sprints or bleachers."
The holiday season revolves around basketball. Indeed, for one
player, Thanksgiving dinner is at the coach's house. While players may
leave campus during this period "for a couple of days here and there,"
that, too, depends upon "being in good stead with the coach" and is the
"exception rather than the rule." In all cases, players play in tournaments
during the holidays, some at very long distances from home. Players
have little time to spend with family during the holidays and are assured
only two days off, Christmas Day and New Year's Day. During this
holiday period, when they are not competing, players are required to lift
weights in the morning and practice in the afternoon for two hours,
followed by film sessions and meetings. From October to March, one
player said, there was much we "were obligated to do and obligated to
not do."
approved media interviews. From 7:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., he studied in the athlete study facility, and
then from 9:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m., he reviewed game film and practiced shooting at the gym. See
id.
147. During the 2004-05 season, for example, the MSU basketball team played twenty-nine
regular-season games, twelve of which were played away from campus and thirteen of which were
played during the week-Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday. See Men's Basketball Mich. State
Univ. Spartans, 2004-05 Results/News Releases, http://msuspartans.collegesports.com/sports/mbaskbl/archive/msu-m-baskbl-sched-2004.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). Post-season Big-10 and
NCAA tournament games, not included in these figures, were all away from campus. See Wendel,
supra note 24 (noting that several times in a basketball season, one team played two games in three
days to facilitate national media coverage).
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Off-Season Life and Ancillary Issues Also Demonstrate the
Control the University Exercises over BasketballAthletes

After the season ends in March, study hall hours are still required, and
progress reports must be completed. During this off-season period,
players may devote more time to school. 148 At the same time, as one
player commented, players are required to stay in shape and in contact
with the coaching staff. It is "understood" that an athlete will practice on
his own and lift weights, and that his failure to do so may result in him
being "replaced." Thus, even during the off-season, one athlete works
out a minimum of three hours per day, seven days a week. In the
summer, he explained, most players attend summer school, work, and
continue their spring workout schedule. At least two to three days per
week, they have pick-up games and run wind sprints. They also perform,
and are given training in, weightlifting and cardiovascular conditioning.
As this athlete recounted, toward the end of the summer, the workout
schedule intensifies.
The remarkable degree of control exercised by the coaching staff
throughout the athlete's daily life in both football and basketball shows
that they are directed not only as to the end-winning games-but also
as to the means for doing so. Our data suggest, and other sources
confirm, that no other university employee is even remotely subject to
the degree of control, day by day, hour by hour, minute by minute, as the
employee-athlete. Coaches and administrators exercise pervasive control
over the manner in which athletes undertake their athletic and other
responsibilities and even over their daily lives. The exercise of this
degree of control over any other employee at the university would be
unimaginable. Indeed, if any group of persons may be called
"employees" based upon the degree of control exercised by a university,
it must be the employee-athletes enrolled there.
2.

The Athletic Grant-in-AidFunctionsas Compensationfor Athletic
Services and IllustratesAdditional Control by Coaches over
Athletes
The common law definition of employee requires that the employer

148. Very little of the academic year occurs outside of the basketball season. Only the periods
from late August to mid-October and from the end of March through the end of April fall squarely
outside of the season. Thus, during the vast majority of the regular academic year, players have little
time to devote to class or study.
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compensate the alleged employee for services rendered, 149 and the
athletic grant-in-aid fulfills this role. 150 The athletic grant-in-aid is
unquestionably a transfer of economic value to the employee-athlete in
return for his athletic services. 5 ' For their service, players receive
grants-in-aid to cover tuition, housing, books, and a meal plan for the
told us they also receive four free
term. Players whom we interviewed
1 52
game.
home
each
for
tickets
Athletic grants-in-aid are strictly regulated by NCAA rules, 15 3 and
constitute a central feature in the economic regime by which the NCAA
governs the university-athlete relationship. NCAA Division I institutions
may award scholarships solely on the basis of athletic ability or
achievement, irrespective of the student's academic promise or financial
need.1 54 Denominated "grants-in-aid," athletic scholarships function as
contracts of employment, setting forth the obligations of employeeathletes and defining the resulting economic compensation to be
provided.155
149. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *11 n.27
(July 13, 2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)) (noting that
an employee must perform service "in return for payment" under the common law).
150. The terms "grant-in-aid" and "scholarship" will be used interchangeably throughout this
Section.
151. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVICES, 2001-02 NCAA GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID 87-88
[hereinafter NCAA, AID GUIDE] (providing a Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement to be
signed by the athlete and his university and setting forth the dollar amount and duration of the
award); BYERS, supra note 6, at 373; Lynch, supra note 24, at 608-09, 617 (asserting that grant-inaid constitutes compensation for services); Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective
Bargaining:ScholarshipAthletes Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
167, 191-92 (1996); Orion Riggs, Note, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of MajorCollege Athletics, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1996, at 137, 143 (asserting that the grant-in-aid
is a contract for hire); Rhoden, supra note 24; General Release, Rev. E. William Beauchamp,
Executive Vice President, Univ. of Notre Dame, College Athletes Already Are Fairly Compensated
10, 1997),
available at http://und.collegesports.com/genrel/nd-genreleases06.html
(Mar.
(characterizing athletic grants-in-aid as compensation for entertainment and athletic services).
152. This number of university-provided tickets was not enough for all of the immediate family
members of one interviewee to attend. He noted that the price of each ticket-more than $40 at that
time-represented more than his remaining family members could afford to pay. Interview with
anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003).
153. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.
154. Seeid. art. 15.1.
155. See NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (providing a Sample Athletics Financial Aid
Agreement). The financial value of the athletic grant-in-aid is capped by NCAA rule at the cost of
attendance at the university. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1. That amount varies, of
course, from institution to institution. At Michigan State University, for example, the estimated cost
of attendance for in-state students in 2004-05 was $12,545. Mich. State Univ., Estimated Annual
Expenses (2004 05), SPARTAN SPORTSZONE MAG., Oct. 9, 2004, at 46. At Duke University, the
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NCAA rules governing athletic grants-in-aid are also highly
detailed. 5 6 Compensating an athlete in excess of the maximum
permissible scholarship results in NCAA penalties upon the institution
and the athlete. 157 Excess compensation or payments to athletes, such as
cash or cars,1 58 are prohibited whether provided directly by the
university or indirectly by alumni or other
"boosters"'159 and constitute a
160
significant source of NCAA violations.
cost of attendance that same year was $41,820. Duke Univ., Financial Aid Statistics for Duke,
http://www.finaid.duke.edu/prospect-statistics.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). At the University of
Florida, the cost of attendance was $12,715. Univ. of Fla., Tuition and Annual Cost of Attendance,
http://www.admissions.ufl.edu/annualcosts.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). Of course, these
amounts are significantly more than the real cost to the university of providing another seat in the
classroom, see supra note 10, and significantly less than the value to the university of athletes'
services. See infra note 298. The Reverend Edmund Joyce of Notre Dame has conceded that
"'[parents realize] that their son's effort will generate far more revenue for the school than the cost
of his grant-in-aid."' BYERS, supra note 6, at 233 (quoting Rev. Joyce).
156. The rules governing athletic scholarships span twenty-three pages of the 2004-05 Division I
Manual. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.
157. See generally id., arts. 15.1, 19.
158. Covert booster gifts of new cars or their use has long been widespread. See, e.g., BYERS,

supra note 6, at 124-28, 171-72.
159. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.01.4.
160. Most NCAA rules violations are for impermissible recruiting, misuse of athletic funds, or
improper aid to student-athletes. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 6, at 23-24, 27-28, 31 (documenting
examples of excessive, prohibited payments to athletes at Southern Methodist University and Texas
Christian University, such as gifts of cars, rent-free apartments, a $25,000 signing bonus, and annual
stipends of approximately $30,000); id. at 62 (referring to impermissible cash payments to
basketball recruits at the University of Kentucky); id. at 124-28, 171-72, 208 (discussing the
common but prohibited practice of providing a new car to star athletes); id at 154 (discussing the
increasing use of modest cash payments when predominantly white universities began recruiting
black athletes in the late 1960s); id. at 160, 182, 198-201, 208-09 (describing impermissible
financial benefits for athletes as commonplace); DICK DEVENZIO, RIP-OFF U.: THE ANNUAL THEFT
AND EXPLOITATION OF MAJOR COLLEGE REVENUE PRODUCING STUDENT-ATHLETES 104, 115-16,
118, 146-48, 153-54, 164-67 (1986) (describing numerous examples of covert benefits being paid
to athletes in violation of NCAA rules); MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC
DEPARTMENT vs THE UNIVERSITY 250-51 (1990) (describing covert payments in many forms,
including jobs for parents); ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 24 (reporting 1982 "signing bonuses" in

the five figures); Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA
Regulatory Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 223-24 (1996) (describing factors among
African-American players, such as poverty, that further their incentive to accept prohibited financial
benefits); Harrick Steps Down as Coach of Georgia, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 2003, at
D3 (reporting on allegations that a former Rhode Island basketball coach arranged for players to
receive lodging, cars, and money from boosters); Welch Suggs, College Basketball on the Line,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 26, 1999, at A53 (noting that "coaches continue to offer improper
inducements to recruits"); Tim Sullivan, Coaches Payoffs Spur Pay-for-PlayMovement, ENQUIRER
ONLINE EDITION, Jan. 20, 2001, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/01/20/sptcoaches.html
(estimating the black-market rate for top college football players at $200,000 in 2001); Ryan
Hockensmith, Buckeyes Chime In, ESPN THE MAG., Nov. 9, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/

Myth of the Student-Athlete
The history and development of the grant-in-aid shows that players
receive such compensation only in return for athletic services. In 1948,
the NCAA membership adopted the so-called "Sanity Code," which
formally outlawed scholarships based solely on athletic ability. 61
Scholarships under the Sanity Code were to be based instead only upon
financial need and/or academic ability, criteria both independent of
athletic skill. And significantly, once such scholarships were granted,
they could not be withdrawn by the institution, even if the
student later
162
decided not to participate in intercollegiate athletics at all.
At the 1956 NCAA Convention, however, the membership officially
sanctioned, for the first time, 163 scholarships based solely on athletic
ability. It amended the NCAA's Constitution to authorize "schools to
pay... regardless of need, ... [or] of academic potential... all
'commonly accepted educational expenses' for the undergraduate
athlete." 64 By this, the delegates explicitly authorized, formalized, and
legitimized the practice of using scholarships to compensate college
athletes for their athletic services alone.
This official sanctioning of athletic scholarships began the modem era
news/story?id=1919258 (describing improper payments to members of the Ohio State University
football team including cash, cars, furniture, meals, additional cash in exchange for athlete-signed
OSU memorabilia, and payments received in jobs for which work was never performed); cf Lynch,
supra note 24, at 618 (noting that under the current NCAA regime, athletes may not receive marketvalue compensation, and that this encourages "covert payments").
Such payments constitute compensation to athletes for their athletic services and demonstrate to
some degree the actual market value of these athletes' services. The amount of covert payment to an
athlete generally corresponds to his perceived athletic value to the team, and in this manner the
quantity of compensation roughly reflects the quality of athletic services rendered. See Tom Friend,
My Side, ESPN THE MAG., Nov. 9, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1919246
(noting that cash payments to OSU football players varied in direct proportion to the quality of play
on the field). It bears noting, therefore, that prohibited compensation more accurately reflects the
athlete's actual worth to the university than does sanctioned compensation in the form of financial
aid.
161. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 43-44; Lynch, supra note 24, at 617; Gary T.
Brown, NCAA Answers Call to Reform: The 'Sanity Code' Leads Association Down Path to
Enforcement Program, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, availableat http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/
19991122/active/3624n24.html (noting that the Sanity Code adopted the principle of "awarding
financial aid without consideration for athletics ability").
162. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 67; SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 44; Allen L. Sack,
Big-Time Athletics vs. Academic Values: It's a Rout, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 26, 2001, at B7.
163. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 10, 72.
164. Id. at 72. Later, in 1957, "commonly accepted educational expenses ...were defined as
tuition, fees, room and board, books, and $15 per month for nine months for laundry money." Id.
Cash stipends for laundry or other purposes are no longer permitted. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note
3, art. 15.2.
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of college sports in which universities openly and unabashedly pay
players for their athletic services in abrogation of the amateurism
principles the NCAA professes to uphold. Former NCAA Executive
Director Byers described this change as "forswearing old amateur
principles without admitting it."' 165 It "was an act of administrative
convenience for college management and a recruiting bonanza for
coaches. It.. . sanctified an industry-wide, common pay scheme based
on athletic skill."' 166 Equally pointedly, Fritz Crisler, former head
football coach at the University of Michigan, described it as
"professionaliz[ing]"' 67 the college athlete. Once universities began
compensating students solely for their athletic services, they fulfilled the
compensation requirement of the common law test, 168 thereby
propagating the employment relation with their athletes.
Initially, NCAA rules safeguarded the athletes to some degree. For
example, an athletic grant-in-aid could be awarded for up to four full
years, 169 guaranteeing a gifted athlete four years of education and giving
him a significant incentive to select a university offering a four-year aid
package over other schools offering only one-year scholarships with
merely the possibility for renewal. Under the initial legislation, such a
four-year grant-in-aid could not be withdrawn by the university even if
the athlete elected not to play. 70 Finally, a university scholarship
committee, not the athlete's coach, made determinations regarding the

165. BYERS, supra note 6, at 74.
166. Id. at 338-39; see also id. at 65 (noting that "in 1956 the colleges, acting through the NCAA
in the name of 'amateurism,' installed their own pay system called the athletics grant-in-aid or
athletics 'scholarship'). Former NCAA director Byers stated that
[t]he colleges are already paying their athletes. The grant-in-aid established that.... The
uniform stipend is awarded without regard to the financial need or the academic attainment of
the recipient .... College leaders argue that a free education is sufficient pay for a varsity
athlete, even though it is subject to being terminated or renewed annually, based on what the
coaching staff decides.
Id. at 373 (emphasis in original); see SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14; JOHN SAYLE
WATTERSON, COLLEGE FOOTBALL 287-307 (2000); Chin, supra note 3, at 1236 (arguing that each
annual scholarship constitutes pay to the athlete); Sack, supra note 162.
167.

3YERS, supra note 6, at 74.

168. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *11 n.27
(July 13, 2004) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)) (describing
the common law test, which includes a compensation element); supra Part II.A.
169. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 72; Sack, supra note 162.
170. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 72; Louis Hakim, The Student-Athlete vs. the Athlete Student:
Has the Time Arrivedfor an Extended-Term Scholarship Contract?, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 145, 158
(2000); Sack, supra note 162.
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17
renewal or non-renewal of a one-year athletic grant-in-aid. 1
Over time, however, these initial safeguards were repealed, rendering
the athletic grant-in-aid even more obviously compensatory. The most
significant erosion in player protection occurred at the 1973 NCAA
Convention with the adoption of Proposal 39. 172 Under that legislation,
athletically related aid could "not be awarded for a period in excess of
one academic year."' 173 The proffered rationale for the change from fouryear scholarships to one-year renewable grants was to treat athletes like
non-athlete students whose scholarships, it was claimed, were awarded
on a year-by-year basis. 174 In fact, however, institutions often awarded
non-athletes scholarships on a multi-year basis, 175 and the real reason for
the shift from four-year to one-year athletics scholarships was, instead,
to create a mechanism by which university athletic programs could
maintain pressure on the scholarship athlete throughout his college
career.176
The shift from multi-year to one-year athletic scholarships was an
important step in the evolution of the university-athlete relationship to an
employment relationship. For the first time, the NCAA tied
compensation directly to the athletes' performance of athletic services,
not merely to athletic promise, and NCAA rules no longer allowed the
athletic scholarship to be guaranteed regardless of whether or not the

171. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 73, 76.
172. See id. at 163-64; Hakim, supra note 170, at 158.
173. BYERS, supra note 6, at 163; see also Sack, supra note 162. This rule is still in place today.
See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.3.1; NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (showing
a Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement, stating that the period of the award may either be an
"academic year" or a "semester/quarter," and providing no option for multi-year aid grants). The
rejection of multiple-year scholarships in favor of a rule restricting members to one-year contracts
likely offends the Sherman Act, which prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ....or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
174. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 163; Hakim, supra note 170, at 158.
175. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 163.
176. See id. (describing the view of former NCAA President Alan J. Chapman that proffered
justifications for Proposal 39 were "bogus"); Hakim, supra note 170, at 148; AM 870 SportsTalk
with Earle Robinson, supra note 129 (host interviewing Professor Robert A. McCormick and
discussing use of the one-year scholarship to "run off' players "all the time").
When Proposal 39 was under consideration, proponents "complained that some athletes, once
they had the four-year award in hand, decided not to play or at least not to give their best efforts.
Such players were cheating the college, they pointed out, and young people should not be permitted
to learn bad habits." BYERS, supra note 6, at 163. How could refusal to participate in athletics
constitute "cheating the college" unless the four-year grant was considered compensation for those
as yet unprovided services?

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:71, 2006

athlete performed those services. 177 The one-year limit on grants-in-aid
thus rendered
that aid even more clearly compensation for athletic
178
services.
Shortly after the NCAA limited scholarships to one year, it
transferred authority over decisions to continue or terminate scholarships
from university committees to coaches. 179 Under this regime, any
athlete's ability to retain a scholarship depended in substantial part upon
his athletic performance the previous year,' 80 and coaches gained
unparalleled power over the athlete.'18 This transfer of scholarshiprenewal authority from faculty to coaches cemented the employment
nature of the relationship because the athlete's continued compensation
depended upon performing to the satisfaction of the athletic supervisor
rather than academic personnel who, in theory, would be disinterested in
athletic performance. 82 Thus, the coach's power not to renew the one-

177. See DUDERSTADT, supra note 24, at 197; SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 84.
178. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1237 (noting that the one-year limit on grants-in-aid illustrates the
university's preference for "fielding a superior sports team" and thereby increasing revenue over
concern for an athlete's education which would be better served by a scholarship guaranteed for
four years). See supra Part Il.B for a discussion of the relevance of commercialism in establishing
an employer-employee relationship and infra Part III.B.2.a for an examination of the entrenched
commercial nature of the university-athlete relationship.
179. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 76, 164 (noting that even though Proposition 39 passed because
of a promise that university committees, rather than coaches, would make scholarship decisions,
"[t]he exigencies of big-time athletics-the need to win and survive-in time would also strip away
the safeguards promised in the one-year grant legislation"); id. at 232-34 (describing an
unsuccessful attempt in 1976 to wrest control of the full grant-in-aid away from coaches and to give
it back to university scholarship committees); id. at 103 (noting that the coach controls the
renewals); NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 100 (demonstrating through hypothetical case
studies that it is the coach who decides whether aid will be renewed); Sack, supranote 162.
180. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 164, 165-66.
181. See id. at 103 ("Both parties understand the grant-in-aid is given on a year-to-year basis,
sometimes semester-to-semester ....
The coaches, in fact, control the renewals ....
If the player
does not conform to the demanding college practice and game schedule [whether denoted as
mandatory or voluntary], his or her grant-in-aid is not renewed and can be terminated [early] for
disciplinary reasons."); see also Murray Sperber, The NCAA 's Last Chance to Reform College
Sports: An Open Letter to the Next President of the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 19, 2002, at B12 (asserting that one-year scholarships are often not
renewed due to unsatisfactory athletic performance).
182. In 1976, several NCAA member schools proposed to limit athletic scholarships to tuition
only, reserving additional stipends covering lodging, food, and books to financially needy students
exclusively. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 231-34, 340; Hakim, supra note 170, at 159; Timeline1940 to 1979, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/
19991122/active/3624n27.html. This measure would have prevented schools from offering a full
ride to gifted athletes whose families could afford to pay for living expenses. At the 1976 NCAA
Convention, however, this initiative was defeated. Schools opposing it grounded their position,
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year athletic grant-in-aid further demonstrates that the control element
required by the common law test for employee is satisfied.
Other features of NCAA Division I rules underscore that the athletic
grant-in-aid gives coaches leverage over athletes and is compensation
for athletic services rendered. For example, under current NCAA rules,
183
an athlete's financial "aid may be immediately reduced or canceled"'
during the quarter, semester, or year it covers if, among other reasons,
the athlete "voluntarily withdraw[s] from the sport for personal
reasons."' 184 The fact that a university can terminate financial aid to a
player immediately upon the athlete's refusal to play demonstrates that
such aid is compensation and a quid pro quo for athletic services
rendered.
While the athlete's scholarship may not be immediately reduced or
cancelled mid-term "on the basis of... athletics ability, performance or
contribution to [the] team's success, because of an injury or illness that
prevents [the athlete] from participating in athletics, or for any other
athletics reason,"'' 85 nothing bars a coach from refusing to renew the
athletic grant-in-aid for the ensuing quarter, semester, or year.186 In other
words, if an athlete does not play well enough or hard enough, or if a
ironically, upon arguments that reinforce the very idea we advance: that athletic scholarships are
compensation paid in exchange for athletic services performed. First, they argued, "[s]tudents in
big-time revenue sports return huge benefits to their institutions in terms of money, morale, and
publicity." BYERS, supra note 6, at 234. In other words, they urged, the athletes should continue to
receive additional compensation beyond tuition because they perform services which add significant
value to their employers-the universities in question.
Second, they asserted, "[tihe all-encompassing commitment required of student-athletes to
survive in the major revenue sports should merit a full ride." Id. at 234. This argument candidly
recognized the commitment required of athletes and suggested that institutions should fully
compensate them for that commitment. In retaining the full athletic scholarship in 1976, Division I
institutions conceded it was a quid pro quo for athletic services.
183. NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (bold in original) (Sample Athletics Financial Aid
Agreement).
184. Id. at 87 (Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement that is provided for use at schools in all
three NCAA divisions); see also Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.4.1; NCAA, AID GUIDE,
supra note 151, at 95 (providing a Sample Cancellation of Award During the Academic Year Letter
and incorporating justifications for a mid-term cancellation of financial aid including withdrawal
from the sport "for personal reasons"); id. at 101 (illustrating through a hypothetical case study that
a university may cancel Anne's financial aid immediately if she decides to quit her sport midway
through the season).
185. NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement); see
also DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.4.3.
186. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.5; NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 96
(providing a Sample Nonrenewal of Award Letter and requiring no reasons to justify the
nonrenewal of an award for a subsequent academic term).
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better athlete arrives, or even if the athlete is injured in the course of his
sport, the coach may refuse to renew the athlete's grant-in-aid. 18 7 One
athlete told us that his quality of life depends much upon how well he
plays. "Those who perform well get away with more. If you are on the
bubble, you best behave yourself." "There are," the coaches remind
them, "plenty to step into your shoes., 188 Again, the coaches exercise
unparalleled control over athletes by having the power not to renew their
scholarships. This paradigm matches that of the employment relation in
which an employer may terminate an employee once he is no longer
useful. 189
In short, the relationship between the university and the scholarship
athlete is that of employer and employee.1 90 Employers pay their
employees in exchange for services. Universities likewise award grantsin-aid to athletes in exchange for the athletes' services in their sports.191

187. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.5; NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 100
(illustrating through a hypothetical case study how a coach may not reduce or cancel player Max's
aid during the period of the award for athletics reasons but may do so at the end of the year by
refusing to renew the award for the subsequent period).
While coaches at some schools sometimes voluntarily renew an athletic scholarship in the event
of injury, NCAA rules do not require that result. Moreover, NCAA rules limit the number of
scholarships Division I member schools may grant. In Division I-A football, a university may award
up to eighty-five scholarships at any one time. For men's basketball, the number of scholarships is
limited to thirteen. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.5.4.1, 15.5.5.1; BYERS, supra note 6,
at 355. Such limitations on the number of scholarships dramatically increase a coach's incentive to
allocate these valuable resources only to the best athletes available. Therefore, even if a coach
would like to renew a player's scholarship, he will be hard-pressed to do so when the player is
unable to contribute to the success of the team. Allocating resources to under-performers would
allow other colleges a competitive advantage on the playing field. See id. at 76 ("The law of
survival quickly dictated that the colleges' money for full rides should go only to players who help
the team."); Hakim, supra note 170, at 148, 159. The financial importance of winning, see Robert
H. Frank, Challenging the Myth: A Review of the Links Among College Athletic Success, Student
Quality, and Donations 3 (May 2004), http://www.knightfdn.org/athletics/reports/2004_frankreport/
KCIAFrank-report_2004.pdf; infra Part llI.B.2.a (describing the financial benefits of winning),
places enormous pressure on coaches not to allocate awards to unproductive players. Hakim, supra
note 170, at 159.
188. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Nov. 10, 2003).
189. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 5 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the at-will doctrine).
190. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 24, at 608-09, 617; Ukeiley, supra note 151; Riggs, supra note
151, at 143 (asserting that the grant-in-aid is a contract for hire); Rhoden, supra note 24.
191. Indeed, the public commonly perceives that college athletes receive compensation for their
athletic services because they "get a free college education." Given low graduation rates, see infra
Part II.B.2.b.(8), diluted curricula, see infra Part III.B.2.b.(4), and extraordinary demands on the
athletes' time and energy, see supra Part III.A. 1, however, even this promise of an education is not
fulfilled in many cases. Thus, in many instances, athlete compensation falls woefully short of that
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In effect, the athlete is an employee with a one-year, renewable contract
of employment. Universities may terminate these employees for any
reason, or no reason, at the end of the year through nonrenewal of their
contracts. 192 Furthermore, like an employee who may be terminated
during the period of a contract for reasons stated therein, an athlete may
be terminated mid-season for certain behavior, such as becoming
academically ineligible, engaging in serious misconduct that brings
disciplinary action from the school, withdrawing from the sport, or even
refusing to follow the coach's rules.1 93 Termination occurs in the athletic
context via immediate cancellation of the athlete's compensation, or
athletic scholarship.
Under the common law standard, an employee must be compensated
for services rendered. Given the history and structure of the athletic
grant-in-aid and the policy choices made by the NCAA in its
development, grants-in-aid transparently serve as compensation for
athletic services. Moreover, the coach's ability to cancel or not to renew
a grant-in-aid fixes his control over athletes, another element required
under the common law test.
3.

Athletes Are EconomicallyDependent upon Their Universities

In addition to a right of control and compensation, the common law
test for "employee" sometimes also refers to the putative employee's
economic dependence upon the employer. 194 Grant-in-aid athletes at
Division I NCAA institutions are deeply economically dependent upon
their universities. In fact, their primary requirements for survival-food
and shelter-are met by their university-employers through grants-inaid.' 95 Interviews and secondary sources suggest that many athletes
come from impoverished or humble backgrounds and cannot afford
which seems to be promised them, a college education. This inadequacy of player compensation is
not entirely the athlete's fault if he is not capable of doing college-level work, see infra Part
III.B.2.b.(l ), when he lacks the time needed to do so, see supra PartlII.A. 1, or when his scholarship
is not renewed because he has been injured or his performance falls short of the coach's wishes, see
Part Ill.A.2.
192. See, e.g., Schott, supra note 24, at 35 (noting that the university can dismiss the athlete by
failing to renew his one-year scholarship); see also supra notes 186-87.
193. See Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra
note 151, at 87 (Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement); see also supra notes 183-84 and
accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
195. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.2.2 (permitting financial aid to cover room and
board in addition to tuition, fees, and books).
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school, food, or lodging without the grant-in-aid.196 Although athletes
are permitted under current NCAA rules to take part-time
employment,1 97 the extraordinary demands on their time and energy
from their athletic obligations necessarily preclude outside employment
as a meaningful means of self-support.1 98 And, because they may not
profit from their reputation as athletes, 99 any earnings from such
employment are likely to be minimal, again leaving them fully
economically dependent upon their universities.
Moreover, NCAA rules forbid players from accepting cash or other
gifts from non-family members, 00 and even gifts from family and
guardians are limited to an amount which, when combined with any
grant-in-aid, covers only the cost of attendance. 20 1 Despite providing
valuable services, players whose families cannot afford to provide them

196. Athletes commonly describe lacking resources for basic necessities. "There are
days... when training table is the only thing I eat all day." Irvin Muchnick, Welcome to Plantation
Football: The FinancialRewards for a Winning College Program Have Never Been Greater. Yet
Most of the Athletes Who Make it Happen are Living in GrindingPoverty. How Fair is That?, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, (Magazine), at 114 (quoting James Bethea, a U.C. Berkeley football player).
"Athletes don't have the money to live the normal life of a student. They don't have the money to
buy toothpaste. They don't have the money to buy toilet paper." Id. (quoting Kevin Murray,
California state senator). Quinn Dorsey, a University of Oregon football player, was suspended for
the first four games of the 2003 season when he traded his complimentary game tickets for rent. Id.
197. Before August 1998, the NCAA completely prohibited scholarship athletes from holding
part-time jobs during the academic year. See Greg Skidmore, Recent Development: Payment for
College FootballPlayers in Nebraska, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 321 n.15 (2004). From August
1998 until the 2003-04 academic year, they could earn no more than $2,000 from a job during the
academic year without correspondingly diminishing their financial aid. NCAA, 2002-03 NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL (2002), arts. 15.2.6, 15.2.6.1. Since 2003, athletes can take legitimate
employment, and their earnings do not affect their financial aid. NCAA, 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL (2003), art. 15.2.6; DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.2.7. The athletes, however, may
not accept compensation for their fame as athletes and may receive pay only for work actually
performed at levels commensurate with the prevailing rate for that work in that community. Id. arts.
12.4.1, 12.4.1.1, 15.2.7(a)-(c). Thus, while the rules now permit employment, they still prohibit the
athlete from profiting from the one real source of value he possesses-his fame as an athlete. See
generally id. arts. 12.5.2-.4.
198. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 618; Drape, supra note 127.
199. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 12.5.2, 15.2.7.
200. See id. arts. 12.1.1, 15.01.2 (rendering ineligible for athletic competition any athlete who
receives financial aid from sources other than those permitted under NCAA rules); id. art. 15.2.6
(allowing athletes to receive "financial aid from anyone upon whom the ... athlete is naturally or
legally dependent"); 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 16 (describing the suspension of
former UCLA football player Donnie Edwards for accepting food); see also Muchnick, supra note
196 (noting that accepting lunch "from anyone other than an immediate family member can be
construed as a gratuity from a booster-punishable by loss of eligibility").
201. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.2, 15.1, 15.2.6.1.
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with extra money struggle financially throughout their college
experience. That athletes commonly leave their universities without
graduating when coaches do not renew their grants-in-aid 2. also
demonstrates their high level of economic dependence upon those
institutions. Unable to earn significant outside income, forbidden from
accepting gifts other than limited amounts from parents, and with
primary living expenses covered by the university through the grant-inaid, scholarship athletes are utterly economically dependent upon their
universities.
The foregoing demonstrates that athletic grant-in-aid students are
employees. As the NLRB has underscored, "[u]nder the common law, an
employee is a person who performs services for another under a contract
of hire, subject to the other's control or right of control, and in return for
payment., 20 3 Athletic grant-in-aid students are employees under the
common law because they serve under the substantial control of their
university-employers 2°4 in return for compensation and are economically
dependent upon them.
B.

College Athletes Are Employees Under the NLRB's Statutory Test
from Brown

Having shown that grant-in-aid athletes are employees under the
common law test, we must nevertheless establish that they likewise meet
the NLRA's statutory definition of that term. That is, we must also show
202. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003) (former basketball player
attesting that athletes commonly leave the university when coaches do not renew grants-in-aid);
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003) (football player attesting to same).
Nonrenewal of the grant-in-aid can occur either because the athlete exhausts his four years of
eligibility before completing the course requirements for his degree, see infra Part III.B.2.b.(7), or
because the coach decides not to renew the scholarship, opting to use it instead for another athlete.
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with anonymous
employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003); see also supra Part III.A.2 and note 187.
203. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *11 n.27 (July
13, 2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)) (emphasis omitted).
204. NCAA regulations govern myriad aspects of the athletes' lives:
Encyclopedic regulations will govern their lives, on and off campus, for the next four to six
years, starting with the first recruiting contact while they are high school students. The
youngsters have no choice in the matter. You can't play in college unless you pledge allegiance
to the rules, they are told. Then they are warned that the NCAA can rule them permanently
ineligible at all 900-plus NCAA colleges for violations of marginal substance.
BYERS, supra note 6, at 365. Employee manuals in most industries establish the employer's right to
control how the employee performs his job. The employee manual in college sports, the 487-page
NCAA Division I Manual, however, goes much further in controlling virtually all aspects of
employee-athletes' lives.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:71, 2006

that employee-athletes are not foreclosed from being employees by
virtue of their simultaneous status as students.2 0 5 To do so requires an
analysis of the NLRB's most recent pronouncement on the status of
students as employees, Brown University.
1.

Brown Identifies FourFactorsin Assessing Students' Employee
Status

As discussed previously, in Brown, the Board examined four factual
criteria to decide whether graduate assistants were statutory employees:
"[(1)] the status of graduate assistants as students, [(2)] the role of
graduate student assistantships in graduate education, [(3)] the graduate
student assistants' relationship with the faculty, and [(4)] the financial
support they receive to attend Brown. 2 0 6 Applying this test to
employee-athletes yields the conclusion that they are not primarily
students and that their relationship with their universities is an economic
one. With respect to these four areas of inquiry, employee-athletes are
employees under the first three criteria. The logic underlying the fourth
criterion is fallacious, and even if the fourth factor is valid, it, too, results
in employee status for athletes. For these reasons, and because they also
meet the common law test for employees, 20 7 employee-athletes are
employees under the NLRA.
a.

Under the First Factor,Athletes Play a Limited Role as Students

In Brown, the first factor upon which the Board relied to hold that
20 8
graduate assistants were not employees was their status as students.
The Board noted the graduate assistants at Brown University were all
enrolled as students, 0 9 their status as teaching assistants (TAs), research
assistants (RAs), and proctors was contingent upon being enrolled as
students,2 10 and they were unlike others previously held to be employees
because they were still students.21
205. See Brown, slip op. at 5, 8, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7, *11 (requiring that students pass both
the common law test and a special statutory test to acquire employee status).
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744 at *10.
See supra Part III.A.
Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10.
See id., slip op. at 6, 10, 2004 WL 1588744 at *9, *14.

210. See id.
211. See id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744 at *6 (distinguishing the research associates at issue
in C.W. Post Center of Long Island University, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971), who had already obtained

Myth of the Student-Athlete
At the outset, it bears remembering that the Board in Brown did not
foreclose graduate student assistants from employee status solely
because they were students. That is, the Board did not rule in Brown that
students and employees are two mutually exclusive categories.
Otherwise, its analysis of and reliance on the second, third, and fourth
criteria would have been superfluous. Rather, the Brown Board
concluded that graduate assistants fell outside the Act because they were
"primarily students. 2 12 The necessary inference is that other students
compensated by universities whose services are not primarily
educational may still be treated as employees. This reasoning is further
supported through the Brown Board's acknowledgment that students
who perform services unrelated to their educational programs may
properly be characterized as employees. 1 3 As we will show below, the
athletic services provided by employee-athletes are predominantly
unrelated to their educational programs; 21 4 consequently, these athletes
may properly be viewed as employees.
Importantly, the Board in Brown looked to the substance, not merely
the form, of whether the persons in question were students. It analyzed
whether the graduate assistants were students in reality, not simply
whether they were students in name only. In this respect the Board
considered the amount of time the assistants spent performing their
duties compared to the amount of time they spent otherwise as students
and found that "students serving as graduate student assistants spend
only a limited number of hours performing their duties, and it is beyond
dispute that their principal time commitment at Brown is focused on
obtaining a degree and, thus, [on] being a student. 215 As demonstrated
above, the same cannot be said of employee-athletes. On the contrary,
the onerous time commitments imposed on athletes make it evident that
their degrees).
212. Id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7 (emphasis added).

213. See id., slip op. at 9 n.29, 2004 WL 1588744, at *12 n.29 ("Although the dissent cites
language from Cedars-Sinai... to the effect that the Board has included students in some
bargaining units and in a few instances, authorized elections in units composed solely of students,
the Board clarified this general assertion in St. Clare's by making clear that this does not include the
category of students who perform services at their university related to their educational
programs."). The necessary inference is that students whose services are unrelated to their
educational programs may be employees and may organize.
214. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
215. Brown, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9; see also id., slip op. at 10, 2004 WL
1588744, at *14 (stating that graduate assistants' "principal time commitment.., is focused on
obtaining a degree, and, thus, being a student") (emphasis in original).
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21 6
their primary focus is on athletic, not academic, responsibilities.
The Board also identified "[b]eing a student" as "synonymous with
learning, education, and academic pursuits, ''2 17 strongly suggesting that
being a student requires more than mere enrollment, but also
encompasses actually engaging in these activities. Under Brown, then, to
conclude that an individual is a student, not an employee, he must be
actually engaged in learning, education, and academic pursuits.
Lamentably, a great many NCAA Division I football and men's
basketball players are students in name only. They do not spend the
majority of their time engaged in learning, education, and academic
inquiry, but rather in furtherance of their work as athletes.2t 8

b.

The Second FactorConsidersthe Role of Athletic Participationin
Education

The second criterion relied upon in Brown was the "role of graduate
student assistantships in graduate education., 219 With this factor, the
Board sought to measure the degree to which the graduate assistants'
work furthered their education. It found that the graduate assistants'
services constituted a required component of their courses of study, and,
thus, that they were serving as students, not employees, when
performing that work.220 Moreover, the Board noted that graduate
22
student assistants "received academic credit for their research work.", 1
Finally, the Board emphasized that the assistants' services in teaching
and research were directly related to their courses of study.222 Because
216. See supra Part Il.A.1.
217. Brown, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9.
218. See supra Part III.A. 1; see also infra Part III.B.2.b.
219. Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10.
220. Throughout the Brown opinion, the Board emphasized that serving as a TA, RA, or proctor
was a required condition for obtaining a Ph.D. degree. See id., slip op. at 2 & n.l 1, 4-5, 6-7, 10,
2004 WL 1588744, at *2 & n.1 1, *5-6, *9, *14. As the Board noted, for most graduate assistants
"teaching is so integral to their education that they will not get the degree until they satisfy that
requirement." Id., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9.
221. Id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *6 (citing Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 214 N.L.R.B.
621 (1974)).
222. The Board repeatedly emphasized the close relationship between the assistants' services and
their courses of study. Students are not employees when they perform "services ... which are
directly related to their educational program." Id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744 at *7 (citing St.
Clare's Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977), and Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976)
with approval). "[T]heir service as a graduate student assistant is part and parcel of the core
elements of the Ph.D. degree." Id., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9; see also id., slip op. at 10,
2004 WL 1588744, at * 14. "Graduate student assistant positions are, therefore, directly related to
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the graduate assistants' services were an integral component of their
degrees, the Board concluded that the university-graduate assistant
2 23
relationship was an academic, not an economic, one.
In the case of employee-athletes, the services they perform for their
university employers-playing football and basketball-are wholly
unrelated to their education and their degrees. 224 Those services are not
the core elements of the Ph.D. degree and the educational reasons that students attend Brown." Id.,
slip op. at 6-7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9.The Board also wrote that "[t]he relationship between
being a graduate student assistant and the pursuit of the Ph.D. is inextricably linked, and thus, that
relationship is clearly educational." Id., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9; see also id., slip op.
at 7, 2004 WL 1588744 at *10.
223. See id., slip op. at 7, 10, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10, *14.
224. The official game program sold at fall 2004 Michigan State University football games lists
103 undergraduate players. Of those, thirty-five had not yet selected a major when the booklet was
printed. Of the sixty-eight players with declared majors, only nine had selected a major, like
Kinesiology (the study of the mechanics of human motion), that might conceivably be related to
football activities. The other fifty-nine athletes, however, majored in courses of study to which their
football activities bore no relation whatsoever. These majors included: Agribusiness Management;
Communication; Community Relations; Criminal Justice; Economics; Education; Engineering,
including Civil, Computer, General, and Mechanical; English; Family Community Services;
Finance; Fisheries & Wildlife; Food Industry Management; General Business; General
Management; Hospitality Business; Human Biology; Human Resources; Humanities; Landscape
Architecture; Law and Society; Marketing; Merchandise Management; Pre-Law; Psychology;
Sociology; Spanish; Studio Art; Supply Chain Management; and Telecommunication. Mich. State
Univ., supranote 155, at 11-16.
While some universities have recently awarded academic credit for playing on the football or
basketball teams, see Mark Schlabach, Varsity Athletes Get Class Credit; Some Colleges Give
Gradesfor Playing, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1; Lexus Halftime Show: Michigan-Notre
Dame Game (NBC television broadcast Sept. 11, 2004), doing so violates NCAA rules. Offering
such credit is an impermissible extra benefit under Article 16.02.3, which defines such a benefit as
any special arrangement... to provide a student-athlete... a benefit not expressly authorized
by NCAA legislation. Receipt of a benefit by student-athletes.., is not a violation of NCAA
legislation if it is demonstrated that the same benefit is generally available to the institution's
students.. . or to a particular segment of the student body (e.g., foreign students, minority
students) determined on a basis unrelated to athletics ability.
Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 16.02.3; see id. arts. 2.5, 16.12.1.1, 16.12.2.1; Mathewson, supra
note 10, at 100 & n.89 (asserting that a university may not provide any benefit to student-athletes,
including special courses, that are not provided to students in general); accord BYERS, supra note 6,
at 103 (describing requirement that courses such as weight-lifting classes must be posted and open
to all students). Because participation in varsity football or basketball is limited to NCAA athletes,
offering academic credit for that participation violates these provisions. Even though some
universities have impermissibly awarded credit for being an athlete, to our knowledge, no university
confers a degree in football or basketball.
We do not suggest athletes gain nothing by playing sports. Teamwork, discipline, and dedication
are all undeniably important aspects of character, and are arguably strengthened through athletic
preparation and competition. But character development is distinct from education and learning and
is neither what we mean nor what the Brown Board meant by "education." No doubt the NCAA
hopes to persuade the public that athletics participation is a core component of athletes' educations
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required elements of any course of study at any university, nor are they
requirements for the completion of any degree. 5 In short, playing
football or basketball is completely unrelated to the vast majority of
athletes' courses of study. As a consequence, the services employeeathletes perform are not educational but are, instead, economic; the
athletes do not serve primarily as students, but rather as employees.
The Board also used this second factor as support for its conclusion
that the relationship between Brown University and its graduate students
was primarily academic and not economic.226 That is, the fact that their
work as graduate assistants was part of their degree requirements
supported not only the idea that they were primarily students, but also
and, for this reason, insists that "student-athletes" learn so-called life skills by participating in their
sports. See NCAA, Public Service Campaign, supra note 7. Such potential for character
development, however, is completely unrelated to their degrees, and, apart from the one to two
percent of college athletes who become professional athletes, this learning is also unrelated to their
future professions. See NCAA, Estimated Probability, supra note 30 (stating that only 2% of
football players and 1.3% of men's basketball players later play professionally).
Moreover, although the NCAA emphasizes the life lessons athletes may learn through their
athletic training and participation, the reality may be far different. See JAMES L. SCHULMAN &
WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 265
(2001) (finding that athletes are no more likely to provide leadership than are their non-athlete
peers). Many coaches, in fact, socialize their players "into young men with warped perspectives on
obedience, morality and competition. These young men are often unable to function appropriately in
the real world... until they learn new methods of behavior and thought." Telander, supra note 39,
at 98. Sociologists studying this phenomenon have concluded that coaches often
educate participants in a "dysfunctional manner.". . . [T]he things players are taught are not
How often is blind obedience taught in place
what they need to learn to be good citizens ....
of the courage of conviction? How often is intimidation taught under the guise of tenacity?
How often is manipulation and deliberate rule violation taught as strategy? How often is
composure and sportsmanship mistaken for lack of effort?"
Id. at 98-99 (quoting sociologists John Massengale and James Frey of the University of Nevada at
Las Vegas, who noted that coaches are "experts at brainwashing, at keeping their players
subservient, thankful for the simplest of rewards," and explaining that many former football players
cannot function "on their own").
225. Athletic services on the football and men's basketball teams cannot be required elements of
any course of study because if they were, regular, non-athlete students could not meet that
requirement, and as a result could not major in that particular course of study. NCAA rules require
all courses for which credit may be granted to be open to all students, not solely to athletes. See Div.
I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 16.02.3, 16.12.1.1., 16.12.2.1. Consequently, playing football or
basketball cannot, under NCAA rules, be a requirement for any major.
226. See Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10 ("'Since the individuals are rendering
services which are directly related to-and indeed constitute an integral part of-their educational
program, they are serving primarily as students and not primarily as employees. In our view this is a
very fundamental distinction for it means that the mutual interests of the students and the
educational institution in the services being rendered are predominantly academic rather than
economic in nature."' (quoting St. Clare's Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002)); see id., slip op. at 10,
2004 WL 1588744, at *14.
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that their relationship with the university was not economic. In the case
of employee-athletes, the dearth of educational content in their services
as athletes confirms that their working relationships with their
universities are economic, not primarily academic.2 27
c.

Under the Third Factor,Athletes Are Supervised by Coaching
Staff Not by Faculty

The third criterion the Board used in Brown to conclude that graduate
assistants were not employees was the nature of the "graduate student
assistants' relationship with the faculty. 2 28 At Brown University, faculty
oversaw the functions graduate assistants carried out and decided
whether graduate assistants' scholarships would be renewed.2 29 In this
regard, the Board heavily emphasized the supervisory role of faculty, as
opposed to university administrators, to show that the work of TAs,
RAs, and proctors was part of their education. 230 The Board pointedly
observed that the faculty members who oversaw the teaching and
research of the graduate assistants were the same individuals who taught
them, supervised their studies, and evaluated their dissertations.231
Because the graduate assistants were supervised by faculty members,
rather than by administrators or other staff, teaching and learning
functions were occurring through the services being performed, and,
therefore, graduate assistants were acting as students, not as employees.
The situation regarding employee-athletes is diametrically opposed to
that of the graduate assistants in Brown. Faculty have no supervisory
role whatsoever over the athletic services athletes provide.2 32 Rather,
coaches and athletic staff, who are not faculty at those schools, supervise
athletes.233 The fact that coaches, not faculty members, supervise the
227. See infra Part IlI.B.2.b.(4).
228. Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10.
229. See id., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9.
230. See id. ("Brown's faculty oversees graduate student assistants in their role as a research or

teaching assistant ....[M]ost [graduate student assistants] perform under the direction and control
of faculty members ...[and] generally do not teach independently ....RAs performing research
do so under grants applied for by faculty members,... [who] are often the same faculty that teach
or advise the graduate assistant student in their [sic] coursework or dissertation preparation.").
231. See id.
232. Faculty do not review a player's athletic contribution to the university and usually may not
even observe practice, let alone comment upon an athlete's performance or make suggestions for
improvement.
233. Coaches are not eligible for tenure, they do not engage in scholarly research or publication,
and they rarely, if ever, teach courses that are open to the general student body. See Steven G.
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athletes' services demonstrates that players' work as athletes is not
educational in nature. Moreover, university faculty have no authority
whatsoever over renewal of an athletic grant-in-aid; that decision lies
solely in the hands of the coach,234 and, therefore, cannot fairly be
described as academic. Under Brown, these facts establish that
employee-athletes are not students with respect to their services but are
employees and that their relationship with their universities regarding
those services is not primarily academic.
d.

Under the Fourth Factor,Athletic ScholarshipsAre Compensation
for Athletic Services, Not Merely FinancialAid

Finally, the Brown Board relied upon a fourth element in concluding
that the graduate assistants were primarily students and not employees.
The financial rewards graduate assistants received were not pay for
teaching and research services performed, the Board asserted, but were
merely financial aid to permit attendance at Brown.2 35 In support of this
conclusion, the Board underscored two aspects of graduate assistants'
financial packages. First, the amount provided to TAs and RAs was the
same as that provided to graduate fellows for whom no teaching or

Poskanzer, Spotlight on the Coaching Box: The Role of the Athletic Coach Within the Academic
Institution, 16 J.C. & U.L. 1, 9-18 (1989) (asking in the 1980s whether coaches may fairly be
considered faculty and concluding even then that they could not); id. at 18, 28-34 (indicating that
coaches are not normally placed in the tenure system and arguing that they should not be eligible for
tenure); Edward N. Stoner II & Arlie R. Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract
("MCC"): A Better Starting Point for Your Next Negotiation, 16 J.C. & U.L. 43, 46 (1989)
(indicating that "[a] coach does not teach in a classroom and the precepts of academic freedom do
not apply to coaches" and giving reasons why few coaches would request tenure when negotiating
their contracts) (citation omitted); cf Fish, Sign of the Times, supra note 19 (describing coaches'
recent contract terms and failing to note that those terms impose teaching or scholarship obligations
or that they place coaches in the tenure system); Fish, Sweet Deals, supra note 19 (same). As
college sports have become professionalized, occasional instances in which some coaches
functioned like faculty have all but disappeared. NCAA policy changes evidence this trend. In the
1980s the NCAA recommended, but did not require, that institutions' contracts with coaches should
be "similar to those entered into with the other members of the faculty ... [and] should include the
assignment of faculty rank, benefits of tenure .... and such other rights.. . as are enjoyed by other
members of the contracting institution's faculty." NCAA, 1986-87 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 209 (1986). Significantly, not only has this policy never been
mandated, it is no longer even recommended with respect to Division I institutions. See NCAA,
2004-05 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/
divisioni_.manual/2004-05/2004-05 dl manual.pdf (failing to include such language).
234. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
235. See Brown, slip op. at 6-7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9-10.
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236

research activity was required.
Second, the fact that financial aid
awarded to graduate assistants was unrelated to the quality or value of
services they rendered indicated that the payment was not compensation
for services rendered, but was financial assistance to attend school.237
At first blush, it might appear as though the Board's reasoning with
respect to this fourth factor would equally apply to grant-in-aid athletes.
After all, such athletes receive the same amount of financial aid, i.e., full
tuition, room, board, and books, 238 as do non-athlete full-scholarship
students. In addition, the amount of scholarship each athlete receives
does not necessarily depend upon his intrinsic value as a football or
basketball player. Thus, a journeyman offensive lineman can receive the
same full scholarship as a star quarterback. From this, the NCAA could
argue, as did Brown University with regard to graduate assistants, that
"grants-in-aid" 239 are merely financial assistance enabling these students
to attend college.
In both of the underpinnings for this fourth criterion, however, the
Board's reasoning is fallacious. First, it does not follow that TAs and
RAs were not receiving compensation, but merely financial aid, simply
because they received the same amount as did some other graduate
fellows. In determining whether a payment is compensation for services
rendered, the proper inquiry is whether the payment would cease were
services to be withheld, 240 not whether a third party-a fellow in this
instance-receives like payment without providing similar services. In
other words, the fact that Brown University voluntarily supports fellows
does not mean distributions of similar amounts to TAs and RAs are not
compensation for the services they render. Indeed, were TAs and RAs to
withhold their teaching and research services either collectively or

236. See id., slip op. at 3, 6-7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *3, *9-10.
237. See id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *6, (referencing Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974)); id., slip op. at 4, 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1488744, at *5, *11 n.27.
238. See Div. IMANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.7, 15.02.2, .5.
239. The NCAA requires schools to refer to the agreement between the university and the athlete
as a "grant-in-aid" or scholarship, rather than as an employment contract providing pay or other
compensation. Article 12.1.1 of the Division I Manual makes it clear that an athlete is not permitted
to receive "pay" for athletic services: "An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be
eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his or her
athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport." DIv. I MANUAL, supra note
3, art. 12.1.1. And under NCAA bylaws, the grant-in-aid is not considered "pay" and thus is
permitted. See id. art. 12.01.4.
240. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 24, at 608-09 (asserting that grants-in-aid are compensation for
services because athletes lose scholarships by withdrawing from their sports).
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individually, it is inconceivable they would continue to receive full
"scholarships" and "stipends." Thus, this "financial aid" must be
compensation for services.24 1
Additionally, even if the Board in Brown were correct that the proper
inquiry is whether a third party receives the same financial benefit
without having to provide services, the athlete situation is vastly
different. Athletic grants-in-aid are never given without the requirement
of athletic services being rendered. Even third- or fourth-string athletes
who do not play during games must still come to practice, abide by team
rules, undertake required and "voluntary" training, and, in short, perform
all the services other grant-in-aid athletes must perform.24 2 In fact, no
third parties receive athletic grants-in-aid without having to participate
in the athletic program as a condition of continued receipt.
Comparing the athletic scholarship with the merit-based or needbased scholarship awarded to a non-athlete undergraduate also shows
that the former is compensation. Athletic scholarships are granted only if
the athlete provides athletic services, while merit- or need-based
scholarships awarded to non-athletes require no such services in return.
The latter are given to enable students simply to attend the university. In
addition, the athletes' situation is distinct from that of graduate assistants
in that undergraduate employee-athletes often have all costs waived
while regular undergraduate students rarely receive scholarships
covering all costs of attendance.
Likewise, the Board's conclusion that payments to TAs and RAs are
financial aid, not compensation for services, does not follow from the
fact that the amount of aid was unrelated to the quality of services
rendered or to their value on an open market. All over America, where
employees' wages are set either by collective bargaining agreements
establishing uniform wages or under federal or state civil service rules
similarly setting uniform wages within classifications, employees
receive equivalent compensation regardless of the quality of the services
each renders or their intrinsic value.24 3 Notwithstanding their uniform
241. Similarly, under NCAA rules, college athletes may lose their athletic scholarships if they fail
to perform their athletic services. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.3.4.1(d), 15.3.5.1;
Lynch, supra note 24, at 609; Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003);
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). In fact, they may, and often do, lose
their scholarships merely by failing to perform well athletically. See id.; Interview with anonymous
employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003).
242. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); Interview with anonymous
employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003).
243. Uniform wages are standard in collective bargaining agreements. See United Mine Workers
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wages, it could hardly be argued that such individuals are not
employees.
Even if the Board's reliance on uniformity of wages as evidence that
service providers are not employees were logically correct, once again,
the athlete situation is distinctly different from that faced by the graduate
assistants in Brown. In Brown, the decision to make compensation or
wages uniform among graduate students was the university's, acting
independently of any other university. 244 In the case of athletes,
however, the uniformity of compensation for all grant-in-aid athletes is
mandated by agreement among NCAA member schools.245 More
specifically, NCAA member institutions made athlete wages uniform by
agreeing to limit athlete compensation to the level of the cost of
attending each respective university.246 This anticompetitive and illegal
arrangement 247 can hardly serve as a justification for concluding that
athletes are not employees any more than a wage-fixing arrangement
among employers in industry would render their workers nonemployees. Without the NCAA's wage-fixing agreement standardizing
the price of labor, there is no reason to believe athletes' wages would
remain uniform. The free market would operate, allowing those athletes
with the greatest skill to garner the greatest economic rewards. In
addition, the fact that the fixed wage for athletes coincides with the cost
of attending school does not transform what is compensation for services
into non-compensatory financial aid. The fact that the compensation
comes in the form of in-kind benefits, e.g., tuition, room, board, and
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965) ("This Court has recognized that a legitimate aim
of any national labor organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence
of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on differences in such standards."
(citation omitted)). "Inevitably, this process produces standardization of employment terms for
particular classes of employees." Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, Professional
Football'sDraft EligibilityRule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375,

384 (1984); see Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargainingby Athletes: Of Superstarsin Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1971).

244. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 3-4, 2004 WL 1588744, at *4-5 (July 13,
2004) (noting that Brown University, not other universities, sets graduate assistant stipends and
tuition remission levels at Brown).
245. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1. In actuality, athletes' wages are not uniform
because superior athletes, those with the most potential earning power, commonly receive illicit
payments from boosters, and indeed from the universities themselves, in defiance of NCAA rules
limiting compensation to the grant-in-aid. See supra note 160. This black-market compensation is
evidence of varying market values for different athletes' services and demonstrates that their actual
compensation is anything but uniform.
246. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1.
247. See supra note 37.
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books, likewise makes it no less compensatory.
In sum, the Board's decision in Brown was grounded upon the idea
that the relationship between graduate assistants and the university was
not an economic one, but rather was primarily an academic one.249 This
followed from the Board's view of the Act as a "'vision of a
fundamentally economic relationship between employers and
employees.' 250 Because the underlying premise of the Act is to cover
"assert jurisdiction
only economic relationships, 25' the Board refused to
252
over relationships that are 'primarily educational.'
2.

Employee-Athletes Are Not PrimarilyStudents and Their
Relationship with Their Universities Is an Economic One

Brown stands for the proposition that graduate assistants are not
employees under the NLRA because their relationship with universities
is primarily academic and not economic.253 The relationship between
employee-athletes and their universities, by contrast, is nearly
exclusively economic, or commercial, and is decidedly not
predominantly academic. Thus, by virtue of the Board's own reasoning
in Brown, employee-athletes are employees under the National Labor
Relations Act.
Having shown that employee-athletes meet the common law
definition of "employee," 254 and that the four factors used in Brown also
support our thesis, we now proceed to a discussion of the facts
surrounding the economic and academic status of employee-athletes to
confirm the applicability of the Brown Board's reasoning to them. The
248. Under analogous federal income tax principles, both cash and in-kind benefits can be
compensatory. "Gross income includes income realized in any form, whether in money, property, or
services. Income may be realized, therefore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, stock,
or other property, as well as in cash." Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (2005). More specifically, "[i]f
services are paid for in exchange for other services, the fair market value of such other services
taken in payment must be included in income as compensation." Id. § 1.61 -2(d)(1).
249. See Brown, slip op. at 1, 2004 WL 1588744, at *1.
250. Id., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *8 (quoting WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B.
1273, 1275 (1999)) (alteration in original).
251. See id., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *8.
252. Id., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *8.
253. See id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7.
254. See supra Part III.A. Significantly, the majority in Brown did not find that graduate
assistants were not common law employees, only that they were not statutory employees. Only
Member Schaumber contended that graduate assistants were not common law employees. See
Brown, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *11 n.27.
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remainder of this Article sets out those facts, first focusing in Part
III.B.2.a on the entrenched economic nature of the college sports
industry, and then documenting in Part III.B.2.b the lack of genuine
academic experiences for athletes, while simultaneously revealing that
even the NCAA's academic rules are designed to further universities'
economic interests more than athletes' academic needs.
a.

College Sports Are Thoroughly Commercial

To comply with the teachings of Brown, the NCAA must argue that
athletes are primarily students and only secondarily athletes. 5 This
notion, in turn, is grounded upon the related assertion that college sports
are amateur, not commercial. Neither is true. Many of the athletes in
revenue-generating sports attend universities not for their intellectual
development but in the nearly always unrealistic hope they will play
professionally later.256 More importantly, the college sports industry is
far from "amateur." Instead, revenue-generating sports are highly
professional and commercial in every sense save that of their obligations
to their employees. College sports is a fabulously profitable commercial
enterprise as well as a lucrative component of the sports entertainment
industry. Athletes generate great wealth for their university-employers
through their skill and effort. As a result, their services and their
relationships with their university-employers are deeply commercial.
The commercial nature of the college sports industry is illustrated by
revealing the vast wealth it generates. 7 While the $6 billion NCAACBS contract is an exquisite example, 258 it is only one of many. Like the
NCAA, the conference entities into which the universities group
themselves also sell rights to broadcast their members' football and
basketball games. 259 In so doing, they, too, profit handsomely. For
example, the Southeastern Conference generated $122.5 million in the
2002-03 season,260 largely from the sale of rights to televise regular255. See Brown, slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7.
256. See infra note 399.
257. The financial structure and size of the college sports industry will be explored
depth in a forthcoming article.
258. See supra note 11 (describing NCAA's $6 billion sale to CBS of the rights to
March Madness over an eleven-year period).
259. See Riggs, supra note 151, at 138. A few universities, like Notre Dame, have
independent, opting not to join a conference, but instead to reserve for themselves the
value of their television rights. See id.

in greater
broadcast
remained
economic

260. See SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE, IRS FORM 990, EIN 63-0377461 (2003) (on file with
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season football and men's basketball games, conference basketball
tournament games, its football championship game, and post-season
bowl games. 61 Conferences likewise profit when their universities win,
or even attend, tournaments. 262 At the end of the 2003-04 college
football season, college bowl games generated more than $181 million
263
in additional revenue for the conferences of participating universities.
The following year, bowls distributed nearly $190 million. 26 Most

revenues earned by the NCAA and conferences are then distributed to
their college and university members. 6 5
In addition to harvesting the financial benefit of distributions from the
NCAA and from conferences, colleges and universities with successful
athletic programs also enjoy significant revenue directly from their
operations. Ticket sales alone generate substantial income. For the fall
2003 season, more than 3.6 million fans attended football games at the
top-five-attended schools.166 In 2004, Division I men's basketball games

authors).
261. See id. In another example, the Big Ten Tournament netted $21.9 million in its first five
years from the sale of broadcasting rights and tickets as well as from corporate sponsorships. See
Joe Rexrode, Success Story: Big Ten Event Has Made Money, Helped Teams Get Preparedfor
NCAA Tourney, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, available at http://www.greenandwhite.com/
mens_basketball/p_030312 bigtentourney 1c.html.
262. See 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 14. One athlete we interviewed commented that
his school was "compensated well for being invited to the field of sixty-four. We were taken out for
a steak dinner," he said, "that was our reward.... How much money did the school make?" There is
an "inequitable relationship between people generating the money and the people who distribute the
money," another said.
263. See NCAA, 2003-04 Postseason Football Analysis of Excess Bowl Revenue and Expense
by Conference, http://www/ncaa.org/financial/postseasonfootball/2003-04/2003ExcessRevenue
.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005); NCAA, 2003-04 Postseason Football Summary of Institutional
Expenses,
http://www.ncaa.org/financial/postseason-football/2003-04/2003summarylnstitutional
Expenses.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
264. See Paul Pedersen, College Bowl Games Spread the Wealth, TREASURE COAST BUS. J., Jan.
15, 2005, at Al.
265. Thus, in 2003-04, Division I universities received NCAA distributions totaling more than
$280.1 million. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. Annual conference distributions to
university members are also significant. In 2002-03, the Southeastern Conference distributed more
than $103 million to its twelve university members, averaging $8.6 million each. See
SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE, supra note 260.
266. See FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE, supra note 36, at 4. The five universities with the highest
average attendance per football game were Michigan, Penn State, Tennessee, Ohio State, and
Georgia. Id. The University of Michigan enjoyed the largest per-game attendance in the nation, with
an average in 2003 of 110,918 fans. 1d. In fall 2005, season tickets there cost $350 per seat. Ticket
revenues alone could, therefore, exceed $38.5 million for the year. See U-M Reveals Football Ticket
Prices,LANSING ST. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at 2C.
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drew more than 25.5 million attendees.2 67
Not surprisingly, successful athletic programs derive the most
income, and the greatest revenue follows particularly successful
seasons.2 68 Of the $280.1 million the NCAA distributed among member
conferences in 2004,269 $105.3 million was divided among the
conferences based upon the teams' tournament performances. 270 That
year, each conference received approximately $141,000 for every game
a conference member played in the preceding six tournaments, other
than for the three final tournament games. 27' Thus, as a general rule, the
greater the number of teams from a given conference participating in the
tournament, and the further those teams advance, the more money the
NCAA distributes to that conference.27 2 In 2005, conferences received
an estimated $152,000 for each tournament game, other than the three
final games, that a conference member played in the preceding six
tournaments. 273 Total distributions to all conferences based on
267. See BASKETBALL RECORDS, supra note 36. At the five universities with the highest average
attendance per men's basketball game, over 1.5 million fans attended games, an average of more
than 20,500 per game. Id. at 263. The top five programs in per-game attendance were Kentucky,
Syracuse, North Carolina, Louisville, and Maryland. Id. The University of Kentucky enjoyed the
largest average per-game attendance. See id. In the 200405 season, ticket prices there ranged from
$22 to $27 per seat. See Univ. of Ky. Athletic Dep't, Men's Basketball Ticket Information,
[hereinafter
http://www.ukathletics.com/index.php?s=&changewellid=2&url-articleid= 11359
Kentucky Ticket Information] (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). With an average per-game attendance at
Kentucky of 22,710, see BASKETBALL RECORDS, supra note 36, at 263, ticket sales generated
between $499,620 and $613,170 per game, for a total of $8.5 million to $10.4 million for the
season. See Kentucky Ticket Information, supra (providing University of Kentucky 2004-05 home
schedule of seventeen games).
268. See Frank, supra note 187; Telander, supra note 39, at 97; Martin, supra note 11.
269. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supranote 3, at 24.
270. See id.; NCAA, 2004-05 Revenue Distribution Plan, para. 5, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/finance/
revenuedistribution-plan (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter NCAA, Revenue Distribution
Plan]; Stefan Fatsis, Money Drives March Madness, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 16, 2004, at C 1.
271. See Tim Martin, Big Ten's Share of NCAA Pot May Dwindle, CENTRE DAILY TIMES (State
College, Penn.), Mar. 16, 2004, at BI; see also Tom Lambert, Spartan Fever: March Madness is
Sweeping East Lansing as MSU Basketball Takes Center Stage at the Final Four: Fans Revel in
Men's, Women's Success, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 31, 2005, at IA; Suggs, supra note 11; NCAA,
Distribution of Basketball-Related Moneys According to Number of Units by Conference, 1999[hereinafter
2004,
http://www.ncaa.org/financial/revenue-distribution/dl_bkbdistribution.pdf
NCAA, Distribution Units by Conference] (last visited Mar. 23, 2005); NCAA, Revenue
Distribution Plan, supra note 270.
272. See Martin, supra note 271, at B I; Martin, supra note 11. Conferences have their own
internal agreements governing the distribution of tournament revenues among their members. The
Big Ten, for example, divides NCAA tournament receipts evenly among its eleven member schools
after participating schools' expenses are paid. See id.
273. See NCAA, Distribution Units by Conference, supra note 271; NCAA, Revenue
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tournament play alone aggregated approximately $113.7 million.274
NCAA Division I football programs with the most successful seasons
may be eligible to compete in the Bowl Championship Series (BCS),
comprised of the Rose Bowl, the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, the Nokia Sugar
Bowl, and the FedEx Orange Bowl. The total revenue from the 2005-06
championship series, excluding the Rose Bowl, was projected to be
$93,150,000.275 Of that sum, conferences of participating teams received
$86,630,000.276 In addition, the fourth BCS game, the Rose Bowl,
generated nearly $29 million for participating schools in 2003-04.277
Winning seasons also generate substantial increases in revenues from
the sale of athletic apparel and other merchandise bearing the logo of the
school or the number of a star player.278 Athletic success likewise
stimulates more interest among, and revenue from, schools' corporate
sponsors or "partners., 279 Finally, but not insignificantly, universities
with successful athletic programs also derive the ancillary financial
of indirect revenue from alumni donations
benefit of "millions of dollars
280
and increased enrollment.,
Distribution Plan, supra note 270; see also Lambert, supra note 271 (indicating that conferences
receive no additional revenue if their teams advance to the final tournament games); Suggs, supra
note II (explaining which tournament games entitle universities to payment under the NCAA
formula).
274. See NCAA, Revenue Distribution Plan, supra note 270; NCAA, Distribution Units by
Conference, supra note 271.
275. See Bowl Championship Series, Revenue Distribution, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
index.cfm?page=revenue [hereinafter BCS, Revenue Distribution] (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). Rose
Bowl revenue is excluded because that money is governed under a separate contract and is not
collected by, or distributed from, the BCS entity. The Rose Bowl organization, not the BCS, pays
the conferences of Rose Bowl participants directly. See id.
276. See id.
277. See NCAA, 2003-04 Distribution of BCS Revenue, http://www.ncaa.org/financial/
postseason_football/2003-04/2003BcsRevenue.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
278. See Tim Martin, The Green Machine, LANSING ST. J., Dec. 16, 2001, at IA (noting how
MSU's licensing revenue reached a record $1.7 million following its NCAA men's basketball title
in 2000); see also D. Stanley Eitzen, Slaves of Big-Time College Sports, USA TODAY, Sept. 1,
2000, (Magazine), at 27 (estimating $2.5 billion in annual sales of licensed college merchandise,
generating $100 million for universities annually); id. (noting that the University of Michigan earns
approximately $6 million annually from sales of merchandise).
279. Corporate sponsor Comcast Cable, for example, paid the University of Maryland
$25 million for naming rights to that school's basketball arena. See Student-Athletes, BALT. SUN,
May 5, 2004, at 18A. Value City will pay $12.5 million over several years for such rights at Ohio
State University. See Tim Martin, CorporateSponsorships Net Millionsfor Ohio St., LANSING ST.
J., Dec. 16, 2001, at 6A.
280. Schott, supra note 24 (citation omitted); see also PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS,
SPORTS AND THE LAW 796 (2d ed. 1998) (asserting that Patrick Ewing's performance at
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Under Brown, our thesis requires a showing that the athlete's
relationship with his university is not primarily academic, but is instead
commercial in nature. 28 The huge financial payoffs universities reap
from their winning football and men's basketball teams demonstrate that
these institutions have a powerful incentive to focus on athletic success,
not on academics. The staggering wealth these sports generate makes
plain their fundamentally commercial nature.
b.

The University-Athlete Relationship Is an Economic One:
Academic StandardsAre Formulatedto Serve Universities'
CommercialInterests Rather than Bona Fide Academic Values

Just as the university-athlete relationship is undeniably commercial, it
is decidedly not primarily academic. To demonstrate this fact, we next
examine the state of academics for employee-athletes in Division I
revenue-generating sports. Even NCAA academic standards are
designed to serve the employers' enormous commercial interests,
enabling universities to recruit and retain gifted athletes, rather than to
promote true academic achievement. The weight of the evidence
demonstrates that the majority of these employee-athletes are not
primarily students.282 On the contrary, most of them are inadequately
prepared for academic inquiry and, once enrolled, face enormous
obstacles to fully experiencing the intellectual aspect of university
life. 283 The NCAA's insistence on denoting college athletes as "studentathletes" is a clear attempt to camouflage their true function as
employees in the commercial college sports entertainment industry.
Academic ability is independent of athletic talent.284 Consequently, a
Georgetown University for four years helped generate a forty-seven percent increase in the number
of applications and a forty-point increase in its freshman SAT scores); Laura Freedman, Note, Pay
or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 699-702 (2003) (documenting significant increases in donations and
applications at the University of Maryland following particularly successful seasons in football and
men's basketball).
281. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7 (July 13,

2004).
282. See Part Ill.B.2.b.
283. The demands of the classroom are commonly viewed by coaches as "secondary" and as an
inconvenient distraction from the real purpose, winning on the field. Interview with anonymous
employee-athlete (Nov. 10, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003);
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003).
284. This lack of correlation is the reason why some great athletes lack intellectual ability while
others are extremely intelligent.
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university program that screens admissions applications based upon
potential academic success necessarily excludes many talented athletes,
leaving a team on the playing field with diminished athletic potential. As
former NCAA Executive Director Byers remembered:
The big timers-building a national entertainment businesswanted the great players on the field, whether or not they met
customary academic requirements. In the new open-door era, [in
which virtually all high school seniors were academically
"eligible" for college athletics because of the wholesale
abrogation of academic

entrance

requirements, 285 ] victory-

minded coaches sensed a potential recruiting paradise.2 86
To avail themselves of the best potential players, irrespective of
academic ability, colleges and universities have created academic
programs in name only.287 These programs foster the illusion that
athletes are true students without subjecting them to a genuine academic
experience-one that would interfere with practice or playing schedules
or one that would disqualify some of the best athletes from the school
and, thus, from the team. In favoring commercial success over academic
standards, colleges and universities have minimized academic entrance
requirements for athletes, 288 weakened academic standards, 28 9 diluted
curricula, 290 assigned responsibilities to athletes that would conflict with
any meaningful academic program,291 and stood by as wave after wave
fails to graduate or even to learn.292 Consequently, the label "student285. In 1973, NCAA members completely abolished minimum academic standards for entering
students by repealing the so-called "1.600 rule" at its annual convention. See BYERS, supra note 6,
at 165, 297, 339; Timeline-1940 to 1979, supra note 182. The 1.600 rule had been a modest
attempt to ensure entering athletes were minimally prepared to do college-level work. Under the
rule, the athlete had to obtain a minimum high school grade point average (GPA) in combination
with a minimum SAT or ACT score, which together would predict his ability to earn a 1.600 (or C-)
GPA during his freshman year of college. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 165, 158-59; Timeline-1940
to 1979, supra note 182.
286. BYERS, supra note 6, at 340.

287. See infra Part lll.B.2.b.(4). "IN]either the NCAA nor the student-athlete pursues [the
NCAA's academic goals]." Chin, supra note 3,at 1234.
288. See infra Part llI.B.2.b.(l).
289. See infra Parts lII.B.2.b.(l), (4)-(7).
290. See infra Part lII.B.2.b.(4).
291. See supra Part III.A. 1;infra Part Ill. B.2.b.(2), (3).
292. See infra Parts I1.B.2.b.(1)-(8). Allowing aid to be granted on the basis of athletic ability
rather than academic potential or financial need, and relaxing entrance requirements for athletes,
meant giving up hope that "athletes be genuine students, capable of profiting from higher
education." BYERS, supra note 6, at 153.
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athlete" is mere window dressing for individuals who, in substance, are
employees.
(1) SpecialAdmissions Practicesand NCAA Admissions Policies
Serve Universities' CommercialInterests and Allow
Enrollment of Athletes Who Are Not Bona Fide Students
The erosion of the college athlete's academic experience begins prior
to enrollment. Many athletes lack the academic preparation or ability
required to benefit from a university educational program. The system
by which universities admit athletes despite inadequate academic
credentials is commonly known as "special admissions. 293 Utilized
originally to grant admission to children of some alumni and other
donors, it has become an important tool of athletic departments to enroll
promising athletes with inadequate academic training or potential.2 94
The proportion of special admissions students, or "special admits," on
revenue-generating teams like football and men's basketball is
dramatically higher than for non-revenue sports and for the student body
as a whole. 295 Indeed, some talented athletes have been admitted despite
being unable to read. 96 Not surprisingly, special admissions athletes
293. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 602; Chin, supra note 3, at 1239-40.
294. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.1.7.1.1 (allowing Division I programs to engage in
special admissions practices); see also DUDERSTADT, supra note 24, at 193-95; SACK &
STAUROWSKY, supra note 14; SCHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 224, at 49 (documenting the
divergence of athletes' SAT scores from student averages at Division I-A private and public
universities, with greatest divergence among men's basketball and football players at private
schools, and among football, wrestling, and men's basketball players at public schools); ZIMBALIST,
supra note 14, at 16-53; Lynch, supra note 24, at 602-03, 610; Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 (noting
that special admissions programs are considered the only means for obtaining sufficient numbers of
superior athletes because many are not academically qualified); Derek Bok, The Purely Pragmatic
University: The Costs of Commercializingthe Academy, HARV. MAG., May-June 2003, at 28, 2830; Jim Naughton, Athletes Lack Grades and Test Scores of Other Students, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., July 25, 1997, at A43.
295. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1239-40. "It is estimated that over thirty percent of football and
men's basketball players are special admissions students, compared with just four percent of the
regular student body." Riggs, supra note 151, at 141 (citing Jonathan Marshall, Studies Say that
Colleges Exploit Athletes, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1993, at El). "At some schools, sixty percent of
special admissions [students] are athletes," and their concentration among some other sports teams
is even greater. Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 & n.224 (citing Craig Smith, UW Tops in "Special
Admits "-485% of Athletes Enter with Low Standards, SEATTLE TIMES, May 20, 1991, at BI). "[I]n
1989 over 85% of the University of Washington's football and men's basketball recruits were
special admits." Id. at 1240 n.224 (citing Smith, supra).
296. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240; see also 135 CONG. REc. 18,028-29 (1989) (statement of
Sen. Simon) (describing how star football player Dexter Manley could not read beyond a second
grade level after four years as a student at Oklahoma State University); BYERS, supra note 6, at 299
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consistently underperform their peers in their college classes.2 97 Because
298
colleges and universities so frequently offer admission to star athletes
who are not prepared to do academic work,299 such athletes often enroll
with no real chance to benefit from the universities' educational
programs.
Recent amendments to NCAA legislation weaken initial academic
eligibility requirements for potential athletes, thus exalting athletic
promise over intellectual preparedness. Enacted in 1992, Proposition 16
sets forth the initial minimum academic requirements for a Division I
athlete to be considered a "qualifier" and therefore eligible to play,
practice, and receive financial aid during his freshman year.300 Under the
legislation, a sliding scale is used to calibrate a required minimum grade
point average (GPA) and standardized test score (e.g., SAT) so the
higher an athlete's GPA, the lower his minimum SAT score may be to
achieve qualifier status.30 ' Prior to 2003, athletes could not be qualifiers
unless they earned a minimum combined verbal and math score of 820
on the SAT.30 2 Recently, however, the NCAA relaxed the standard,
making it possible for athletes earning a combined verbal and math score
of 400 on the SAT to be qualifiers. 30 3 A score of 400 is the result if the
(describing how Kevin Ross claimed not to have learned to read despite having spent four years as a
basketball player at Creighton University).
297. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240-41. Realizing they can gain university admission with subpar academic, but elevated athletic, credentials often prompts athletes to underperform academically
in high school as well. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 300-01; Chin, supra note 3, at 1242.
298. Universities admit star athletes with inadequate academic training or ability, not to be
students, but to form superior, semi-professional athletic teams in their revenue-generating sports.
More than a decade ago, economist Robert W. Brown estimated that "each football player recruited
by 'special admissions' earns major NCAA schools an average of $155,000 in additional revenues."
Riggs, supra note 151, at 141 (citing Marshall, supra note 295). Patrick Ewing alone generated an
estimated $12.3 million in value for Georgetown University in the 1980s. See id. at 142 (citing Pat
Ewing Made Moneyfor His College Team Too, JET, Jan. 20, 1986, at 49).
299. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 299. "Isn't it really academically indefensible to grant
admission to UCLA to someone with a 700 on his SAT and a 2.000 grade-point average? I can't see
why we put ourselves in these positions." Thoughts of the Day, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999,
available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991220/active/3626n26.html (quoting Charles E.
Young, Chancellor, Univ. of Cal., L.A., 1990).
300. Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 14.3.1, 14.3.1.1(a)-(b), 14.3.1.1.1; see also Kay Hawes,
Opportunity vs. Exploitation?: Concerns Over Standards and Higher-EducationAccess Sparked
Debates in '90s, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/
19991220/active/3626n28.html.
301. Conversely, the higher the athlete's SAT score, the lower his GPA may be without losing
"qualifier" status. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, at 141, art. 14.3.1.1.1 (former qualifier index).
302. See id.
303. See id. at 143, art. 14.3.1.1.1 (current qualifier index); Tom Farrey, It's All Academic Now,
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3 4
applicant gets every question on those two parts of the test wrong. 0
Under the new NCAA rule, a high school senior who misses every
question on the SAT, but who has a GPA of 3.55, may be admitted to an
NCAA member school where he will be eligible to compete as a
freshman in intercollegiate athletics. 305 Thus, the NCAA requires no
demonstration of any objective academic ability whatsoever under the
SAT as long as the athlete meets the subjective GPA element. And while
the 3.55 GPA requirement might appear to be academically demanding,
grades have notoriously been subject to manipulation by high school
teachers and administrators.30 6 Moreover, special high schools primarily
for athletes have begun to proliferate.30 7 They appear to play the major
role of ensuring that athletes receive the grades needed to make them

ESPN.cOM, Oct. 31, 2002, http://espn.go.com/columns/farreytom/1453693.html; see also Jeffrey
M. Waller, A Necessary Evil: Proposition 16 and Its Impact on Academics and Athletics in the
NCAA, I DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 193-94 (2003) (identifying the new
sliding scale as having evolved from the 1992 Proposition 16 legislation).
304. See Farrey, supra note 303; College Board, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/sat/about/sat/FAQ.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006)
(noting in "What do SAT scores look like?" that each part of the SAT is scored on a scale of 200 to
800); id. (noting in "Is it true that you get a 200 on the SAT just for signing your name?" that 200 is
the lowest score the college board reports for each SAT test (verbal and math)).
305. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, at 143, art. 14.3.1.1.1 (current qualifier index). The SAT
provides an objective measure of academic ability because it is not manipulable and can be used to
compare one student with all others who took the SAT nationally, while high school GPA, by
contrast, is only a subjective measure of academic achievement. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 15859.
306. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 159; see also infra notes 307-08 and accompanying text. High
school grades are often enhanced to assist exceptional athletes gain college admission. It is easy to
understand why high school teachers might inflate the grades of an economically disadvantaged
student who happens to be a gifted athlete. Speaking of students at Philadelphia's Franklin High
School, where only about twenty percent of all seniors attend college but where fifty to seventyseven percent of athlete-seniors do so, Dr. Norman Spencer, Franklin's principal, noted that "[o]ur
kids, if they don't get the [athletic] scholarships, they don't go to college." BYERS, supra note 6, at
303 (quoting Dr. Spencer). In many disadvantaged communities, sports are considered to be the
only ticket out of poverty, and teachers inflate grades to enable athletes to obtain the GPAs needed
to make them eligible to play sports in NCAA colleges. "Admiring teachers and principals often
'help' star high school athletes by lowering their grading standards for those individuals." Chin,
supra note 3, at 1240 n.226 (citing Mark Ivey, How Educators Are FightingBig-Money Madness in
Athletics, Bus. WK., Oct. 27, 1986, at 138); see also BYERS, supra note 6, at 303; Steve Wilstein,
Graduation Rates Sour Sweet 16: Study Shows Blacks Less Likely to Get Degree, J. GAZETTE (Ft.
Wayne, Tex.), Mar. 25, 2003, at 1 ("'There are a lot of people in our schools, too many, who think
they're doing young people a favor by promoting them from grade to grade, believing the dream
that this kid is so talented that he's going to make it into the pros. The odds remain staggeringly
against a high school athlete getting a college scholarship, let alone a career in the pros."' (quoting
Professor Lapchick)).
307. See Farrey, supra note 303.
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eligible under NCAA rules for intercollegiate competition.3 °8
(2)

The FreshmanEligibility Rule Is a Barrierto Academic
Success and Helps Coaches StaffBetter Teams

For most of its history, the NCAA forbade freshmen from competing
in varsity sports.3 09 This prohibition reflected the idea that athletes
should devote their first year of college to academic life, unhampered by
the demands of their sports. Becoming successful students in their new
environment was the goal. 310 "Freshman ineligibility... had been
311
accepted as a benchmark of sound management for almost 50 years"
when the NCAA adopted a proposal to eliminate that rule at its 1972
Convention.3 12 In an important and radical departure from settled prior
policy, that legislation permitted freshmen to play in varsity football and
basketball games for the first time.313
If the NCAA and its member institutions were genuinely interested in
players' academic achievements, a requirement like the freshman
ineligibility rule would permit athletes a period to adjust academically to
university life, free from most athletic responsibilities. 314 By choosing to
308. See id. ("[A] small industry of prep schools... serve[s] as eligibility factories for college
prospects. Abuse of the system has become so accepted that in New York City, several
academically troubled basketball players over the past decade have bolstered their GPAs by retaking classes at one unaccredited school, Christopher Robin Academy in Queens, to get high
grades with little or no work as part-time students."); see also Pete Thamel & Duff Wilson, Poor
Grades Aside, Top Athletes Get To College on $399 Diploma, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at I
(describing an unaccredited correspondence school in Florida that in the past two years "polished"
at least twenty-eight athletes' high school grades, enabling many of them to compete in Division I
football programs).
309. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 102, 109.
310. See id. at 162.
311. Id. at 161.
312. See id. at 161-63; Timeline-1940 to 1979, supra note 182.
313. Although the NCAA had previously waived the freshman ineligibility rule, it did so only
during wartime, when a low supply of college athletes required supplementation by including
freshmen. At the end of each war, however, the rule rendering freshmen ineligible to play was
reinstated. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 162.
314. Former University of Virginia coach Terry Holland advocates reinstating a freshman
ineligibility rule as a means of addressing low graduation rates among athletes. He notes that
"partial qualifiers" graduated at higher rates in four years than did "full qualifiers" in six-year
periods. "Partial qualifiers" were athletes under now-repealed NCAA legislation who were
considered academically marginal or at-risk and were, therefore, precluded from competing or
traveling with the team during their first academic year. Outside the Lines: Zero Percent-College
Basketball's Graduation Crisis (ESPN television broadcast Mar. 1, 2002) (on file with authors)
(interviewing Terry Holland).
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repeal the freshman ineligibility rule, the NCAA, colleges, and
universities exalted their commercial interests-fielding 315the best
possible teams-over the educational advancement of athletes.
(3)

Demanding PlayingSchedules Effectively Bar Athletes from
Functioningas True Students

Many other aspects of the athletes' college experience are also
structured to serve the universities' commercial interests and are at odds
with academic considerations. For example, the players' extensive
practice and playing schedules monopolize their lives,316 leaving little
time or energy for academic pursuits.3 17 This time commitment was not
always so onerous. At one time, NCAA restrictions safeguarded an
athlete's study time to some degree. 318 But because winning games
generates enormous revenues, 3 9 coaches sought means of evading the
training limitations. They required athletes, for example, "to enroll in
weight-training courses outside the permissible practice season, 320 and
eventually prevailed upon the NCAA to legalize the practice.3 21
Similarly, because each game represented additional revenue in ticket
sales, television payments, and concession earnings, the322NCAA
lengthened the football and men's basketball seasons over time.
In 1991, the NCAA limited the number of hours players could be
315. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1247-48.
316. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 629 (recommending restrictions on travel to permit athletes
more time as students); Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 (characterizing heavy athletic schedules as
unrealistic for students and as geared towards winning and making money for universities); see also
supra Part III.A. 1.
317. See supra note 127.
318. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 109 (describing the limit to the number of football and men's
basketball games per season to nine and twenty-one, respectively); id. at 102 (noting that the
football season could not commence before classes did); cf id. at 102-03, 109 (describing limitation
by some conferences of training time to two hours per day).
319. See Frank, supra note 187 ("In view of the enormous revenues that can accrue to the most
successful programs, the incentives to compete for the limited number of positions at the top of the
college athletics hierarchy are strong."); supra Part 1lI.B.2.a.
320. BYERS, supra note 6, at 103.

321. See id.
322. The in-season schedule was increased by permitting "special-exception games," and the
post-season football schedule was expanded to eighteen games. Id. at 340. The NCAA and various
conferences also increased the number of games to be played in their post-season tournaments. See
id.; MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING

UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 38 (2000) (noting that football players participating in bowl games
must practice during their final exam period).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:71, 2006

required to practice to four per day and twenty per week,323 but soon
permitted coaches to hold "voluntary" practices, thereby inviting evasion
of the hour limit. 32 4 Although coaches cannot technically require
attendance at these "voluntary" practices, an athlete who does not wish
to risk offending the coach or losing his athletic scholarship must attend.
Thus, even at "voluntary" practices, attendance is expected.325
Unlike attendance at athletic activities, attendance in class is not
always expected. In fact, coaches do not permit athletes to attend classes
326
that conflict with practice, travel to away games, or tournaments.
"Where else... does the college officially require the student to skip
classes for a college-scheduled function or risk loss of financial
assistance?" 327 In fact, athletes report not always being able to select the
major they desire because of course conflicts with team practice
schedules.32t
Many athletes hardly resemble the students dedicated to "learning,

323. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 17.1.5.1.
324. See id. art. 17.02.13; see also BYERS, supra note 6, at 103, 109 (noting that the hour limits
were unenforceable).
325. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 103. Athletes themselves believe "voluntary" practices are
mandatory, as every athlete whom we interviewed confirmed. See SPERBER, supra note 322, at 31
(describing coaches' use of voluntary workouts to determine starting rosters); Lynch, supra note 24,
at 604 (noting that coaches consider such "voluntary" workouts when determining "an athlete's
status on the team"); Wendel, supra note 24 (acknowledging the expectation that athletes will work
out on their own); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Nov. 10, 2003); Interview with
anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept.
25, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003).
That "voluntary" workouts are, in fact, mandatory is broadly understood: "[Lesley] Stahl: But
athletes know if they don't show up, they'll have no shot at playing. Huma: They're pretty much
mandatory. Stahl: It's a charade. Huma: Yeah. I mean they call it 'volandatory' a lot of times,
because you don't know the difference." 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 17.
326. See Suggs, supra note 137 (describing the experience of star tailback Robert Smith, who had
to quit the Ohio State University football team to be able to attend his chemistry class, which
conflicted with morning practice); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Nov. 10, 2003)
(stating that athletes are not allowed to enroll in courses that conflict with practice time); Interview
with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003) (same); Interview with anonymous employeeathlete (Sept. 25, 2003) (same); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003) (same).
But see Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 17.1.5.6.1, 17.1.5.6.1.1 (indicating that member
institutions must not require athletes to skip classes to attend practice except during NCAA
championships or for practice associated with away games).
327. BYERS, supra note 6, at 103.
328. AM 870 SportsTalk with Earle Robinson, supra note 129 (university professor calling in and
reporting that an athlete requested permission to miss half of his scheduled classes and that his
coach had suggested he change his major because the classes conflicted with practice); Interview
with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003); see also SPERBER, supra note 322, at 244-45.
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education, and academic pursuits '329 that the Brown Board envisioned.
Because of their demanding practice and game schedules, these athletes
lack the time and energy for studying, and their obligations to the
athletic department force them to miss classes regularly. An employeeathlete's academic experience during college could hardly be more
different than that of the ordinary student.
(4)

Sham CurriculaDemonstratethat Athletes Are Not Bona Fide
Students

Weak curricula also characterize many athletes' college experiences.
Universities have created light academic schedules to enable athletes to
devote maximum time to their sports.330 Schools regularly devise
academic majors with minimal academic requirements. 33' Courses of
dubious academic value have also become commonplace.3 32 For the
Summer 1986 term, the University of Nevada at Las Vegas approved a
six-credit course called "Contemporary Issues in Social Welfare,"
known to students as "Palm Trees 101." The course was not listed in any
catalog and was taken only by basketball team members during their
nine-game participation in a sixteen-day, international tournament.333
Similarly, basketball players at Ohio University were awarded four
credits for taking a course
offered during the team's fourteen-day
334
summer trip to Europe.
Academic advisors employed in the athletic department commonly
arrange for academically unchallenging courses and schedules 335 for the
329. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9 (July 13, 2004)
(describing the meaning of "student").
330. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 604; Chin, supra note 3, at 1242. More recently, universities
have been increasing course loads to encourage higher graduation rates. See infra Part llI.B.2.b.(7).
331. See SPERBER, supranote 160, at 283-84; Lynch, supra note 24, at 604.
332. Universities offer many such courses. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 300 (Squad Participation;
Theory of Track and Field); id. at 305 (History of American Sport); Goldman, supra note 37, at 206
n. 10 (citing Notebook, SPORTING NEws, Apr. 3, 1989, at 42) (describing courses used to enable star
Temple University football player Paul Palmer to remain academically eligible); Telander, supra
note 39, at 97 (Bowling; Racquetball; Basketball; Leisure; Adjusting to a University); Hockensmith,
supra note 138 (Coaching Football; Issues Affecting Student-Athletes); Hockensmith, supra note
160 (Officiating Basketball; Officiating Softball; Power Volleyball); Outside the Lines: Zero
Percent, supra note 314 (describing courses offered in the past at Duke University, including
Theory and Practice of Coaching; History of the Atlantic Coast Conference Basketball; Ethics of
Sports; Sports Marketing of Collegiate Athletic Events).
333. BYERS, supra note 6, at 308.
334. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 n.227 (citing Gup, supra note 127, at 59).
335. See Friend, supra note 160; Hockensmith, supra note 138; Outside the Lines: Zero Percent,
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athletes in their charge.33 6 Many of these undemanding courses are
populated primarily by athletes.33 7 Athletes report passing classes they
rarely attended.338 Independent studies and summer courses are regularly
employed to give athletes needed credits without requiring much, if any,
academic work. 339 Athletes have claimed that tutors and professors from
the university sometimes do their schoolwork for them 340 and tell them

in advance which version of a final exam will be administered. 4
Athletes have described receiving special treatment from professors,
such as being allowed to take an oral retest after leaving during the
regular written final examination.3 42 Moreover, at some top sports
universities, many courses are so devoid of academic value that if an
athlete transfers to another school, most of the credits do not transfer.34 3

supra note 314. See also id. for a discussion of weak majors most often selected by athletes.
336. See Friend, supra note 160; Tom Friend & Ryan Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, Cars
Among Benefits, ESPN.CoM, Nov. 9, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1919059
&type=story [hereinafter Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash]; Hockensmith, supra note
160; Hockensmith, supranote 138.
337. See Friend, supra note 160 (describing classes in which approximately thirty of the forty
enrolled students were football players); Outside the Lines: Zero Percent,supra note 314.
338. See Mike Freeman, When Values Collide: Clarett Got Unusual Aid in Ohio State Class,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, § 8, at I (stating that a teaching assistant reported that football players
forged names of absent teammates on the class attendance roster); Harrick Steps Down as Coach of
Georgia, supra note 160 (reporting that a player received an "A" in a course he never attended);
Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, supra note 336; Friend, supra note 160.
339. See Suggs, supra note 137 (describing the case of star linebacker Andy Katzenmoyer who
retained eligibility at Ohio State only by passing Golf and AIDS-Awareness classes during a
summer session); Friend, supra note 160; Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, supra note
336; Outside the Lines: Zero Percent,supra note 314 (asserting that summer school has a diluted
educational value and that Carlos Boozer, a former Duke University basketball player, was away
from campus for half of one summer session to play basketball games while he was enrolled in four
on-campus summer-school classes).
340. See Freeman, supra note 338 (reporting allegations of a teaching assistant and an associate
professor that academic tutors sometimes did homework for players); Friend & Hockensmith,
Clarett Claims Cash, supra note 336; Friend, supra note 160; accord Freeman, supra note 338
(reporting a football player's allegations that counselors who work with the university's Office of
Student Athlete Support Services do the players' homework for them).
341. See Friend, supra note 160.
342. See id.; Freeman, supra note 338 (reporting that two graduate assistants corroborated this
allegation, and stating that the athlete was the only student out of eighty in the class allowed such
special treatment); see also Outside the Lines: Zero Percent,supra note 314 (describing statement
of former Duke University basketball player William Avery that one of his professors "didn't
believe in grading on the test" but would simply grade him orally).
343. See Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, supra note 336; Hockensmith, supra note
160; Hockensmith, supra note 138. "'What kind of degree can you get from Ohio State if none of
your classes count at other colleges?' Id. (quoting Sammy Maldonado, a football player who
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In 2004, eleven universities in the Associated Press pre-season top
twenty-five football poll awarded athletes academic credit for playing
football.344 Football players at Ohio State University may repeat coach
Jim Tressel's two-credit "Varsity Football" class "as many as five times
for a total of 10 credits., 34 5 Nearly three dozen Division I-A universities
award academic credit simply for participating in varsity sports. 34 6 Most
sport-specific classes have no syllabus or exam, require no written work,
and are graded on a pass/fail basis. 4 7 One basketball course offered to
varsity players at the University of Georgia did have a twenty-question
final examination. Among the questions were: "How many halves are in
points does a 3-point field
a college basketball game?" and "How many
348
goal account for in a Basketball Game?
Schools have diluted their curricula because many athletes lack
academic ability and time to study. 349 Enrolling such athletes in marginal
courses allows universities to maintain their athletes' eligibility for
competition under NCAA rules. 350 The universities' creation of weak,
academically bankrupt curricula serves their commercial interests in
recruiting and building winning sports programs, but abrogates their
academic mission. 351 Given this widespread phenomenon, the NCAA's
effort to characterize many of these athletes as "students" is
disingenuous. Division I schools admit many athletes primarily to bring

transferred to the University of Maryland with only seventeen of forty Ohio State University credits
after having been "recruited over" by OSU Coach Jim Tressel).
344. Schlabach, supra note 224. Such awarding of credit violates NCAA rules prohibiting special
benefits to athletes that are not available to the student body generally. See supra note 224. Among
the universities awarding credits for participating on the football team were: Brigham Young;
Florida State; Georgia; Nebraska; Ohio State; and Penn State. Schlabach, supra note 224.
345. Schlabach, supra note 224.
346. Id. For example, Ohio State University awards academic credit for participating in twentyone varsity sports, including ice hockey, lacrosse, and pistol and riflery. While those courses count
towards the NCAA's credit-per-term requirements, they nevertheless do not count towards the
athletes' degree requirements. Id.
347. Id. Some athletics participation courses, however, such as the Kansas State Varsity Football
course, use letter grades, and the vast majority of the athletes enrolled received "A"s. Id.
348. Id.; see also Lexus Halftime Show: Michigan-NotreDame Game, supra note 224.
349. See supra Part lII.B.2.b.(l). Athletes are routinely admitted to Division I schools despite the
relative weakness of their academic records compared to those of the general student body.
350. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 299 (arguing that schools "exploit the athlete
by... providing.., him or her course work of minimum quality" to allow the athlete to meet
minimum eligibility standards).
351. "'The purpose isn't to educate and graduate,' says Drake Group associate director David
Ridpath. 'They're eligibility mills."' Hockensmith, supranote 138.
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athletic and, therefore, commercial success to their schools, not for real
learning.3 52 As one athlete reported, some of his classes were devoid of
academic rigor. The goal
is not to educate the athletes, he said, but to
353
ensure their eligibility.
(5)

Sub-StandardAcademic PerformanceAmong Some Athletes
Is FurtherEvidence that They Do Not Function Primarilyas
Students.

Athletes' performance in the classes in which they do enroll further
confirms they are in school to perform on the field, not in the classroom.
"Over 40% of black football and basketball players at major Division I
schools report having been on academic probation" during their college
careers.354 Temple University certified star football running back Paul
Palmer as academically eligible to play even though he "flunk[ed]
remedial reading four times, [and] complet[ed] no classes in his
major., 355 More recently, Miles Simon led the University of Arizona to
an NCAA national basketball championship in 1997, winning most
valuable player honors, despite having been on academic probation for
three years-almost his entire playing career.3 56 The toll of demanding
practice schedules, coupled with special admission for academically
unprepared athletes who would likely face difficulty handling academic
responsibilities under the best of circumstances, virtually guarantee that
many athletes will be markedly unsuccessful as students.
352. Arkansas basketball player Dwight Stewart noted in this regard: "They recruited me, you
know, to come play basketball. They didn't recruit me to go to school.... Our degree, that's a plus
for us." Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314. Darnell Robinson, also from Arkansas,
believed the same: "In the gym it was way more serious than it was off the court because that was
what I was here for, you know, and, for me to act like that otherwise, I would be missing my
mission." Id. Asked about low graduation rates, Coach Nolan Richardson defended his university's
zero percent graduation rate among African-American basketball players: "Now let's be straight up
and honest. Our livelihood depends on whether we win, and that's the bottom line." Id.; accord
SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 101 (quoting a college athlete who stated that "in college
the coaches be a lot more concerned on winning and the money comin' in. If they don't win, they
may get the boot, and so they pass that pressure onto us athletes."). To be sure, some highly talented
athletes do come to college seeking an education. While this is laudable, it is not the primary reason
universities admit them; universities enroll these athletes to field winning teams.
353. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003).
354. Goldman, supranote 37, at 206-07 n.10.
355. Id. at 207 n. 10 (citing Notebook, supra note 332, at 42).
356. See Arizona Denies Report Simon Got Special Favors, STUART NEWS (Fla.), Oct. 11,1997,
at B8; Mike McGraw, Bending the Rules to Win: MVP Made Grade Only on the Court, KAN. CITY
STAR, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al.
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(6) Athletes and Institutions Alike Engage in Academic Fraudto
Maintain Athletes' Eligibility to Compete
To perpetuate the myth that these athletes are primarily students,
many schools have essentially abandoned their own standards to make
an athlete's academic performance appear better than it actually is. As a
result, academic fraud has often taken place at NCAA member
schools. 357 Notably, administrators in athletic departments, not faculty
members, monitor compliance with NCAA academic regulations.358
Because of the financial incentive to win championships, many coaches
and administrators also have a strong incentive to falsify compliance
with academic requirements, thereby derogating the academic wellbeing of the athlete. 359 For example, from 1994 through 1999 at the
University of Minnesota, a university secretary and a tutor, with the
knowledge of the head men's basketball coach, completed four hundred
3 60
assignments and forty-eight papers for athletes on the basketball team.
Even college administrators refuse to enforce rules when doing so would
implicate athletes.36' It is not unusual for athletes to get credit for, and
good grades in, courses they neither attended nor for which they
studied.362
357. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 610 (describing the practice of universities "relax[ing]"
academic standards to ensure an athlete's academic eligibility). Former NCAA Executive Director
Byers notes that academic cheating has long been widespread. See BYERS, supranote 6, at 11, 178.
A common violation was students not showing up for class but still getting high "grades vital to
their [continued] eligibility." Id. at 178. "'[U]nearned [academic] credits, falsified transcripts and
unwarranted intrusion' of athletics interests into the 'academic processes' of... universities" have
also been typical. Id. at 179 (citing Media Release, Pac-10 Conference, Aug. I1, 1980). In a recent
case, Memphis-area high school football coach Lynn Lang arranged for a third party to take the
SAT for high-school All-American defensive lineman Albert Means. See Schlabach, supra note 21.
Means testified he was afraid he would not score well enough on the exam. Woody Baird, Ex-Prep
Coach Says Michigan State Offered Money for Player, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 26, 2005,
available at http://www.freep.com/news/latestnews/pm2502_20050126.htm.
358. See Robert Sullivan, A Study in Frustration,SPORTS ILLUS., June 19, 1989, at 94; see also
Chin, supra note 3, at 1231 n.150.
359. See Sullivan, supra note 358; Telander, supra note 39, at 101.
360. Infractions Case: University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 6, 2000,
Mark Clayton,
available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20001106/active/3723nl8.html;
Welcome to College, Mr. Jones!, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2001, at 11, available at
http://scmweb2.emcweb.com/durable/2001/02/06/p I Is1.htm.
361. See, e.g., Telander, supra note 39, at 101 (describing Florida State University President
Bernard Sliger as refusing to enforce class attendance rules against Deion Sanders); McGraw, supra
note 356 (suggesting that University of Arizona officials made exceptions to academic standards to
keep Miles Simon eligible to play basketball).
362. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 178-79, 200; Freeman, supra note 338 (noting the allegations of

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:71, 2006

Academic fraud becomes commonplace when powerful financial
incentives to win athletic contests exist. 63 Under these circumstances,
academic achievement becomes secondary to athletic success. Schools
"compete on the field with athletes who are sometimes not qualified to
keep up in the classroom," 364 and as a result, the pressure to breach
academic standards and to mask cheating is enormous both for the
athlete and the university.
(7)

NCAA ProgressRequirements Serve Members' Commercial
Interests but FrequentlyPermit Athletes to Fall Short of
Acquiring a Degree

The inordinate time required for athletes to practice means that even
academically qualified athletes find it difficult to meet course
requirements. 365 Not surprisingly, athletes who are not academically well
prepared do not keep up with their course work. This problem
undermines the identity of athletes as students and has forced the NCAA
to enact legislation tying progress towards a degree to continuing athletic
eligibility.36 6
An examination of NCAA rules on academic progress, however,
reveals little actual concern for athletes' academic achievement. In 1991,
the NCAA adopted legislation requiring athletes to make satisfactory
progress towards a degree to remain eligible to engage in intercollegiate
competition.36 7 Although the NCAA described these rules as being
motivated by a desire to improve graduation rates, 368 they have
contributed to a state of affairs in which athletes cannot graduate
both a teaching assistant and an associate professor that academic tutors sometimes did homework
for players); id. (noting a football player's allegation that Student Athlete Support counselors do
players' homework for them); id. (stating that a teaching assistant reported that football players
forged names of absent teammates on the class attendance roster); Staudt on Sports (WILX
television broadcast Dec. 8, 2002) (including statement of former college quarterback Bill Burke
that players who do well in classes during the semester need not take a final examination).
363. See supra Part ll1.B.2.a (describing the immense direct and indirect financial benefits for
universities of winning athletic contests); see also Frank, supra note 187, at 22-23 ("[T]hese
institutions are often forced by competition to operate close to the margins of allowable conduct.").
364. Freeman, supra note 338.
365. Telephone interview with Warren D. Gower (Sept. 2, 2003) (describing his son's experience
as a college baseball player at Kansas State University).
366. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, at 154, art. 14.4.3.2 (former eligibility requirements); id.
at 160, art. 14.4.3.2 (current eligibility requirements).
367. See id. at 152-58, art. 14.4.3; Chin, supra note 3, at 1240-41 n.228.
368. See Riggs, supra note 151, at 141.
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because their eligibility for financial aid often lapses long before they
complete their degree requirements. In that situation, many athletes
provide their services over a period of369four seasons, but never receive
the anticipated college degree in return.
NCAA progress requirements currently call for an athlete finishing
his fourth year of college to have completed at least eighty percent of the
courses required for his degree. 370 In the meantime, the athlete's
eligibility to compete may not exceed four seasons in a given sport,371
and the institution has no obligation to continue a scholarship beyond
that period.372 Thus, an athlete who begins competing in his first year of
college is viewed as having made satisfactory progress towards his
degree if he successfully completes only four-fifths of his required
courses by the end of his four seasons of competition. Having exhausted
his eligibility, his scholarship aid may end.373 Thus, although his
progress towards degree completion was deemed "satisfactory," and
although his scholarship was called a "full-ride," his school will not have
provided a completed college degree.3 74
369. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003) (describing having
experienced this outcome personally); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003)
(describing having witnessed this outcome for numerous athletes); see also infra Part III.B.2.b.(8)
(documenting low graduation rates among athletes in revenue-generating sports).
370. See Div. 1.MANUAL, supra note 3, at 160, art. 14.4.3.2 (current eligibility requirements).
371. See id. art. 14.2.
372. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 n.228.
373. Given the limitation by sport on the number of scholarships available, see Div. I MANUAL,
supra note 3, arts. 15.5.4.1, 15.5.5.1, an athlete who has exhausted his playing eligibility will likely
lose his scholarship. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with
anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003).
374. Of course the athlete may continue to take classes, meeting his degree requirements and
eventually graduating, if he can pay for college after his scholarship ends. Doing so is extremely
difficult for the many athletes who come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Interview
with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete
(Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). Instead, those players
usually leave school. See id.; Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003);
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003).
In its public relations campaigns, the NCAA constantly emphasizes the "student" in "studentathlete," but if its concern were truly academic, universities would agree to be required to continue
financial aid long enough to enable athletes to graduate. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1247. The
NCAA could achieve this outcome by mandating the continuation of aid for a reasonable period
beyond the period of eligibility in the sport. See id. Extending scholarships in this manner would
allow these often academically unprepared athletes not only to complete their degrees, but might
also permit them the additional time needed for those degrees to confer real value. Put differently,
the athletes might actually have the time needed to learn from their studies. The NCAA has never
seriously considered such a reform.
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One of the players we interviewed said basketball "gave [him] a
chance to go to college" and "there were some good times," but he was
unable to complete his degree requirements by the time his eligibility,
and therefore his scholarship, expired. He dropped out of school, got a
job, and returned several years later to complete his degree.37 5 Given
NCAA requirements on academic progress, it cannot be said that
athletes regularly receive a college degree in exchange for their athletic
services. 376 These low standards permit athletes with little academic
ability to remain eligible to play, thereby enhancing the economic value
of the college sports industry. Thus, the NCAA has structured its own
academic rules more to serve members' economic interests than to
safeguard the players' academic needs. Clearly, this choice reveals the
economic, not primarily academic, nature of the university-athlete
relationship.
(8) Low GraduationRates Show Athletes Are Not Primarily
Students
The NCAA's claim that scholarship athletes are predominantly
students and, therefore, not employees is further belied by appallingly
low graduation rates among athletes in revenue-generating sports. The
NCAA claims athletes are like regular students, pointing to graduation
rates among Division I scholarship athletes that exceed those of the
general student body. In this regard, it emphasizes statistics released in
2004 showing that the graduation rate for all scholarship athletes 377 was
sixty-two percent, while that for students generally was only sixty
percent.3 78
375. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003). In eventually returning to
school, this particular athlete is the exception rather than the rule. Most athletes who leave school
without graduating never return to complete their degree. Interview with anonymous employeeathlete (Sept. 7, 2003).
376. Not all athletes fail to complete their degree requirements, of course, but those who dothose who probably should not have been initially admitted for academic reasons-are being
exploited. They provide valuable services which generate great revenues for their universities, but
they get no degree in return. And if they are among the ninety-eight to ninety-nine percent of
college football and men's basketball players who do not later play professionally, see NCAA,
Estimated Probability, supra note 30, their prospects can be bleak.
377. Scholarship athletes are those "who received athletics aid from the college or university for
any period of time during their entering year." NCAA, Information About the Graduation-Rates
Report: Division I, http://www.ncaa.org/grad-rates/2004/dl/information.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2006) [hereinafter NCAA, Information About Report].
378. NCAA, 2004 NCAA Graduation Rates Report Data, Division I, http://www.ncaa.org/
gradrates/2004/dl/DI.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter NCAA, Graduation Rates
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Two defects, however, flaw this comparison. First, the comparison is
not between similarly situated groups. By definition, those in the
scholarship athlete group all have at least some degree of athletically
based financial assistance, with many receiving "full rides., 379 By
contrast, many fewer individuals in the overall student population
receive waivers for tuition, room, board, and books. Thus, many regular
students who leave school without graduating do so because of financial
challenges that make it difficult to pay for school. 380 Given this sizeable

built-in financial advantage for athletes, were all other factors equal,
athletes should graduate at much higher rates than the student body
overall. Yet they do not.
Second, the sixty-two percent graduation rate for scholarship athletes
is inflated because it includes individuals in non-revenue-generating
sports who are not the subject of our thesis and who typically graduate at
such high rates that they camouflage the much lower graduation rates
that persist for scholarship athletes in the revenue-generating sports.
These outliers include female scholarship athletes who graduate at the
stunningly high rate of seventy percent.38' When such groups are
excluded, leaving only scholarship athletes from the revenue-generating
sports, the athlete graduation rate for Division I universities plummets.
It is the Division I grant-in-aid athlete in revenue-generating sports,
however, who is an employee.382 Therefore, most germane to our inquiry
is a comparison of the graduation rates of football and men's basketball
players on the one hand, and all students on the other. The 2004 data

Report]. This inquiry examined students entering college in the fall of 1997. Students who were
freshmen in the fall of 1997 and the spring of 1998 are the most recent group for which the six-year
graduation rate data exist. NCAA, Information About Report, supra note 377.
379. See NCAA, Information About Report, supra note 377.
380. See, e.g., Stephen L. DesJardins ct al., Simulating the Longitudinal Effects of Changes in
FinancialAid on Student Departurefrom College, J. HUM. RESOURCES, Summer 2002, at 653, 65355, 669, 671-74 (demonstrating that the availability of scholarships for undergraduate students
reduces attrition rates compared to students receiving loans or those receiving no financial aid at
all); Stanley I. iwai & William D. Churchill, College Attrition and the FinancialSupport Systems of
Students, RES. IN HIGHER EDUC., 1982, at 105, 105-06 (stating that in sixteen of twenty-one
attrition studies, financial difficulty was among the top three most important factors); Lydia
Kalsner, Issues in College Student Retention, HIGHER EDUC. EXTENSION SERV. REv., Fall 1991, at
3, 3, 6 (noting that financial difficulties play a "central role" in student attrition and that the
availability of grants can significantly ameliorate the problem).
381. See NCAA, Graduation Rates Report, supra note 378.
382. It is the athlete in the revenue sports, not the others, who meets the Brown requirements of
not being primarily a student and of having primarily an economic, not educational, relationship
with his university. See supra Parts III.B. 1,1J.B.2.a-b.
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show football players at all Division I universities graduating at a rate of
fifty-five percent and men's basketball players at forty-four383percent, both
far below the sixty percent graduation rate for all students.
Graduation rates are particularly problematic for those athletic
programs with the most success on the field or court. In football, for
example, the graduation rates for the eight teams that played in the four
2004-05 BCS bowl games were significantly lower than the rates for the
overall student bodies at those schools.384 At the University of Texas, for
example, the graduation rate for football players was only thirty-four
percent while that of the overall student body was seventy percent; at the
University of Pittsburgh, the respective rates were thirty-one and sixtythree percent.385 At both universities, the graduation rate for football
players was less than half that for students overall.3 86
The same pattern occurred in men's basketball. Of the sixteen teams
advancing to the "Sweet Sixteen" in March 2004, team graduation rates
were available for only eleven. Of those eleven, every team but one had
a graduation rate significantly lower than that for the student population
overall at their universities.387 Indeed, consistent with the general
pattern, the greater the athletic success, the worse graduation rates tend
to be. Thus, the two teams with by far the lowest graduation rates were
the same two that advanced the furthest-to the coveted NCAA
championship game. They were the University of Connecticut and the
Georgia Institute of Technology, each with a mere twenty-seven percent
graduation rate for their men's basketball players. In each case, the
graduation rates for the student bodies as a whole at those universities,
sixty-nine and sixty-eight percent respectively, were more than two and
one-half times greater than those of the basketball teams.388 This large
disparity is consistent with the conclusion that these athletes are not
383. These football and basketball athletes also trailed the fifty-seven percent graduation rate for
all male students. See NCAA, Graduation Rates Report, supra note 378.
384. See INST. FOR DIVERSITY AND ETHICS IN SPORT, UNIV. OF CENT. FLA., KEEPING SCORE
WHEN IT COUNTS: ASSESSING THE 2004-05 BOWL-BOUND COLLEGE FOOTBALL TEAMSGRADUATION RATES, http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/downloads/media/ides/Table%20-%20
Graduation%20rates%202004-05%20bowl-bound%20teams.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
385. See id

386. See id.
387. See INST. FOR DIVERSITY AND ETHICS IN SPORT, UNIV. OF CENT. FLA., KEEPING SCORE
WHEN IT COUNTS: THE 2004 MEN'S SWEET 16 TEAMS-GRADUATION RATES, TRANSFERS AND
RACIAL BREAKDOWN OF ROSTER PLAYERS, http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/publie/downloads/media/

ides/table_04.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
388. See id.
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primarily students, a showing required under Brown to demonstrate their
employee status.
In 2002, ESPN released a report that scandalized the college
basketball world. It documented a zero percent graduation rate among
African-American basketball players at thirty-six different Division I
universities over the five-year period from 1990 through 1994.389 Out of
concern about the public relations problem created by its claim that
employee-athletes are primarily students when so many never graduate,
the NCAA has undertaken a campaign to improve those rates. 390 To
address the problem, the NCAA has recently passed legislation
rewarding programs that meet minimum scholastic requirements and
punishing those that do not.39 1
While this "Academic Performance Program" will undoubtedly
encourage some universities to improve athlete graduation rates, the
legislation itself is likely to have a smaller impact than recent media
reports would suggest. The major penalties, such as warnings, loss of
scholarships, ineligibility for post-season play, and reclassification to
restricted status, are imposed on a progressive basis,3 92 allowing most
universities to avoid sanctions for a number of years. With regard to
these major penalties, no punishment at all may be imposed on schools
389. See Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314; see also Study: Many Don't Make
Grade on Graduation:Blacks Lag Whites; Men Lag Women, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 16, 2005, at 4C
(describing the continuing graduation rate crisis among African-American men's basketball
players).
390. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 23.01.2 (noting the NCAA's commitment to improve
graduation rates). While NCAA efforts to improve graduation rates may be laudable, they bypass
the most direct means of increasing them-ending special admissions, ceasing the monopolization
of virtually all the athletes' time to allow for academic pursuits, and providing scholarship aid for a
sufficient period to permit graduation. If universities were to take these three actions with respect to
their revenue-generating sports, graduation rates among athletes could soar, and actual education
could take place. The relationship between athletes and their universities could become more
academic than economic. But universities have not taken these simple steps precisely because to do
so would harm their economic interests-their ability to dominate on the playing field, and thus to
generate tens of millions of dollars. See infra Part lI.B.2.a (describing how financially lucrative it
can be for universities to win in Division I athletics); see also Joe Drape, College Football at a
Crossroads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at Dl (quoting Scott S. Cowen, President of Tulane,
lamenting that the football and basketball programs with some of the worst graduation rates are
permitted to participate in profitable post-season play).
391. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.9, 23.01.2. Under the legislation, first effective
in the fall of 2004, teams with low graduation rates could lose scholarships and be excluded from
postseason play. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 23.2.1.2.2-.3. Teams with exemplary
academic performance, on the other hand, could earn additional revenue from the NCAA and gain
more scholarships. See Drape, supra note 390.
392. See Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 23.2.1.2.
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3 93
until data have been collected for three years.
Of greater concern than the delay in implementation of sanctions is
that the Academic Performance Program's academic requirements have
been set so low that most institutions will never be found to have

violated the rules.394 The NCAA Division I Board of Directors recently

set the minimum acceptable rate at a level that "isroughly equivalent to
an expected 50 percent graduation rate., 395 NCAA data show that under
this new program, only approximately 7.4% of teams in all Division I
sports would fall below this standard.3 96 Given this low standard, most
universities will be able to continue recruiting athletes with minimal
academic ability without experiencing any sanctions whatsoever. Only
those institutions with the most academically marginal athletes will run
the risk of violating these new rules and of incurring sanctions.3 97
How much, if at all, this reform will actually improve athletes'
graduation rates remains to be seen. And, of course, such reform
guarantees nothing regarding whether a graduate has actually learned
Whether reform packages such
anything from his college experience.
as the Academic Performance Program will actually improve athletes'
education, or whether they are only more window dressing, a mere fifty
percent graduation rate belies the assertion that these athletes are
genuine students, enrolled in the university for an education.
In the end, the fact that so many athletes fail to graduate undermines
the NCAA's assertion that those athletes are students and, therefore, not
employees of their universities. We have already described numerous
factors that contribute to this phenomenon: the admission of some
athletes who are not intellectually prepared to succeed in college; the
monopolization of their time; the bone-crushing and exhausting series of

393. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 3, at 38.
394. See NCAA, NCAA Division I Board of Directors Sets Cutlines for Academic Reform
Standards, January 10, 2005, http://www2.ncaa.org/media and_events/press-room/2005/january/
20050110 dilbod.html [hereinafter NCAA, Cutlines] (announcing the NCAA Board's
determination of minimum standards).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. NCAA estimates show that for 79.9% of Division I men's basketball teams and for 69.3% of
Division I football teams, not even one player will be below the standard. See id. (claiming that for
20.1% of men's basketball and 30.7% of football programs, at least one player would fail the
standard). This demonstrates that the new program should be a relatively easy standard for
universities to meet.
398. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 39, 46-48 (noting that graduation rates say nothing about
the quality of education); Lynch, supra note 24, at 602.
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practice and game schedules; prevailing attitudes about college athletics
being a prelude to a professional career rather than a way to attend
college; 399 and the fact that scholarships often end prior to completion of
degree requirements. Unacceptably low graduation rates demonstrate
that universities and the NCAA are being dishonest when they
characterize these particular individuals as full-fledged students.
Universities' commercial interests have prevailed over the academic
interests of their athletes, 40 0 rendering the university-athlete relationship
a commercial, not an academic, one. As a result, employee-athletes
rarely obtain a real education. As former Washington Redskin and
Northwestern University Athletic Director Mark Murphy has
commented: "Money has blurred the line, and makes some schools
ignore things when the revenues are going up.... Schools are not
insisting that their athletes get an education. 4 1
CONCLUSION
NCAA athletes in Division I revenue-generating sports are employees
under the NLRA. They meet both the common law and statutory
standards for that classification. They are common law employees
because they are compensated for their services with athletic
scholarships that are unquestionably a quid pro quo for athletic services
rendered, and they are subject to a pervasive level of control by their
employers on which they are also economically dependent. They are
also statutory employees under Brown because their relationships with
their universities are not primarily academic; they are overwhelmingly
commercial. In fact, intercollegiate athletics has become a dazzlingly
commercial activity. It is managed and generates revenue like a highly
399. See SPERBER, supra note 160, at 8; Lynch, supra note 24, at 609, 619. Many athletes
indicate they do not attend college for an education. When asked if he wanted to be in college,
Deion Sanders responded, "No ....But I have to be." Telander, supra note 39, at 96. Stephon
Marbury, a point guard from Georgia Tech, admitted college was "to position myself for the [NBA]
draft." ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 39. Andy Katzenmoyer said he attended Ohio State University
"to play football, not to attend class." Suggs, supra note 137. Coaches, too, believe many athletes
are in school for one reason only-to transition into the professional leagues. "'They come here not
actually wanting a degree.... The number one thing in their mind is, is the NBA."' Outside the
Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314 (quoting Nolan Richardson, former Arkansas basketball
coach); see also Peter Alfano, Basketball's 2 Stressful Worlds Offer Coaches a Tough Choice, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1989, at 8 (revealing Larry Brown's wish as a college coach for all his players to
feel they could play professionally).
400. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 162.
401. Drape, supranote 390 (quoting Mark Murphy).
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successful business and has become a professional enterprise,
abandoning amateurism in all respects save one: the treatment of its
players. Bobby Bowden, the most successful coach in the history of
college football, has candidly conceded: "The boys go out and4°earn
2
millions for their university. Everyone benefits except the players.
Although players devote extraordinary energy, time, and dedication to
their "jobs" as athletes, they have none of the protections of "employee"
status. They are not paid a negotiated wage for their services and are not
regarded as eligible for workers' compensation in the event of injury.
Their employers provide limited health or injury insurance, and, most
important to our thesis, they are not eligible to bargain collectively with
their employers.
The parties to this employment relationship hardly share equal
bargaining power.4 °3 And unfortunately for these athletes, their voices
are not nearly so powerful as those of the forces that oppose them.
Naturally, those with the greatest pecuniary stake in this question-the
universities, the NCAA that represents them, the corporations,40 4 and the
many other beneficiaries that profit from college sports 4 5-will likely
decry our thesis as blasphemy. Their opposition to this truth, however, is
simply a reflection of the profit that so richly rewards them.
To call NCAA Division I athletes in revenue-generating sports

402. Riggs, supra note 151, at 142 (citing Bob Oates, In the Never-Ending Scramble to Uphold
the So-Called Amateur Code by Catchingand PunishingGreat Universities, the Student-Athlete has
Become the Forgotten Man, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at C3); see Drape, supra note 127. "You see
all the money changing hands over what you do and then you go home and-and you struggle to
make ends meet." 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 14 (statement of former UCLA linebacker
Ramogi Huma).
403. See generally Daniel Nestel, Athletic Scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the
University and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST, L.J. 1401 (1992) (describing the athletes' lack of
bargaining power). Given the gross disparity in bargaining power, the substance of the contract
cannot be considered fair. "Freedom of contract begins where equality of bargaining power begins."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 229 (Pocket Books
1968). For many reasons, employee-athletes have no real power to exact an appropriate bargain for
their labors. They are young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three, not competent in
the arts of negotiation or deal making. Moreover, NCAA rules preclude any bargain exceeding the
cost of attending the university and, indeed, prohibit professional bargaining representation
altogether. Div. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.01.2 (prohibiting unauthorized aid); id. art. 12.3.1
(prohibiting the use of agents). "Against such an array of power stands the young athlete,
unorganized and a part of the system for only four to six years before he or she moves on to be
replaced by another 18- or 19-year-old." BYERS, supranote 6, at 371.
404. See supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text (discussing corporate sponsors' marketing
opportunities and earnings of broadcast networks).
405. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing exorbitant coaching salaries).
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amateurs is farcical. The NCAA's droning insistence on labeling them
"student-athletes" is done simply to shore up the fiction that they are
something other than employees. NCAA rules, promulgated by the
university-employers themselves, bar these athletes from earning
compensation representing their true worth. Unaware of their market
value, constrained by NCAA strictures, and raised in the myth of the
student-athlete, they enter into servitude by the thousands every year.
Thus, this fiction has worked to convince even the players themselves to
bask in the bright, but brief, glow of their status as campus heroes, and
has nurtured their unrealistic dreams of glory, obscuring the reality of
their exploitation.
The power of myth is undeniable. 40 6 It has served the economic
interests of the NCAA and many other participants in major college
sports richly. But the power of the law is also great, and a society that
respects the law looks through the myth and the propaganda to facts. The
rule of law eschews a "tyranny of labels ' 40 7 and seeks truth. And the
truth is that these athletes are employees under the law.

406. See generally JOSEPH CAMPBELL &

BILL MOYERS, THE POWER OF MYTH (Betty Sue

Flowers ed. 1988) (describing the power of myth throughout human history).
407. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
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